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Raymond A. Prier

ARCHAIC LOGIC

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ARCHAIC LOGIC:
SYMBOL AND STRUCTURE IN HERACLITUS,
PARMENIDES, AND EMPEDOCLES

by

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Von Humboldt Fellow — Hamburg

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Εἷς, δύο, τρεῖς · ὁ δὲ δὴ τέταρτος ἡμῶν

sono qui

To three close friends and scholars:

Robert Barnes

Jane Cody

Elaine Gazda

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The following study represents an attempt not only to explicate in some small way a mode of thought significantly different from much of our own, but also to suggest a new criterion of judgment for Classical Philology. These two purposes merge into one insofar as both come about from my own sharp disagreement with certain prevailing critical attitudes towards the so-called pre-Socratics. These essentially ungrounded attitudes are characterized, as I see them, by strong relativistic and materialistic premises which, although hidden for the most part, result in awkward misunderstandings of the pre-Platonic corpus in general and an uneven, if not castrating, criticism of specific authors in particular. These modern critical stances did not exist in the pre-Aristotelian Greek world in any predominant form, but Classical Philology in the later half of the twentieth century maintains otherwise and has, consequently, severely limited itself and very probably its future by adopting a narrow and unnecessarily rigid criterion of judgment that largely misrepresents the literary evidence at hand. Beyond the by no means unanimous acknowledgment that Aristotle revealed little of the real worth of the pre-Socratics, modern Classical Philology has not even suggested the need of a method – let alone the method itself – that might grasp the period between Homer and the Platonic revolution. I offer this study as an attempt to supply this critical tool.

The method I shall suggest is one stemming from my studies for over a decade of Archaic Greek literature and, therefore, represents the accomplishment of more than intermittent thought over several years. I could not, however, have completed my endeavor without the encouragement and help of several universities and individuals. I should like to thank Stanford, Yale, U.C.L.A., and U.S.C. for the use of their libraries and U.S.C. for supplying the funds to put in order the final manuscript. I am especially indebted to Robert Brumbaugh, Thomas Cole, Michael Gagarin, Eric Havelock, and Bruno Snell for encouragement and advice along the way. I also wish to acknowledge *Apeiron*, *Classical Philology*, and *Classical World* in whose pages a portion of the following text has appeared in the past.

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CONTENTS

Preface	VII
I The Archaic Configuration of Mind	1
II The Homeric Hymns and Hesiod	27
III Heraclitus	57
IV Parmenides	90
V Empedocles	120
VI Language, Time, and Form	149
Bibliography	154
Index of Ancient Passages	159

THE ARCHAIC CONFIGURATION OF MIND

The most ancient literatures of Greece have fascinated genius from Plato to the present. Yet, why this should be so has never been adequately explained. Nor has any critic ever established a criterion by which this period could be comprehended satisfactorily. Both conditions may, however, be explained by the same reason: behind a very large portion of the literature written before Plato lurks a way of thinking that post-Platonic intellection, because of its own peculiar logical sense, has found either of little use or downright inimical. The earlier, non-Aristotelian configuration of mind I shall designate as "archaic".

From the outset it is absolutely imperative to understand that the term "archaic" when applied to pre-Aristotelian thought does not in any way partake of the meaning "antiquated", "underdeveloped", or even "embryonic". Archaic thought is a self-contained and self-supporting point of view, possessed of its own structure and symbols and totally independent of the so-called rational patterns of Descartes or numerous logical patterns traceable from Aristotle to the present. It is comprehensive and all-inclusive in nature, based on one or more *a priori* structures, established not only as the base or "beginning" of thought but also as the ruling pattern of the thought itself.

The archaic configuration of mind moves within an established structure in a simple, almost graphic, manner. This "graphic" or "pictorial" nature is important, as we shall see, in relationship to the question of symbol. It is also the basic constituent of the thought's deceptive simplicity or seeming one-dimensional nature, for the oppositional and symbolic character is a given, a phenomenon that can generally be drawn or sketched; yet, beyond mere opposition there exists a third term that works between or behind given sets of oppositions. What this third element might be is one of the most central and most important considerations of this study.

It is not difficult to trace archaic thought patterns in the history of culture. What is unusual, however, is to find conscious statements indicating a knowledge of what these patterns are in themselves — statements which of necessity must describe these patterns in a configuration apart from a mode of thinking

best described as “objective” and “scientific”. We have at last reached this stage in the twentieth century. Three men, Carl Jung, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Ernst Cassirer have contributed greatly to the elucidation of the mode of thought whose influences we shall trace in the ensuing pages. Each, working from a different professional point of view and actually for very different purposes, has opened the serious investigation of the archaic configuration of mind.

Jung has revealed the powerful, symbolic character of archaic thought patterns by realizing that they are not antiquated phenomena but constituents of the psyche itself. His description of this symbolic phenomenon involves his famous hypothesis of the Collective Unconscious and its accompanying mandala patterns – the archetypes that belong to neither a spatial nor an empirical realm in an objective or scientific sense, but are highly subjective and artistic in their dimensions. He appreciates the strong subjective flavor in the myths of primitive man¹ and notes an unexpected dichotomy between reason and the eyes, for what the psyche sees forces archetypal symbols which in turn appear in art.² There is, then, a primary visual perception for Jung that is based not on naively objective sense perceptions but on an inner perception of symbols. These symbols are the mandalas Jung sees as psychological expressions of the totality of self.³ They assume generally the geometrical form of a circle that resolves strong oppositional conflicts within the psyche. Mandalas, then, are the symbol of a *complexio oppositorum*,⁴ and it is the oppositional character of the archaic configuration of mind that is, as we shall see, its most easily distinguishable trait. Jung traces this penchant for opposition further, however, than just a mere recognition of its existence, for he considers it also as a form of dualism, and it is he who remarks upon the symbolic importance of a dual descent, i.e., the product of divine and human parentage.⁵ I shall develop this genealogical opposition and symbolism in my subsequent examination of the Homeric Hymns and Hesiod.

Jung too has described a specific phenomenon in the archaic consciousness of time which he calls awareness of “synchronicity” – a phenomenon that for the primitive mind is a self-evident fact.⁶ Synchronicity is the influence, neither “natural” nor causal in the Aristotelian sense, that produces “meaningful coincidence in time”.⁷ In other words there is no linear, cause-effect concept of events but one in which a coincidence or simultaneity of a subjective character influences what events *mean*. What this condition in itself might indicate in terms of language and style I shall discuss in its proper place. At this point it is sufficient to note that Jung has made a powerful move to dislodge the cause and effect logic of modern science from its clear supremacy in thought and has gone far in the consideration of a temporal sense that seems to be specifically archaic. In general we shall not concern ourselves with the psychical ends towards which Jung applies his observations of symbolism and synchronicity. The primitive phenomenon of synchronicity

is merely another strong argument against a causal misrepresentation of the evidence; the mandala as the symbol of a *complexio oppositorum* is, once perceived, however, a primary critical tool for the interpretation of early Greek literature.

Lévi-Strauss discloses certain *a priori* archaic principles in his anthropological studies. Again we are not interested in the way he applies these principles to the sociological and anthropological questions he raises. What is pertinent to this study are the archaic structures he perceives. He attributes to archaic thought a well-articulated system and declares it independent of scientific thinking.⁸ He sees that "the thought we call primitive is founded on this demand for order".⁹ He allows a certain generalizing element in archaic thought, even though imagery is very powerful, and admits readily that *in our own terms* it works on a series of analogies and comparisons. The important fact is that there is a constantly new arrangement of elements, "the nature of which is unaffected by whether they figure in the instrumental [causal] set or in the final [effected] arrangement".¹⁰ In other words, as it was in the case of Jung, Lévi-Strauss points out clearly that ends and means are not specifically differentiated. Explanations, therefore, assume a totally different quality.

Lévi-Strauss also stresses the oppositional character of the phenomena he investigates. Kinship systems and myth partake in a dualistic operation and a system of polar oppositions.¹¹ Dualistic structures with a third element also find their way into his writings,¹² and again this is very important in our own study, for while we can little use the substance of Lévi-Strauss' research, still the *a priori* principle of polar opposition and a possible third term matches well with what we shall discover in early Greek literature. Lévi-Strauss has both used and made clear the logical structure of archaic thought. It is, of course, this logical structure that I shall endeavor to elucidate in the ensuing pages.

Lévi-Strauss is well aware of the strong subjective and symbolic flavor of archaic thinking,¹³ but it is Cassirer who grasps its importance and defines it more broadly and completely as a particular mode of thought. He calls this mode "mythical thought" and devotes the second volume of his *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* to the exposition of this phenomenon. To my knowledge there is no better preliminary examination and interpretation of the archaic mind than this one volume. It creates possibilities for the constructive interpretation of literatures in any period and examines many more sides of the archaic configuration of mind than I shall develop in this study.¹⁴ I wish, therefore, to mention only those points of interpretation that might elucidate my own.

Mythical thinking for Cassirer reveals a process of schematization that involves "an increasing endeavor to articulate all substance in a common spatial order and all happenings in a common order of time and destiny".¹⁵ The

mythical intuition of space lies in a middle position between the space of sense perception and the space of pure cognition.¹⁶ As Cassirer points out, mythical space is structural in contrast to modern space which is mathematically functional. There is no sense of a growing from given elements according to determinate rules. "We find rather a purely static relationship of inherence. Regardless of how far we divide, we find in each part the form, the structure, of the whole".¹⁷ The basic principle of primitive logic is this *pars pro toto*.¹⁸ This macro-microcosm concept is certainly not alien to Greek thinking. One has only to point to Plato's *Republic* and its description of city-states in terms of character traits as proof (*Rep.* 434e-435c). The holistic quality often observed in Platonic and pre-Platonic Greek thought, then, could easily be explained by reference to mythical or archaic models. We shall see this characteristic stated and taken for granted in the "philosophies" of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles.

There is one observation of Cassirer that has opened my own thinking greatly in terms of the archaic configuration of mind in early Greek literature: he observes that wherever mythical thought "posits a definite relation between two members it transforms this relation into an identity".¹⁹ This law holds true, as he shows in Greek and Egyptian religions where cults are "grounded in the identity assumed between god and man".²⁰ In the following chapter I shall endeavor to show how this mythical "identity" plays against an inbred linguistic opposition to prefigure the structural oppositions of Heraclitus. Cassirer also discusses another characteristic of archaic or mythical thinking that will become clear in my own exposition of this thought's structure and symbol in so far as I shall make use of lyric poetry to indicate a ground of oppositional thinking: the contrast of light and dark. "Every separation of the zones of space . . . is connected with this contrast".²¹ Jung, Lévi-Strauss, and Cassirer each in his own terms goes far in revealing the widespread oppositional structure of archaic thought.

Like Jung, Cassirer also notes a strong symbolic tendency in the archaic configuration of mind, and although his main goal in *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* is to expose this symbolic function in contemporary thought, his analysis of archaic thought in solely symbolic terms has value for us too. For him there is a certain dynamic within the realm of thought that is "both intensified and regulated by the sign" [symbol]. Cassirer notes that Leibniz explains this in his *characteristica generatis* to the effect that this thought serves not only to represent "but above all to *discover* certain logical relations". "It not only offers a symbolic abbreviation for what is already known but opens up new roads into the unknown".²² It is, of course, these "logical relations" I wish to expose in the ensuing pages by relating certain symbolic and structural characteristics of early Greek literature to a logical framework, for it is also my belief that "in the symbolic function of consciousness — as it operates in language, in art, in myth — certain unchanging

fundamental forms . . . disengage themselves from the stream of consciousness; the flux of contents is replaced by a self-contained and enduring unity of form".²³

How far are we now into the realm of modern phenomenology? To what extent does phenomenology form the requisite point of view in which the phenomena we shall examine make sense? I am not primarily interested in the modern investigations into this area — e.g., Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, or even Cassirer — although I suspect that the thrust of their arguments points towards a position similar to my own. As far as I am concerned and as far as this concept is used in this study, phenomenology is a study of events that occur in a "realm" somewhere between the material and objective world of science and the experienced and subjective world of man. This "realm" changes emphasis from one pole to the other, and no doubt there will be written someday the history of man's phenomenological world, but I am at this point only interested in the phenomenological realm of the archaic configuration of mind. In this particular phenomenology, events (phenomena) assume specific symbolic and structural characteristics through a particular type of perception, which I shall henceforth label "symbolic". These characteristics explain and clarify the fragments of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles.

Both symbol and structure are primarily logical phenomena as I shall use them. Logic is a cognitive method by which two or more phenomena are related. What properties this relationship assumes depends entirely on the type of logic under consideration. It should be clear by now that these properties I describe do not fit into modern logical frameworks. An archaic symbol in its logical sense is an uniquely used picture represented more and more consciously in terms of a noetic area of experience. This symbolic word forms an immediate representation of logical structure itself and/or is, in a less comprehensive sense, used within a structure as a logical term. As I said above, the symbol for a "third term" is one of the most important considerations of this work.

Examples of this type of symbol occur with some frequency in archaic Greek literature. In the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, Aphrodite herself symbolizes a "sweet" sexual nature that links men and gods — that is, a simple symbol for the relationship between opposites. Aeneas, as the genealogical intermediation between men and gods, is a similar symbol. We shall investigate subsequently the possibility of Eros in Hesiod's *Theogony* as both a symbol and a third term. Then I shall advance an argument for $\pi\upsilon\rho$ in Heraclitus as a symbol of his logic as a whole, just as is the *Logos*. Symbols relegated to subordinate positions in order to mark out the structure of the logic itself are also plentiful in Heraclitus. Take for instance the following aphorism: $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\sigma\omega$ $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\underline{\upsilon\delta\omega\rho}$ $\gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, $\underline{\upsilon\delta\alpha\tau\iota}$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\gamma\eta\nu$ $\gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, $\epsilon\kappa$ $\gamma\eta\varsigma$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\underline{\upsilon\delta\omega\rho}$ $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$, $\epsilon\kappa$ $\underline{\upsilon\delta\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma}$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\underline{\psi\upsilon\chi\eta}$ (36)²⁴ ("For *life-forces* it is death to become

water, for *water* it is death to become *land*. *Water* comes out of *land* and *life-force* from *water*). It is clear, I think, that “water” and “land” are not used in a physical sense because of the term *θάνατος* used in reference to their transformation. All three words, *ψυχή*, *ὕδωρ*, and *γῆ* are symbols as I have defined the word. I shall discuss subsequently how they fit into a logical structure. In Parmenides it is the goddess *Δίκη* who stands as the underlying symbol of a dualistic logical pattern, possessing her interchangeable keys (*κληίδας ἀμειβοῦς*). Then too the use of *ὁδός* in the proem designates, as I see it, a symbolic third term that unites the ways of Being and Not-Being. At last in Empedocles the third term *clearly and consciously* assumes its position as *τὸ πᾶν*, the phenomenon that is “underneath” (*ὑπένερθε* – 26.7). It also takes not only the symbolic representation of the *Σφαῖρος*, which in itself suggests an obvious relationship to Parmenides’ description of Being (8.43), but also the more logical form of the *logos* (17.26), which might be merely the “argument” but interestingly enough is an “argument” structured on a peculiarly triadic, archaic base – one that could easily be related to the *Logos* of Heraclitus. Then, of course, one must not forget that the famous *Φιλότης* is a direct influence in the construction of the “one cosmos” (*εἰς ἓνα κόσμον* – 26.5) and as such must be considered, I shall argue, as another possibility for the symbolic representation of the third term.

Structure is a formal characteristic that gives the archaic configuration of mind its logical unity. In the archaic phenomenological realm structure assumes a pattern that tends to posit identical oppositions. My discussion of the relationship between *ἀθάνατος* and *θνητός* in the following chapter will clarify this peculiar phenomenon. This structure is, however, not as simple as mere opposition, for the one unmistakable quality of early Greek oppositional thinking is a constant activity or movement between sets of opposites that partakes, at least ostensibly, of a certain hierarchical character. Take for instance the god-man-child proportion in Heraclitus 79 (*ἄνθρωπος νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός*). The oppositional, yet hierarchical relationship between God and child is intermediated by a third term (*ἄνθρωπος*). I shall argue subsequently, with Hermann Fränkel, that this proportion can be interpreted as one that uses oppositional structuring to move towards a highest term – in this case *δαίμων*.

There is, in other words, a possible dialectical quality in the structure. This quality is especially clear in Heraclitus. I shall even argue the possibility of its presence in Parmenides in so far as I see an underlying third term between Being and Not-Being. As for Empedocles, there is no great difficulty in showing that the dyadic tension between *Νεῖκος* and *Φιλότης*, this dyadic or diploid argument Empedocles gives us (17.16), is in fact a dialectic pointed towards an underlying One. I wish to make it clear, however, that when I refer to “hierarchical” characteristics of archaic structure, I do not speak of

the simple post-Platonic arrangements of someone like Dionysius the Areopagite, for in the archaic configuration of mind the opposing members do not hold such a clear qualitative ranking. There is not a clear subordinate relationship that would set one opposite in a totally commanding position over the other. There is instead a non-causal polarization with the connecting and underlying presence of a third term. For this reason and for the reason that action or movement is particularly characteristic of the thought, there seems to be a high degree of identity in opposition – a radically non-Aristotelian phenomenon. In my subsequent examination of oppositions in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, the identity of opposition achieved by an active participation of one opposite in the realm of the other should go far in revealing this basic logical phenomenon in the literature of early Greece.

The role of symbol in the archaic configuration of mind is much more varied – mainly because, as I have indicated above in my mention of Heraclitus' fragment 36, many phenomena may be construed as symbols and often it is not the name of a particular symbol that is as important as its place in the general structure of the logic. The confusing and often misleading characteristic of symbols is that they exist not only in a phenomenological world but possibly also in a purely physical one in a diagrammatic sense – that is, they are truly *imagines mundi*. As Lévi-Strauss has observed, the savage mind "builds mental structures which facilitate an understanding of the world in as much as they resemble it". Only to this extent may savage thought be considered "analogical".²⁵ These "structures" often take on geometrical forms. In fact, "the Greeks had a predilection for explaining qualities in terms of spatial shapes because the latter seemed to them especially suited to represent objective reality".²⁶ This structurally geometrical use of space (cf. *Rep.* 616c ff. where Plato describes the universe in terms of the geometrical Spindle of Necessity) is certainly what Jung has in mind with his circular and rectangular mandala patterns and Cassirer indicates when he characterizes the mythical intuition of space as occupying "a kind of middle position between the space of sense perception and the space of pure cognition, that is, geometry".²⁷ Cassirer in this instance is speaking of geometry in a Euclidian sense. The geometrical forms with which I shall deal in the following pages are circles and dyadic or triadic structures that can be drawn. Parmenides 12 is an excellent example of opposition within a circle. Rings of fire ($\pi\upsilon\rho$) alternate with rings of night ($\nu\acute{\upsilon}\xi$). A portion of flame ($\varphi\lambda\acute{o}\xi$) dashes between the two, and in the center is ensconced the great Parmenidian symbol of $\Delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\eta$. The circle is a convenient and ready symbol. In archaic literature good examples are the shields of the warriors in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*. For instance light and dark imagery divides Tydeus' shield on which is inscribed the circular symbol of the full moon. This $\sigma\eta\mu\alpha$ or symbol is of such centrality ($\epsilon\nu\ \mu\epsilon\sigma\omega\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}\kappa\epsilon\iota$) and power that it becomes identical to the shield itself:

And he possesses on the shield this arrogant σῆμα,
 A fashioned heaven, blazing under stars;
 In middle shield, the whole moon, radiant, shows forth —
 Eldest of the stars, the eye of night

(*Septem* 387-390)

Natural phenomena are a medium through which the archaic configuration of mind tries “to explain facts which are themselves not of a material but a logical order”.²⁸ Lévi-Strauss himself realizes that in archaic thought we are not dealing with any scientific perception as we know it today but with a realm I have myself defined above as phenomenological and he describes as a region constituted of elements lying “half-way between percepts and concepts”.²⁹ By forming these symbols within the phenomenological realm and not solely in terms of the transient world of objective sense perception, the archaic configuration of mind assumes its characteristic feature of timelessness. It achieves its object of grasping “the world as both a synchronic [a paratactic occurrence of events] and a diachronic [the hypotactic occurrence of events] totality and the knowledge which it draws therefrom is like that afforded of a room by mirrors fixed on opposite walls which reflect each other”³⁰ Symbols, then, arranged in or for sets of oppositions represent a whole world. These sets guarantee the holistic nature of archaic Greek thought.

In any system it is of course impossible to define a symbol completely, since definition is in the end an analytical tool and a symbol, because of its holistic nature, must be a synthetic phenomenon. Yet one can say that a symbol is both transcendental and present. In the archaic configuration of consciousness this indicates that in meaning there is no important difference between a symbol in general or specific terms. Such a use of a symbol also is another indication that the archaic configuration is quite different from the scientific configuration present today — a configuration that draws sharp lines between the specific and the general, the concrete and the abstract, and even the objective and subjective.

Archaic symbols also possess certain peculiar effects which I shall examine closely, because they are obviously tied in in some way with the general movement and action within the logic itself. Archaic symbolism is *affective*. This characteristic may easily be seen in Greek lyric poetry. Snell in his *Discovery of the Mind* points out some of the examples. He notes that when lyrists speak of a good it is “an object of glittering beauty”.³¹ In fragment 65a (Diehl) Sappho speaks of her great love for the sun. Snell comments that, as it is in the case of Pindar, here Sappho is revealing “the willingness to identify the divine with brightness and light”.³² In fact Snell argues with conviction that in the early Greeks’ “meditation” (perhaps “preoccupation” would be a better choice of words) on the various manifestations of the divine, we find the first sketch of a logical system.³³ It is difficult, to be sure,

to understand exactly what kind of “system” Snell has in mind here, for he does not fully explain his idea. Yet, it is easy enough to surmise that the deities of this “logical system” based on “various manifestations of the divine” could represent some kind of logical symbols, and in so far as these symbols may be drawn structurally or graphically into a logic, there is a strong similarity between what Snell intimates and what I wish to discuss in the ensuing pages.

The “affective” nature of the symbol is rooted in the Greek language itself. Cassirer comments that there is preserved in language a connection between speaking and saying and showing and indicating. He sees, for instance, a relationship between *dicere* and *δείκνυμι*. He argues that *φημί* is derived from the root *φα* (Sanskrit *bhā*) that means “to glitter”, “appear”, “make to appear” (cf. *φαέθω*, *φῶς*, *φαίνω*, Lat. *fari*, *fateri*, etc.).³⁴ If true, this is an interesting etymological point and one that could easily apply not only to symbols of a structural or graphic nature but also to language – a phenomenon Cassirer considers primarily symbolic in itself. Both linguistic and stylistic peculiarities contribute greatly to the understanding of archaic logic. The language itself, once considered, possesses within itself the strong possibility of the archaic configuration of mind.

There lies, for instance, both at the roots of the Greek language and also in its Indo-European background a particular dualistic or dyadic nature that bears strongly upon the structure of Greek thought. Pairs or twos in correlation come to express a particular meaning that ones or groups of larger numbers do not possess. Take, as an example, the existence of the Dual case. The most important characteristic of the Dual is its designation of pairs.³⁵ The members of a pair are more closely related to one another than are just the separate phenomena. The relationship between the members of a pair is also peculiarly unspecified, making it quite impossible to set up any rigid categories that might determine exactly wherein the two designated phenomena are dissimilar or identical. At a very early step in the history of language the Dual could even stand for a dissimilar pair (a and b) as well as for a like one (a and a). In both cases the pair stands for the “whole”. Their existence in the language at one time can be inferred from Sanskrit examples such as *pitārau* or *mātārāu*, “Father and Mother”, *dhani* n.: “Day and Night”.³⁶ The Dual case is one way in which Greek – and to an even greater degree, perhaps, proto-Greek – could express a correlation between opposites that involves large areas of identities. As Cassirer points out, the Dual represents a very special type of generic grouping.³⁷

The “dual quality” of the Greek language – that is, an especial importance given to the phenomenon of two – may also be seen in forms like *ἕτερος* and in the use of *ἄλλος* and *ἄλλοι* in the oblique cases. The suffix **-tero-* serves as an expression of opposition between two things.³⁸ This opposition, however, must not be regarded solely in terms of mere disjunction. The **-tero-* suffix

exists only upon an underlying binary or dyadic structural identity of terms which represents the same "condition of language" as does the Dual case. Schwyzer states in his article on *δεύτερος* that the *-τερος* suffix ties together *δεύτερος* in meaning with *ἕτερος*, *ἐκάτερος*, *ἀμφοτέρως*, *πότερος*, *πρότερος*, *ὑστερος* and that *δεύτερος* has also a semantic connection with *ἄλλος*.³⁹ In his article on *ἄλλος* and *ἕτερος* he specifically indicates the meaning of "the other" for the former and "the one of two" for the latter.⁴⁰ Oppositions within twos seem to be inbred in the language itself. These "pronouns denoting a reciprocal relationship between two phenomena are extremely old and may be traced far back into language".⁴¹

Finally the correlative conjunctions *τε . . . τε* (Lat. *que . . . que*) and all of their compounds also reflect the dualistic or dyadic tendency. "Te" itself may be traced back to a proto-Indo-European element⁴² and in the oldest Indic poetry and prose the element is correlated with itself (ai. *ca . . . ca*, Gr. *τε . . . τε*).⁴³ In early Greek it is found in several instances binding opposites — e.g. *πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε* (Il. 1.544) and *ἄφατοι τε φατοί τε* (Hes. E.3). The language then, at a very early stage possessed a dyadic connecting principle that moved towards an equalization and unification of possible oppositions. A similar argument should be made for the use of the alpha privative⁴⁴ found in the above Hesiodic phrase and in many other instances within the corpus of early Greek literature. This phenomenon⁴⁵ in Indo-European and Greek could also be regarded as related to dualistic expression in the language *insofar as a word formed with the privative is used with its unprefix positive*, thereby forming a natural pair or unity. I shall argue in the ensuing chapter that the privative-positive relationship between ideas of mortality and ideas of immortality (that is, primarily between *θνητός* and *ἀθάνατος*) is not merely separative but in several senses implies, in a peculiar way, identity — that is, by a factor of interaction and generation, these opposites imply one another and are considered somehow one. Here will be a prime example of *paired opposites*, a particular dualistic notion carried into the story line and the syntax of literature itself.

Stylistically also the Greek language possesses some peculiar traits that indicate a way of thought we shall discover in Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles. Take for instance the stylistic phenomenon of apposition and its relationship to the early Greek's sense of time.

Verb forms do not make Greek difficult for us but the way in which the thought or sentence is structured. For the modern reader, the unity of thought is very weak; it is somehow not organic. It looks as if an author has composed his work or a man his thought from autonomous pieces that one may change about as one wishes.⁴⁶ The whole system we know as cause and effect no longer holds its validity. Aetiological explanations in Greek literature reverse what we should consider the "normal" process.⁴⁷ Ideas and juxtapositions of words are not subordinated in a manner familiar to us.⁴⁸

Van Groningen in *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque* has made clear the modern man's quandary, but his categories for analysis (la juxtaposition, le raccord, l'intercalation, la transposition, l'exorde, l'épilogue, l'encadrement par l'exorde et l'épilogue, les répétitions, le réseau entrelacé) are not satisfactory, for they beg the real cause of an archaic peculiarity of style by listing a series of compositional techniques, and although van Groningen states that the pre-classical mentality obeys its own proper laws and should be seen as an autonomous phenomenon,⁴⁹ he does not discuss these underlying laws as true unifying terms. In fact he denies any real underlying unity to archaic thought at all. Archaic composition is, for him, an effort towards coherence, and it is his task to show how simple juxtaposition transforms itself "more or less into unity".⁵⁰ Consequently we are given a series of defined techniques but hardly any substantive understanding of the thought itself.

Van Groningen's major mistake, however, is not in failing to see a structural unity in archaic thought, for he does create unifying structures of sorts by his literary categories, but in failing to turn first and foremost to the appositional nature of the language. He should have asked how archaic thought might be peculiar and consistent before labeling underlying structures. The unity of the archaic configuration of mind lies in an appositional style that ultimately reflects, I think, a particular and unifying sense of time.

To put the matter in its simplest and most basic form: *the archaic configuration of mind is characterized by a parataxis (juxtaposition) of thought that lies outside of any cause and effect structure we might know because of our own natural, but not necessary, inclination towards hypotaxis (subordination)*. From appositional juxtapositions of the language arise the logical phenomena we shall discuss in the ensuing pages.

Meillet and Vendryes in their *Traité de grammaire comparée des langues classiques* have indicated that the appositional mode was a phenomenon of the Indo-European sentence.⁵¹ It is expected that, as an archaic expression of meaning, then, one should find it in the literatures of Greece. The work of Harry and Agathe Thornton (*Time and Style: a Psycho-Linguistic Essay in Classical Literature*) reveals clearly what the appositional mode of thought means in terms of the archaic configuration of mind, and where they do not explain all of the complicated literary structures van Groningen addresses, they do outline a method that seems to me likely to prove a necessary base to van Groningen's taxonomic approach.

What is this "appositional mode of thought"? As Thornton and Thornton describe it, it is one of two categories under the more general phenomenon of parataxis — i.e., a presentation that "proceeds by way of succession rather than subordination".⁵² The first category is linear — i.e., "a form of expression, proceeding step by step in an unswerving swift and pauseless movement, using the simplest only of connecting words . . .".⁵³ The second category is appositional — i.e., a form of expression that states a particular idea

and continually elaborates this with details or repetitions of the idea itself.⁵⁴ There arises, then, the phenomenon of “appositional clusters” that are not used to describe a linear progression of thought in a historical context (that is a progression from the past to the present to the future as is common in our own style of language) but to describe in either an ornamental or emotive sense one particular idea. This mode of expression is therefore vertical; it produces meaning by piling up appositions *or identities* between ideas. *A historical context does not apply.* “It is plain that time in our modern sense, with its homogeneous flow from past through present to future, is not the ordering principle of this sort of narrative. The actual sequence of events is of no account”.⁵⁵

This vertical expression of thought is directly linked with the logical patterns we shall discover in Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles insofar as there is an inherent identity between opposites in the archaic logic I am endeavoring to describe. The appositional mode of thought requires that in an expression of thought one particular phenomenon be reaffirmed, that, as Cassirer says, any relation between two members is transformed into an identity.⁵⁶ It may be said that within the archaic configuration of mind oppositional thinking is a subcategory of the appositional mode of thought, one which carries to an extreme the habit of juxtaposition without explanatory connections. Both category and subcategory appear in the Heraclitian phrase: [ἀθάνατοι/θνητοί,] [θνητοί/ἀθάνατοι], [ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον,] [τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεώτες] (62) (Immortals [are] mortals, mortals [are] immortals, the living the death of one, the dying the life of the other). There is not a paradox of separated and disjunct oppositions but an affirmation of the inherent unity or identity behind or within a positive and its privative. They are the same and not the same.

One result of the appositional mode’s manner of “starting with the issue and dwelling on it through all the stages of its realisation” is a condition quite unlike the “modern tension of waiting and its resolution”.⁵⁷ Emotional intensity is not foreign to the archaic worldview. Martin Nilsson in his “Götter und Psychologie bei Homer” indicates that the Homeric hero is in a very unstable state.⁵⁸ One may cite for instance Achilles’ great rage or Patroclus who in anger during dice kills a playmate (*Il.* 23.85ff.). Homeric heroes are not known to restrain tears. Odysseus weeps when Circe tells him he must visit the underworld (*Od.* 10.496ff.). “Such a description must be taken literally, if we are to realise the affective intensity of ancient man. It is on the basis of this emotional instability that Nilsson (p. 375) explains the way in which the Homeric hero feels beset by infatuation (*atē*) or by a divine power (*daimōn*). ‘He is subjected to the affect of the moment; when the intoxication is past, when the fateful consequences are at hand, he says: I do not wish this, and then: I did not do this. His own behaviour has become strange to him’”.⁵⁹ This powerful emotive aspect in the archaic configuration of mind is reflected

in the appositional style, for the disjointedness of time under strong emotional stress is reflected best by this mode.

Time and space, therefore, in the archaic configuration of mind become highly qualitative, rather than quantitative, in nature. Thornton and Thornton, making use of the underworld passage from Hesiod's *Theogony* I myself shall examine subsequently, note these temporal and spatial peculiarities:

Let us sum up the structure of this passage. When in the course of his narrative Hesiod comes to the defeat and imprisonment in Tartaros of the Titans at the hand of Kottos and his companions, he dwells on Tartaros, its distance, wall and position in relation to the roots of the earth and sea. Then he returns to the Titans as living in Tartaros and to their victors, Kottos and his companions. Again, he dwells on the 'springs and ends of earth, sea' etc., one which he elaborates, ever adding detail both factual and emotional and ever and again expanding on something mentioned before in a balder fashion, until at last he finally returns to the dwelling-place of the Titans and their victors. Although this is a description of dwellings etc. in the underworld, its structure is not determined by spatial relationships. There is no conception of the space of the underworld as a whole in which one might move about in consistent and orderly fashion from place to place. There are many indications of locality, but all of them devoid of clear reference. It is impossible to imagine concretely a voyage in these regions. Space here is not Euclidean space. It is not quantitative so that one could measure distances or work out relationships in the three dimensions. It is qualitative. Each place in this 'space' has its own quality or character which the poet and his audience experience, enjoy or suffer, as the gloom of the house of Night, the grim inevitability of the house of Hades, the splendid awesomeness of the abode of Styx. It is from the intensely felt experience of the quality of things that the appositional mode of expression arises here. The coherence of such a passage has to be understood in emotive and qualitative terms.⁶⁰

Early Greek literature abounds in examples of non-quantitative uses of space. In Bacchylides 17.81ff. (Snell), Theseus springs overboard and is whisked away by dolphins to the halls of Poseidon. His adversary, Minos, amazed (*τάφεν δὲ Διὸς υἱὸς ἔνδοθεν/ κέαρ* – 17.86-87), gives the order to keep the ship moving. "The northwind blew from astern and the ship leapt forward on her course" (17.90-91). "Meanwhile" Theseus enters a fairyland region just as indescribable in physical terms as is Hesiod's Tartarus. He sees the daughters of Nereus emitting light and dressed in gold (*Νηρηῶς δλ-/ βίου κόρας · ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀγλα-/ ὦν λάμπε γυίων σέλας/ ὥτε πυρός, ἀμφὶ χαίταις/ δὲ χρυσέπλοκοι/ δῖνηντο ταινίαι* – 17.102-107). In the a-spatial and a-temporal region of Poseidon's palace the affective light imagery of symbols assumes a considerable power – a power linked with the symbol's emotive quality or more precisely the emotional reaction on the part of the viewer. From Amphitrite he receives a wreath and suddenly springs up beside the stern of the ship, dry, a wonder to all (*θαῦμα πάντεσσι*). He bewilders Minos (17.119-123), as well he might, since Minos had given orders that the ship sail on once Theseus had jumped overboard. Space and time in a linear sense have been confused and reduced to nothing. We are instead faced with a qualitative sense of time based largely on the emotive force of events. In the following

pages I shall introduce other examples that fall outside of time and space as we usually conceive of them: Parmenides' proem to his work, his mandala fragment 12, and of course his appositional logic itself. In Heraclitus the concepts of *Logos*, *ὁδός*, *ἁρμονία*, *πῦρ*, and *μέτρον* fall easily into this category as does the oppositional nature of his logic. Time for Empedocles is governed by the eternal presence of the dyadic elements, *Νεῖκος* and *Φιλότης* (16). For him time is essentially teleutic or completing (30). It is an eternal interchange (21.9), a sacred circle that remains unmoved (47 and 17.13). Then in Hesiod, both Tartarus and, as I shall later argue, Ocean show a similar a-temporal and a-spatial character. In the Homeric Hymns the affective light imagery surrounding the gods and their a-spatial and a-temporal ability to change shapes and sizes harks back to a particularly emotive sense of time and space.

Thornton and Thornton deal specifically with the subject of "Temporal Experience and Appositional Expression" (pp. 75-88), and since the idea is novel, one should, I think, expose what they say about this phenomenon in some detail. They first state that "all acts of speech consist of successive items experienced in time".⁶¹ Yet, the idea that "speech is a temporal process" is not as simple as it might seem. A person speaking cannot express what he has to say all at once but is forced to make use of time by his sequence of words. In a like manner, the person listening apprehends the utterance in a piece by piece way; "This means that an act of speech is a temporal experience. So also is its counterpart — an act of understanding. It is this 'temporality' with its different modes which we propose to analyze psychologically".⁶² A person's mental activity is one of "attending selectivity". "The subject attends to what is presented to him, but not to all of it equally, only to whatever his interest leads him to attend to".⁶³ Now it is quite possible to organize one's attention so that a strict adherence to the motion of time from past to present to future is followed and the whole sense of the sentence involved is not completed until its end. Thornton and Thornton give the modern English example of "These cakes are all sold" and the Greek example, *ἀλλὰ πάντας ἡμᾶς περὶ ἐλάττονος ποιεῖ χρημάτων* (Lysias 32.17) as possibilities of such expression.⁶⁴ On the other hand, when Homer tells of Calypso handing Odysseus an axe (*δῶκέν οἱ πέλεκυν μέγαν, ἄρμενον ἐν παλάμῃσι, / χάλκεον, ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀκαχμένον* — *Od.* 5.234-5), it is easy enough to see that an initial statement or idea is elaborated and given detail. "The burden of all the appositional expansion, whether adjectives, participles or a sentence elaborating on 'axe', is praise of the excellence of the axe that Calypso gave to Odysseus. The intensity to which this praise is built up expresses Calypso's love for Odysseus and the care with which she plans his voyage. In this Homeric sentence, as contrasted with the above sentence of Lysias, the sense to be conveyed is given to the listener as early as possible. All the factual and emotional detail is then added to it".⁶⁵

Thornton and Thornton then ask what this continual "addition" or "pick-

ing up" might mean in terms of its effects. Its major effect is to "make vivid again or 'revive' memory images" of what has just been said.⁶⁶ Even on a larger scale, this is the case. Whole episodes, e.g., the Prometheus story in Hesiod and Homer's telling of the bow of Odysseus (both examples are analyzed by Thornton and Thornton), are told in this vivid manner that puts everything into a time that is equally present to the listener and narrator. "There could not then be any chronology, and in fact . . . there is not".⁶⁷ Thornton and Thornton admit that "all utterance involves an experience of time in speaker and listener". The distinguishing characteristic of an appositional utterance is that insofar as it deals with the future it is "a minimum of a future that is certainly to be expected and in part predetermined. As for the past, it is not strictly separated from the present as a past that has been and is no more, but is always close behind the present intensifying and illuminating it".⁶⁸ Time, therefore, in appositional utterance is "not yet clearly and necessarily differentiated into past, present and future".⁶⁹ "The temporal succession characteristic of the appositional style is determined by affect, by the positive feelings of delight and intense interest in speaker and listener".⁷⁰ Such is this notion of time.

This qualitative sense of time comes out clearly in certain Greek verb forms — especially in the aorist and perfect tenses. The aorist was differentiated from the imperfect, a tense with distinctly "past meanings", very early in the development of ancient language and is a basic tense in Greek.⁷¹ In the aorist there is an idea of something given but not lasting or habitual.⁷² In the case of the gnomic aorist, it is evident that the tense represents something happening in the past that may or must be repeated in the present or future as well.⁷³ There is, therefore, little of the clear differentiation in tenses that separates past, present, and future in modern languages. Wackernagel gives the argument that from the beginning the aorist was used in a timeless sense.⁷⁴ The perfect tense also shows a similar disregard for modern linear sequences of time. Its oldest meaning was a kind of present. It then moved into a resultative meaning — that is of an action completed in the past with direct influence on the present. Its last meaning, far advanced in the history of the tense, was a historical one, which tended to isolate the time of action in the past, thereby creating a tense along the lines of the perfect of today.⁷⁵ It is clear, therefore, that time was not arranged for the archaic Greek on a linear plane moving from past, present, to future but on startling emotive points that either contracted and collapsed or destroyed any possible linear concept.

It must be noted that this qualitative sense of time is radically opposed to any Aristotelian concept of the phenomenon. Aristotle's discussion of time is primarily in his *Physics*. He is interested in the principles or causes of Nature. Nature is concerned with motion, as is time. Time for him is involved with motion; it is a kind of "*κίνησις*" and "changing" (218b9-10). The passage of

time is everywhere alike and is in relationship to everything (ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσι — 218b13-14). He explicitly denies that time has anything to do with different states of consciousness themselves and argues that only if we are in the state that perceives and distinguishes changes do we say time has elapsed. It is clear that time must be connected with κίνησις and μεταβολή (218b29-219a1). Time must, therefore, involve a perceived motion or continuum of movement (219a12-13; 219b9-10). It takes its definition by the now's relationship to something prior and something posterior. In fact this "calculable measure of motion" (ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως) in respect to that before and after stands as Aristotle's definition of time (219b1-2). Aristotle has, therefore, established time as a linear continuum moving from the past through the present to the future on which points of time are differentiated by the present or now. As John Callahan has stated in his very helpful book, *Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy*, "Thus the continuity of time and the succession of prior and posterior in it are founded on motion and ultimately on spatial magnitude".⁷⁶ Such a notion of time is totally at odds with the qualitative and appositional mode of the archaics, for there any real sense of continuum or movement is broken by the vividness of the present. The "nows" do not relate to the past and future as they do in Aristotle's view of time but are of such powerful consequence that past and future collapse into a series of ornamental or descriptive appositions. The archaic configuration of mind is one, as we shall see, dependent upon an immediate and timeless structure and symbol. In fact given the appositional nature of the archaic mind with its decided lack of discursive cause-and-effect thought patterns to give it form, there is no other way a unity could be achieved except through a series of structures and symbols that by their very presence give thought both unity and meaning. The most important consideration is, of course, that *insofar as these structures and symbols relate parts of a given unity, they are logical.*

★

Peculiarities of language and style mark off an area of thought, then, to which I shall henceforth refer as "archaic". Tendencies towards dualism, opposition, and apposition with its accompanying vividness and particular time sense produce the structural and symbolic phenomena I am about to examine — phenomena based on a language and style radically non-Aristotelian in nature. Initially the archaic mind appears to us in Greek culture in what we today should call poetry. This poetry retains this character in the late sixth and early fifth centuries in the lyric poets, the elegiac poets, and Aeschylus; yet, the most elegant and clear examples are the so-called philosophic fragments of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles.

I wish to draw no dichotomies between the "poets" and the "philosophers" and hence in any way support the historical trap of Aristotle in his *Metaphysics A*. Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles do *not* somehow pre-

figure Aristotelian concepts. The “pre-Socratics” represent a culmination and reflection of language that must be traced back into the roots of Greek and not ahead into the narrowly linear and causal modes of Aristotle. In terms of linguistic development, I only wish to state that the clarity of the structural and symbolic usage of language is most obvious in the works ranging from Hesiod through Empedocles, and while I shall show that the structural and symbolic matrix lies in the Homeric Hymns, I do not wish to enter into any discussion of Homer — a body of material that lies as a storehouse of archaic vocabulary and grammar, but not of easily usable examples of comprehensive and fully-developed structure and symbol. Why this condition should be so is clear enough, I think. The archaic feeling for time and place imbues the *Odyssey*. Take, for instance, Odysseus’ mythical episodes with Calypso and Circe or in the Land of the Lotos Eaters and the Court of Alcinoos. Yet, this time sense is not clearly regulated to particularly recognizable phrases or words. The Shield of Achilles in the *Iliad*, which does make an exact symbolic and structural use of Ocean as its rim, is still not as obviously archaic in tone as the difficult “klepsydra” fragment of Empedocles (100). In the later example there exists a conscious and exact representation of symbols and their structure. In Homer, narrative and an unconscious — or perhaps, in Schiller’s sense, a “naive” — use of archaic language obscures an exact clarity of expression. The reasons for this phenomenon lie not only in some kind of immediate, but primarily unthought, use of language, but also in what Bruno Snell has argued so well to be a lack of a developed sense of self — a sense of self we are not to perceive in its completeness until the lyric poets.⁷⁷ There is a strong bond between self-consciousness and the linguistic ability to reveal a clear and exact worldview based on particular symbols and structures. To appreciate the archaic vocabulary and syntax in Homer in terms of later poetry and the pre-Socratics, one would have to delve into the many studies comparing Homer and the individual “poets” and “philosophers” — studies which abound in any good bibliography of sixth and fifth century creators of literature. Such a study exceeds the bounds of this present work and to my mind is largely unnecessary since quite enough proof of the pre-Socratics’ debt to archaic thought lies in the Homeric Hymns, the works of Hesiod, and the elegiac and lyric poets.

In the following pages I shall attempt to observe the symbolic and structural properties of archaic thought at work in early Greek literature, beginning with the Homeric Hymns where structural and symbolic functions are first easily seen and ending with the writings of Empedocles.

The clear possibility of symbolic and structural thought lies in the Homeric Hymns. In the first eighteen lines of the *Hymn to Demeter*, for instance, the plucking of the symbolic narcissus, the chasm that draws Persephone into the “other” world, and the affective or magical quality of light are clear examples of strong, symbolic, and structural phenomena in archaic terms. So also are

the terrifying symbols (σήματα) of the bear, lion, and growing vine in the *Hymn to Dionysus*. In the *Hymn to Aphrodite* the goddess' appearance, her dressing, and her undressing by their formal nature and their highly affective ornamentation constitute a symbolic and structural design of the world. The major importance of the *Hymn to Aphrodite* for us, however, is the oppositional nature of its plot and language. Although the polar nature of the two spheres is inherent in the language itself (e.g., the addition of the alpha-privative or negation-prefix to a positive word meaning men in order to mean gods), the poet's use of this opposition in this particular hymn proves the general importance of polarity for the epic mentality.

The lyric poets present us with a number of examples in which the use of light and dark and specific incidents and objects indicates a strong oppositional and symbolic nature. These writers will be used to shed light on the particular questions I wish to raise concerning archaic symbol and structure. Pindar, a poet whose style makes extensive use of the affective nature of light, in the *Thirteenth Olympian* contrasts in an oppositional sense sleeping and waking and gold and dark (66-78). In the *First Pythian* he makes use of a strong light/dark imagery in the chaotic description of the eruption of Thyphon. It is especially interesting that here the symbolic words $\pi\upsilon\rho$ and $\varphi\lambda\acute{o}\xi$ — words that appear later in the pre-Socratics — are raised to a noticeable distinction. Again in the *First Olympian*, $\pi\upsilon\rho$ is a key image in terms of glory and fame — two concepts on the highest level of experience for the poet. In this particular poem concepts and colors assume an unusual and distinct movement. This symbolic or mythical movement occurs again in the *Third Olympian* where the poet swears to entertain us with a "glistening new style" ($\nu\epsilon\omicron\sigma\acute{\iota}\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu\ \tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\nu$ — 4) and relates a dream sequence that tells of an extended voyage among the gods that ends in the virtues of men. In Pindar's *Hymn to Zeus* the universe is equated with the physical world, Delos becomes a star in the sea — a far-shining star set against the oppositional blackness of Earth. Snell comments that here lies a Heraclitian proportion: "Those in the sky regard the earth as those on earth regard the sky".⁷⁸ It is one of the few places that Pindar leaves the realm of affective symbolization for a pure structural opposition.

The lyric poets, Mimnermus, Archilochus, Alcman, and Sappho provide us with an even larger set of examples in terms of symbols and basic polar oppositions. In Mimnermus we are told of the hollow bed of the sun ($\epsilon\upsilon\nu\acute{\eta}/\kappa\omicron\upsilon\acute{\omicron}\lambda\eta$) that moves from one horizon of Ocean to the other.⁷⁹ This bed could possibly be understood, in macrocosmic terms, as the dome of heaven inverted above the observer who plots the course of the sun with his eye. There is, in other words, a strong indication of an intermediation involved here between the subjective world of the viewer and objective world of his cosmos. The speaker in Archilochus' eclipse poem (West 122.1-4) is by no means fully aware of the significance of what frightens him — that is, a kind of oppo-

sitional identity of symbolic perception – and so quakes before the midday's darkness. His poem gives great weight to an argument indicating a phenomenology of oppositions in the archaic mentality. Alcman and Sappho contribute a strong personal touch to the polar relationship between men and gods. The former, in a poem that makes use of the affective mythical movement of gold and silver objects, compares a girl in his chorus to a single star blazing brightly against the divine night (Page 1.52-63). Sappho (Page 191) juxtaposes herself with golden Aphrodite in familiar conversation and entreats the goddess in such a way so that the worlds of men and gods become related by a peculiar kind of communication – a communication that necessitates in itself a certain identity of interests. Then too, the poetess plays to a great extent with the juxtaposition of colors – e.g., golden Aphrodite against the black world (Page 191.7-12). Bacchylides too uses opposition of colors extensively in his poetry. Take for instance the phrase *φοίνισσα λευκώλενος* (Snell 17.54) or *ἐναριζ[ομέν]ων/ δ' ἔρευθε φώτων/ αἵματι γαῖα μέλα[ινα]* . . . (Snell 13.151-153). Such parallels as these elucidate the study of Heraclitus and Parmenides.

In terms of the philosophical and logical properties of Greek, however, Hesiod's *Theogony* is the all-important work. Here the poet, inspired by the Muses, establishes a primal opposition between Chaos and the phenomenological world – that is the structured system of gods he creates. This primal architectonic opposition takes its form as the Chaos/Earth opposition, the third term being Eros or Love. I shall argue that Eros is heuristic in the sense that it will act as the linking, active member of all future marriages. This threesome, however, is only formal; the genealogical patterning of the work begins with the opposition of Earth and Heaven. The oppositional structures in the *Theogony* are many-layered and carefully worked out. Placed against the movement from the first to the third generation, they indicate a dialectic on a very basic level. I shall discuss these structures and point out the dialect that leads to a third generation in which violent oppositional juxtaposition succumbs to a tripartite, tensed structure. Here the third term has become accepted consciously into the structure of the universe.

The symbolic nature of the *Theogony*, I shall argue, finds its greatest and most significant expression at that point where Zeus establishes his reign. The length of times separating Heaven and Tartarus is especially interesting because the spatial and temporal divisions are obviously mythical. The opposition of Heaven and Tartarus (the opposition between the Olympians and their enemies) is structurally and symbolically represented by the addition of a third term (Earth) and by a "temporal" equation that states that Heaven is to Earth as Earth is to Tartarus. The negative forces within the universe remain opposed to the positive ones within a structure made possible by the addition of a third term. This type of structuring is identical in the thought patterns of Heraclitus.

Heraclitus expresses archaic oppositional logic and its symbolic nature in its most elegant fashion. Like Pindar he speaks from an almost oracular point of view, but this does not mean necessarily that he is “obscure”. The fragments of Heraclitus may be divided into the following groups with admitted cross references: (1) descriptions of the *Logos* (2) the non-obvious nature of the realm of the *Logos* (3) descriptions, consequently, of a Subjective Inner Core that establishes man as a measure or ground of all things (4) logical symbols that are clearly grounded in lyric and epic (5) logical opposition and tensioned polarity that tends to culminate in a three-termed or proportional logic, representing the structure of the *Logos* itself. The point I shall prove is that everything in Heraclitian thought is subordinated to the intuition or comprehension of the *Logos*. This *Logos* is revealed to man both through its tripartite logical structure and its more purely symbolic representation as fire which is a *σῆμα* (symbol) of the polar, oppositional nature of the world, much in the same sense as is the fall of the anvil in Hesiod, except here its affective qualities, its color and brightness, resemble most of all lyric phenomena. Logically Heraclitus makes use of a third term which binds opposites. Most of his oppositions themselves imply such a connection. Beneath the movement of these opposites there lies an unchanging third or complete state – the *Logos*.

Parmenides too describes a third state and maintains an even stricter oppositional logic – so strict that one must be careful in order to avoid misunderstanding his writings. Oddly enough (or perhaps not so if one would incorrectly prefer to limit archaic thought to more purely “poetic” forms) the proem to his work is more easily comprehensible from a symbolic than from a purely logical point of view. Here we are told of the path (*ὁδός*) along which Parmenides is driven by the goddesses – perhaps the same “right road to truth” we find in Pindar’s *Third Pythian* (*Ἀλαθείας ὁδόν* – 103). This *ὁδός* appears also in Heraclitus as the phenomenon that is the same both up and down (60). The primary opposition of Day and Night and the double keys of *Δίκη* indicate the polar nature of the logic, as does the almost Hesiodic gaping chasm beyond the doors of the House of Night. Then too there is a great deal of circular imagery that eventually represents itself in the almost perfect mandala symbol of fragment 12.

The main body of the poem presents some problems because, while the strict dualistic structural and logical opposition between Being and Non-Being is maintained throughout, there seems to be a great emphasis on the Way of Being and at times a direct rejection of oppositional thinking on a substantive level. In the sixth fragment Parmenides attacks those men who say x and y are the same and not the same as muddle-headed boobies. Is this an attack on Heraclitus? It could be an attack on what Parmenides thought Heraclitus said, but it is my opinion that Heraclitus did indeed posit a third area or term. Parmenides attacks dualistic thinking because mere dualism does not. Soph-

istic oppositional patterns – facile manipulations of meaningless oppositions – were already present in the earlier part of the Fifth Century, and it is my opinion that Parmenides tended to misunderstand Heraclitus in these terms. For in the end the similarities between the two philosophers are too striking to maintain that there existed a basic difference in their thought. As it was in the case of Heraclitus' *Logos* so it is with Parmenides' Being. It is the limited (and therefore the symbolic in geometrical terms), unborn, whole, unique, and immovable phenomenon behind the seeming opposition of the world – an opposition not identical with the original Being/Non-Being polarity. In Parmenides this seeming opposition is, I shall argue, of necessity half valid because it partakes of Light (the positive phenomenon we encounter in the proem towards which Parmenides moves). In other words there is a mortal and logical duality in the universe behind which, as a third term, lies Being in a structured, unmoving form. There is, then, in this view very little difference between the basic thought patterns of Heraclitus and Parmenides.

Nor does Empedocles deviate appreciably from the established, archaic structures and symbols. His usages are, in fact, the most conscious, detailed, and hence, in a sense, objective. Examples of the archaic mentality may be found in both the *On Nature* and the *Purifications*; hence, one may avoid a critical problem that has befuddled scholars for years. What is most interesting is the great duplication of language that occurs between this poet-philosopher and Heraclitus and Parmenides – a clear indication that in Empedocles we might be faced with the acme of the archaic, pre-Socratic mentality.

In terms of the basic structural idea underlying the Empedoclean cosmic cycle, I shall rely heavily upon fragment 17, an extended statement whose very form assumes the dyadic and then tripartite structure of the whole. *Φιλότης, τὸ πᾶν*, and the One may all be regarded as an underlying third term that is structurally parallel to Heraclitus' *Logos* and Parmenides' Being – the same elusive position of a positive term in the triadic form remains a constant. Empedocles' dynamic principle of the *δύνη*, with all of its earlier connotations in epic and lyric poetry, assumes an all-important role in any consideration of archaic structure. Empedocles goes to great lengths to describe the underlying structural idea of his thought. Parallels in structural language between Parmenides and himself are abundant, just as they are between Heraclitus and himself. Yet, always the language and descriptions are more exact in the latest of the three.

This phenomenon is particularly true when one considers Empedocles' use of symbols. His structuring of the cosmos into its component elements is the most obvious example of the close relationship between symbolic and structural characteristics in archaic thought and surely must be considered carefully in terms of the startling similarities it possesses to Heraclitus' own cosmic descriptions. Yet, any symbolic study of Empedocles must delve much further than a comparison of cosmic descriptions, for in this poet-philosopher's extant

corpus lies a matrix of symbolic language that should reveal most clearly how archaic logic essentially works. It was Empedocles whose writings first reveal the symbolic element as an *εἶδος* and hence consciously tie together thought and geometry in order to reveal a basic archaic characteristic of mind — one which was quite obviously still at work in Plato.

The three great pre-Socratics reflect, then, strikingly similar usages and representations of language. One may, of course, indicate specific areas of difference but never over the obvious archaic similarities — that is, the patterns and symbols that make up archaic logic.

NOTES

1. C.S. Jung, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (New York 1959), p. 6.
2. *Ibid.* p. 301ff.
3. *Ibid.* p. 304.
4. *Ibid.* p. 11.
5. *Ibid.* p. 45.
6. C.S. Jung and W. Pauli, *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche* (New York 1955), p. 117.
7. *Ibid.* p. 144. Synchronicity may take three forms: "a) The coincidence of a certain psychic content with a corresponding objective process which is perceived to take place simultaneously b) The coincidence of a subjective psychic state with a phantasm (dream or vision) which later turns out to be a more or less faithful reflection of a 'synchronistic', objective event that took place more or less simultaneously, but at a distance c) The same, except that the event perceived takes place in the future and is represented in the present only by a phantasm that corresponds to it" p. 145.
8. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago 1968), p. 13. "Magical thought is not to be regarded as a beginning, a rudiment, a sketch, a part of a whole which has not yet materialized. It forms a well-articulated system, and is in this respect independent of that other system which constitutes science, except for the purely formal analogy which brings them together and makes the former a sort of metaphorical expression of the latter".
9. *Ibid.* p. 10.
10. *Ibid.* pp. 20-21.
11. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (Garden City 1967), pp. 74-75.
12. *Ibid.* "Do Dual Organizations Exist?" pp. 128-160.
13. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, p. 131. "All that I claim to have shown so far is, therefore, that the dialectic of superstructures, like that of language, consists in setting up *constitutive units* (which for this purpose, have to be defined unequivocally, that is by contrasting them in pairs) so as to be able by means of them to elaborate a system which plays the part of a synthesizing operator between ideas and facts, thereby turning the latter into *signs*. The mind passes from empirical diversity to conceptual simplicity and then from conceptual simplicity to meaningful synthesis".
14. The volume's second part entitled "Myth as a Form of Intuition. Structure and Articulation of the World of Time and Space in the Mythical Consciousness" is especially useful to anyone studying the archaic configuration of mind. The second chapter devotes itself to the "Foundations of a Theory of Mythical Forms, Space, Time, and Number".
15. Ernst Cassirer, *Mythical Thought, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: 2* (New Haven 1968), p. 80.

16. *Ibid.* p. 83.
17. *Ibid.* pp. 88-89.
18. *Ibid.* p. 50.
19. *Ibid.* p. 250. This statement on first reading could for some border on the absurd; yet, the question of what kind of relationship there is between elements in archaic thought is an important one. B.A. van Groningen in his *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (Amsterdam 1960), p. 33, indicates that there is little relation at all between the autonomous units that compose archaic thought. Cassirer's statement here simply indicates that the mode of thought we shall later describe as the "appositional mode" necessitates a relationship of what I shall call in the next chapter "mutual association" or partial identity rather than cause and effect.
20. Cassirer, *op. cit.* p. 189.
21. *Ibid.* p. 97.
22. Cassirer, *Language, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: I* (New Haven 1966), p. 109.
23. *Ibid.* p. 89.
24. Unless noted, this essay makes general use of readings from the following texts: for the pre-Socratics, H. Diels' and W. Kranz' *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Zürich 1951); for the lyric and elegiac poets, M.L. West's *Lambi et Elegi Graeci*, vls. I and II (Oxford 1971 and 1972); D.L. Page's *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962); E. Loebel's and D.L. Page's *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*; B. Snell's *Bacchylides* (Leipzig 1961). All other readings are from the most recent Oxford Classical Texts of the particular author.
25. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, p. 263.
26. Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind* (New York 1960), p. 239.
27. Cassirer, II. 83.
28. Lévi-Strauss, *op. cit.* p. 95.
29. *Ibid.* p. 18.
30. *Ibid.* p. 263.
31. Snell, *op. cit.* p. 62.
32. *Ibid.* p. 87.
33. *Ibid.* p. 41.
34. Cassirer, I. 182.
35. Eduard Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik auf der Grundlage von Karl Brugmanns Griechischer Grammatik* (München 1939-1950), 11.47. "Die eine ererbte Hauptanwendung des Duals ist die Bezeichnung der Paarigkeit; im blossen Dual steht, was von Natur oder gewollt ein Paar bildet".
36. *Ibid.* p. 50. "Seit indogermanischer Zeit konnte der Dual statt für ein gleichartiges Paar (Formel a & a) auch für ein ungleichartiges, immerhin ebenfalls natürliches und ständiges Paar gebraucht werden (Formel a & b); dabei steht der Dual des führenden Wortes für das Ganze . . ."
37. Cassirer, I. 245. He sees the dual as an expression within the phenomenological realm: "Whereas most grammarians had hitherto regarded it [the Dual] as mere ballast, as a useless linguistic refinement, he [Humboldt] traced it to a twofold source, subjective and objective, and an original signification which he found to be partly sensuous and partly intellectual . . . As the idea of the *numerical series*, as a whole constructed according to a strictly unitary principle, gains ground, the particular number ceases to represent a specific content and becomes a mere member of the series, equivalent to other members".
38. Jacob Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen über Syntax* (Basel 1957), II. 112. "Der Ausgang -τερος dient auch sonst zum Ausdruck eines Gegensatzes zwischen zweien (z.B. in ἑτερος)". The strong disjunctive quality of this suffix based on an underlying dyadic structure has recently been studied by Jaan Puhvel, "Nature and Means of Comparison in Proto-Indo-European Grammar", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1.2 (1973), pp.

145-154. He argues that **-tero-* "signals the marked member of a *binary pair of opposites*, to the exclusion of an unmarked alternative either implied or juxtaposed by syntactic means (p. 149 – underlining mine). In the case of ἕτερος he argues that "its unmarked opposite is εἷς 'one', and the IE reconstruction thus **sems: *sm̥teros*". He provides the interesting example of *Il.* 2.217, χωλὸς δ' ἕτερον πόδα 'lame in one foot' and goes on to conjecture that "IE **kʷo-tero-* 'whether of two' involves singling out, marking one of a pair . . ." (*ibid.*).

39. Schwyzer, *op. cit.* I.595.

40. *Ibid.* p. 614.

41. Wackernagel, *op. cit.* II.97. "Diese Ausdruckweise ist sehr alt und in verschiedenen Sprachen zu einem eigentlichen Reziprositätspronomen erstarrt. So im Altindischen in mehreren Formen und im Altiranischen".

42. Schwyzer, *op. cit.* I.65.

43. *Ibid.* II.573-574.

44. The expression "privative" interestingly enough comes to us via Aristotle and Cicero. Cf. Wackernagel, *op. cit.* II.284.

45. One could speculate that although words compounded with the alpha-prefix are in use at all times in the language, the meaning of the phenomenon is revealed more clearly in the earlier literature, for here it is easier to argue that an alpha-privative somehow includes its opposite (the positive). Its compounded nature supports this argument. It originated, it seems, in compounds of the bahuvrihi type (Hjalmar Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* [Heidelberg 1960], I.1) and may be traced back to Indo-European **ḡ-*. This distinguishing element belongs to a very old group of prefixes (Schwyzer, *op. cit.* I. 431) and means "having no part in". Jaan Puhvel in a very interesting article emphasizes the separative quality of the phenomenon: "The value of **ḡ-* in bahuvrihis is privative or separative. Thus, ἀπαῖς means 'no-child-having, without child', or rather 'child not there' . . ." (Jaan Puhvel, "Indo-European Negative Composition", *Language* 29 [1953], p. 19). (Cf., however, A.C. Moorhouse, *Studies in the Greek Negatives* [Cardiff 1959] who concludes "that Puhvel does not succeed in overthrowing the traditional view that connects **ne* and **ḡ-*, nor in establishing a local, separative origin for the negative prefix . . ." [p. 46]. I do not find Moorhouse's argument convincing, for the fact still remains that the privative is separative in intent and very likely, therefore, in origin. It does indeed depend upon the underlying existence of its positive – another case of a disjunction or opposition based on two phenomena, just as Puhvel argued regarding the **-tero-* suffix – cf. fn. I.38.) The paradox is, of course, that we are faced with a linguistic peculiarity that is most probably separative in meaning but additive in construction and hence possibly additive in meaning too. Or, to put the idea in another way, is not the positive both present and implied in compounds of this nature? Henri Bergson in his *Creative Evolution* (New York 1944) describes well the additive function of a negating particle or idea: "To represent the object A non-existent can only consist, therefore, in *adding* something to the idea of this object: we add to it, in fact, the idea of an *exclusion* of this particular object by actual reality in general. To think the object A as non-existent is first to think the object and consequently to think it existent; it is then to think that another reality, with which it is incompatible, supplants it" (p. 310). "*Negation, therefore, differs from affirmation properly so called in that it is an affirmation of the second degree: it affirms something of an affirmation which itself affirms something of an object*" (p. 313). I am prone to argue that the formation of negatives with alpha-privatives involves not only a disjunction of two phenomena but also their nondifferentiation or identity. It all lies in the basic "dual" nature of the language. In the case of alpha-privatives, this unusual structure reveals itself most clearly, I should argue, in those expressions containing the close linking of the privative and its unprefixated positive (e.g., ἀπατοῖ τε φατοῖ τε Hes. E. 3).

46. Van Groningen, *op. cit.* p. 33. "Il est d'ailleurs évident que la juxtaposition d'éléments plus ou moins semblables ne parvient pas, à elle seule, à constituer un ensemble très solide. En constituant un recueil, l'auteur ne fait, tout au plus, que la moitié de son devoir: il choisit des éléments. Mais il néglige absolument de les ordonner, de les raccorder. Chaque pièce est contiguë à une autre, mais n'y est pas reliée . . . Le tout n'est que la somme d'une addition qui aurait pu être plus grande ou plus petite. Son unité est très faible; elle n'a rien d'organique".

47. *Ibid.* p. 19. "La suite des idées peut prendre ici, en principe, deux directions: des causes aux effets, ou des effets aux causes . . . La méthode étiologique si fréquente dans la pensée archaïque grecque – et encore longtemps après – tant chez les philosophes que chez les narrateurs, n'a rien qui doive étonner. Le contraire serait remarquable . . ."

48. *Ibid.* "C'est pour cette raison qu'en grec pré-classique les phrases causales avec γάρ sont tellement plus fréquentes que les subordonnées avec ἐπεὶ et ses synonymes suivies d'une principale exprimant la conséquence".

49. *Ibid.* p. 11.

50. *Ibid.* p. 12. "La tendance unificatrice est toujours présente, sans doute; sans elle pas d'oeuvre littéraire; mais d'autres impulsions pourront prédominer. Il y a, dans chaque ouvrage, un effort à la cohérence, puisqu'il se présente, matériellement déjà, comme une entité distincte. A nous la tâche de déterminer les procédés que cet effort met en action, de montrer par quels moyens la juxtaposition se transforme plus ou moins en unité".

51. Meillet et Vendryes, *Traité de grammaire comparée des langues classiques* (Paris 1948), Ch. 840.

52. Harry and Agathe Thornton, *Time and Style* (London 1962), p. 1.

53. *Ibid.*

54. Here is one example Thornton and Thornton (pp. 2-3) produce to illustrate appositional style: "The description of Olympus whither Athena departs from Nausicaa (*Od.* 6.41ff.) is an appositional elaboration extending over several sentences. 'She, having spoken thus, went off, owl-eyed Athena to Olympus where, they say is the gods' seat unshakeable in all eternity'. Four lines follow describing that blissful abode of the gods. The passage ends by taking up the thread of the action through a literal repetition of part of line 41: 'thither went off the Owl-eyed one when she had told the maiden'. At the mention of Olympus, the poet halts in his narrative, and allows all that is held in the idea of 'Olympus' to unfold, feature by feature: no storms, no rain, no snow, but clear sky, unclouded, a white radiance. This is cast in the form of a relative clause, 'where, they say, is the gods' seat unshakeable in all eternity', a three-barrelled independent clause, 'neither is it shaken by storms, nor even wetted by rain, nor covered with snow', a contrasted clause, 'but clear sky is spread out', with an adjective 'unclouded' in apposition to 'clear sky', and an independent clause, further expanding on 'unclouded', 'and a white radiance is over it all'. The effect of such piling-up of expressions is great intensity of perceptual vividness. The whole is rounded off by a reference to the blessed life of the gods in this place, the line being connected by the demonstrative 'on it' or 'there' which refers back to line 42. With the mention of the blissful life of the gods on Olympus (46) we return to the initial mention of Olympus (42). With Athena's departure (47) we return to our initial statement (41). The form of the whole is a chiasmus, viz. a b c b a, c being the appositional cluster. Chiasmus is the natural outcome of the appositional mode of thought and expression at this early stage".

55. *Ibid.* p. 8.

56. Cf. fn. 19.

57. *Ibid.* p. 13.

58. Martin Nilsson, "Götter und Psychologie bei Homer", *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 22 (1923-4), pp. 363ff; Thornton and Thornton pp. 120-121 cite this article and

speak of the problem of emotional intensity in Homer. In the present paragraph I make use of many of their comments and examples.

59. Thornton and Thornton, *op. cit.* p. 121.

60. *Ibid.* pp. 20-21.

61. *Ibid.* p. 75.

62. *Ibid.* p. 77.

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.* pp. 78-82.

65. *Ibid.* pp. 83-84.

66. *Ibid.* p. 85.

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.* p. 86.

69. *Ibid.* p. 87.

70. *Ibid.* p. 88

71. Schwyzer, *op. cit.* I.640. "Die Differenzierung des ursprünglichen Präteritums . . . in Imperfekt und (starken) Aorist, die schon in Indogermanischen begann, ist im Griechischen grundsätzlich durchgeführt".

72. Wackernagel, *op. cit.* I.173.

73. *Ibid.* I.179. "Hiernach würde der Aorist gesetzt, weil man von dem, was manchmal geschieht, denkt, dass es immer geschehen kann oder immer geschehen muss; das Beispiel der Vergangenheit diene dazu anzudeuten, dass etwas zu geschehen pflegt".

74. *Ibid.* I.180.

75. Schwyzer, *op. cit.* I.641.

76. John F. Callahan, *Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy* (Cambridge 1948), p. 194.

77. Cf. Snell, "The Rise of the Individual in the Early Greek Lyric", *op. cit.* pp. 43-70.

78. *Ibid.* p. 82.

79. I prefer Meineke's *κοιῖλη* (*κῶιλη* codd.) which E. Diehl (*Anthologia Lyrica Graeca* [Leipzig 1949-1952], 10.6) maintains over Kaibel's *ποικίλη* – a reading West (12.6) prefers. *Ποικίλη* is certainly a more commonly-used epithet in the Homeric language and is found with a variety of objects. *Κοῖλος* appears mostly as an epithet for ships. Metrical consideration tends to support *κοιῖλη* over *κόιλη*. My preference for *κοιῖλη* lies in the fact that it strikes me as an adjective peculiarly descriptive in terms of the way the archaic imagination might work: the sun moves along the curve of its "hollow bed" in its arc through the heavens. The idea of the heavens as a kind of hollow vessel might underscore a parallel with the common usage of the adjective with "ship". Note also Stesichorus' reference to the "golden globet of the sun" (*Ἀέλιος ... δέπας ἔσκατέβανω χρύσειον* – Diehl, *op. cit.* 6), a reading I prefer over Page's *ἄμος... δέπας ἔσκατέβανω χρύσειον* because of the former's clear statement of the primary symbol. Note also Stesichorus' reference to the "golden goblet of the sun" (*Ἀέλιος δέπας χρύσειον*) which is quite similar to the present image in Mimnermus (Diehl 6).

THE HOMERIC HYMNS AND HESIOD

The term for symbol in Greek is *σῆμα*.¹ It may indicate any apparition of exceeding beauty or terror. It is always surrounded by an aura of the cosmic, supernatural, affective, or we should say, I think, “metaphysical” or “other worldly”. The Homeric Hymns, as one might expect, are pregnant with such phenomena. In the *Hymn to Dionysus*, for instance, symbols (*σῆματα*) are linked directly to the various forms of the god. In the midst of the confused crew Dionysus shows forth as a shaggy-necked, raving bear. On the deck he appears as a fierce, roaring, glaring lion:

ὃ δ' ἄρα σφι λέων γένετ' ἔνδοθι νηὸς
 δευὸς ἐπ' ἀκροτάτης, μέγα δ' ἔβραχεν, ἐν δ' ἄρα μέσση
 ἄρκτον ἐποίησεν λασιώχενα, σῆματα φαίνων.

But straight-off by the bows, there on ship
 He waxed a dreadful lion. Loud he roared. Straight-off
 In mid-ship he made a shaggy bear, showing forth these his σῆματα.
 (44-46)

The symbols of Dionysus are affective, bristling with terror and emotion. They are immediate and startling. They also possess no matter or substance (*ὕλη* or *οὐσία*) that could possibly be gauged by Aristotelian cause and effect. These things are terrifying, and it is not surprising that they fill the crew with fear (*ἐρόβηθεν* – 47). Earlier these men are literally inundated by Dionysus in his symbolic form of wine, while the symbol of the ivy-vine curls about the mast, blossoming flowers and berries and wafting the strange, sweet smells of ambrosia (35-41). These events are untoward. They are all wondrous works (*θαυματὰ ἔργα* – 34) of the god, and again, as it is in the case of the vine, they defy Aristotelian time and space; the symbol is immediate, terrifying, and in a sense twofold or dyadic: in a blink of an eye the vine stretches out “here and here” (*αὐτίκα δ' ... ἐξετανύσθη / ἄμπελος ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα...* 38-39).

Compare this amazing growth of vine to those willow withes Apollo employs to bind Hermes in the *Hymn to Hermes* (410-413). These miraculously fall away, intertwine and easily (ῥεῖα – 412) grow to cover the wild cattle. Herein lies the affective power of Hermes' godhead – that same affective power of all symbolic phenomena. Both his sacrifice of Apollo's oxen, their flesh he stashes high in the air (115-137), and his gift of the lyre to Apollo (507-510) are symbols (σήματα) of Hermes' power as a god, the one signifying his thievish bent (σῆμα νέης φωρῆς), the other his pact of friendship with Apollo (καὶ τὰ μὲν Ἑρμῆς / Λητοῖδην ἐφίλησε διαπερές ὥς ἔτι καὶ νῦν / σήματ' ἐπεὶ κίθαρ' μὲν Ἑκμηβόλῳ ἐγγυάλιξεν ... 507-509). Hermes' activities and powers are in no ordinary context. Their meaning is symbolic; they deal with his σήματα. Note that in the *Hymn to the Dioscuri*, the demi-gods become stars, powerful and beautiful symbols for sailors (ναύταις σήματα καλὰ – 16). Here at last we move into the symbolic realm of light, an area of unusual perception, that finds expression at important junctures in the Homeric Hymns. This is especially true in terms of fire – a symbol employed directly by Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles. Hermes' eyes, for instance, twinkle fire (πῦρ ἀμαρύσσων – 415); this fire (πῦρ) is not material in any way, but affective and, therefore, potentially symbolic. Nor is it unimportant that one of the symbolic works of the god is the discovery of πῦρ itself (*h.h. Her.* 111). Fire occupies a symbolic realm. It is a-material and symbolic here, just as it is in the *Hymn to Demeter* where the goddess deifies Demophoön in the might of fire (πυρὸς μένει – 239) and produces by this act a great wonder (θαῦμα) in those who watch him grow (240-241). In the *Hymn to Pythian Apollo*, Apollo reveals his godhead by the sudden brightness of the flame (φλόξ) in his tripod. Divine splendor is immediately connected with light – light that is no material concept, but a direct, affective, and symbolic representation of the archaic mentality.

Examples of such symbolism are by no means absent from the *Hymn to Aphrodite*. Before appearing to Anchises, the goddess surrounds herself with heavenly oils, filled with an unearthly, ambrosial fragrance, and dresses herself in golden costume. Her fragrance and her dress are direct symbols of her godhead, and it is the symbolic power of her shining ornamentation (κόσμον φαεινόν – 162) and dress (εἵματα σιγαλόεντα – 164) that Anchises later removes before they lie together – a mortal with an immortal. It is not without purpose that the poet notes her dressing once more (αὐτῇ δὲ χροὶ ἔννυτο εἵματα καλὰ – 171) and then describes her in her godlike height – another example of a mythical perception of space. Her beauty is unearthly (ἀμβροτον – 175). This “bigger-than-life” appearance of a god is not without parallel. Demeter in her hymn reveals herself in a similar way (275-280): beauty spreads about her as she transmutes her size and shape (μέγεθος καὶ εἶδος ἄμειψε – 275). As Aphrodite shows an unearthly beauty so Demeter fills the house with the brightness of lightning (αὐγῆς δ' ἐπλήσθη πυκνὸς δόμος ἄστεροπῆς ὥς...

280). In both cases the affective quality of the goddess as symbol overcomes normal spatial dimensions and places these goddesses in a realm far outside Aristotelian time and space. No, it is the coupling of this divine symbol, this ἀ-θάνατος, with Anchises, the human symbol (θνητός), that produces the desired intermediation between opposites and moves symbolism into a logical structure.

The relationship between men and gods is a logical problem. Since Plato it has received a complex explanation in terms of some kind of hierarchy or intermediation between a higher and lower order, sometimes through the central figure of a Christ. In early Greek, however, the explanation lies in an extensive use of the opposition between mortal and immortal. The general oppositions between these two primary spheres may be extended into pairs of words related to one side and the other, although generally at least one of the two opposing phenomena will be a form of either θνητός or ἀθάνατος. The epic poets employ this cultural opposition to reveal a deceptively simple unity that in fact is a unity of two mutually interacting and identical opposites. There is a principle of "mixture" at work in this basic linguistic and cognitive unity – a principle we shall easily see in Empedocles – which Plato rejected when he deemed the actual intercourse between men and gods to be no longer of logical concern, arguing instead for an ὁμοίωσις (e.g., *Tht.* 176b).² The archaics, on the other hand, conceived and experienced the relationship between man and god in a quite different way. The interesting point is, of course, that this archaic concept and experience arose directly from the dyadic and oppositional properties of the Greek language.

The Homeric Hymns are the natural place to turn in any investigation of men and gods because they deal directly both in language and in content with the relationship between the two. The *Hymn to Demeter*, for instance, tells of Demeter's wanderings on earth in her sorrow for the loss of Persephone. She nurses a mortal child, Demophoön as if he were an "offspring of a god" (ὥς εἰ θεοῦ ἐκγεγαῶτα – 237). She endeavors to bring this child into the realm of the immortals and make him ἀθάνατον, ἀγήραον, and possessed of an ἄρδιον τιμήν (260-261). The child himself belongs to both worlds, perhaps as Persephone will belong to two. Demeter in mortal form moves actively within the realm of mortals; she is capable of transferring mortals into a condition of immortality. Although men and gods are antipodal linguistically, they also share a third realm where they may be identical. The *Hymn to Hermes* is particularly rich in this type of correlation. Although it deals primarily with the two gods, Apollo and Hermes, there is a clear indication that Hermes inhabits the realms of men and gods equally. His mother, in a significant formulaic usage of the opposed terms, describes him as one begotten as a worry for both men and gods (μεγάλην σε πατὴρ ἐφύτευσε μέριμναν/θνητοῖς ἀνδρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι – 160-161). He is compared to both men and gods in his degree of delusiveness (338-339). Apollo first considers the lyre, that invention of Hermes which will soon be a

symbol of Phoebus' own power, to be a gift from the realm of either men or gods (*ἡέ τις ἀθανάτων ἡέ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων / δῶρον ἀγανὸν ἔδωκε...* 441-442). Hermes, like Demeter, consorts with both gods and men (*πᾶσι δ' ὅ γε θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ὁμιλεῖ* – 576). It is significant, I think, that this all-important description of the god lies in the very last lines of the hymn.

The gods of the Homeric Hymns are always characterized, as one might expect, by some kind of strong relationship to men. They can be a source of joy to all mortals as is Apollo a *χάρμα βροτοῖσι* (*h.h. Del. Ap.* 25). They can be rulers of all men (*ibid.* 29). They also may be ruled by men. Take, for instance, Pan's servitude in the form of a shepherd to a mortal: "there, even though he was a god, he would tend the sheep with dry, rough hair at the place of a mortal man" (*ἐνθ' ὅ γε καὶ θεὸς ὦν ψαφαρότριχα μῆλ' ἐνόμειν / ἀνδρὶ πάρα θνητῶν* – *h.h. Pan* 32-33). There is, in other words, a strong and necessary orientation of each realm towards its opposite – an orientation that should be considered not so much in terms of an authoritative Platonic or Christian hierarchy but more in terms of a third "space" of mixture, interaction, and experience in which the opposing phenomena react to and experience a world in identical ways. From this "mixture" of men and gods there arises the genealogies that structure the world. Genealogy is simply another, more extended expression of a seminal opposition. As a logical structure, genealogy is developed in Hesiod's *Theogony*, but we must note first that the whole logical problem involved in "genealogy" and "mixture" is inherent in the Hymns, not only in a general sense as I have indicated above, but in one very particular way that shows how the primary linguistic opposition of *θνητός / ἀ-θάνατος* patterns a third realm and establishes a primary genealogy. I speak of the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*.

In the figure of Aphrodite, the goddess, in her antipodal, the mortal Anchises, and in their particular act of love the literary and the linguistic coalesce to provide the pattern of a third realm and a third term. The condition – let me state again – is derived from the seminal opposition of *θνητός / ἀ-θάνατος*. This is the "myth" of the hymn: Aphrodite, at last forced by Zeus to mate with a mortal man, meets, lies with, and departs from the hero in clear forms of ritual action. The hymn is concerned literally with the *ἔργα* ("works") and the *ἕμερος* ("sweet desire") of Aphrodite (1-2) – a "sweet desire" that mediates between men and gods and creates a common realm.³ After their "mixing", Aphrodite addresses Anchises and relates the coming birth of their son, Aeneas. She reaffirms the meaning of their meeting, the intercourse of man and god, in three short tales set in the middle of the long Aeneas-narrative: Zeus' rape of Ganymede, Eos' rape of Tithonus, and the more central story of the nymphs who are to care for Aeneas.

Both of the first two stories bear directly on the logic of the situation at hand. Because of Ganymede's beauty, Zeus carries him off to the realm of the immortals (*ὦν ἀθανάτοισι μετεῖη* – 202).⁴ God and mortal are immediately

juxtaposed at the beginning of the tale, each with his epithet, each with his position in the line (... ξανθὸν Γανυμήδεα μητίετα Ζεὺς – 202). The internal rhyme Γανυμήδεα μητίετα creates a neat artistic link between the mortal and the immortal. Ganymede is presented consistently in terms of his reciprocal relationship with the ἀθάνατοι : he is their servant; on the other hand, he is honored by them (πάντεσσι τετιμένος ἀθανάτοισι – 205). In other words, the boy moves in a sphere that is peculiarly related to immortality, and, as a mortal, he attains two qualities normally reserved for the gods: he is both immortal and unaging (ὥς ἔοι ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρωι ἴσα θεοῖσιν – 214).⁵ The story of Dawn's rape of Tithonus is a variation of the Ganymede tale. Man and goddess appear together. Tithonus, an ancestor of Anchises, is, like him, described as comparable to the immortals (ἐπιείκελον ἀθανάτοισι – 219). Yet, Aphrodite hastens to inform Anchises that the parallelism of men and gods does not always hold: Dawn does not ask Zeus to make Tithonus ageless, and hence he withers away to a mere sound. She asks only that he be identified with immortality in deathlessness and the prerogative of living forever (ἀθάνατόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ζῶειν ἡμᾶτα πάντα – 221). The same line is put into the mouth of Aphrodite at 240. She would not identify mortality and immortality in this way, nor would she offer the prerogatives of immortality Zeus confers upon Ganymede. In the cases of Tithonus and Anchises, the characteristics of men and gods form a realm of action or experience in which the antipodals retain a portion of their own identity at all times. The point, however, is that in the "mixing" they are inseparable, wholly one, and identical.

The third story is perhaps more central to our investigation. We are told of a set of nature goddesses or nymphs who, although eating the food of the gods and partaking of their dances, indeed die (257-272). As goddesses they act as the intermediaries and third terms between any possibly separate realms of men and gods and significantly have as their charge Aeneas, the intermediation between Anchises and Aphrodite – that is, between mortal and immortal. Like Ganymede and Tithonus, they are examples of existence or experience both mortal and immortal. Unlike the two, they seem more to approximate mortality: they die.⁶ All three tales suggest or indeed define a third area derived directly from the initial underlying opposition between *θνητός* and *ἀθάνατος*.

The *Hymn to Aphrodite*, I repeat, is a study of a logical structure obtained from the mixing of these two antipodal terms. This structure is indicated most clearly not only in the usage and juxtaposition of words referring to each of the two opposing spheres, but also especially in the juxtaposition of the forms of *θνητός* and *ἀθάνατος* themselves. The separate appearance of either one or the other of these words exposes the general, logical content of the work and supports the more formal juxtapositions of significant terms.⁷ Yet, I think our most important consideration and our most cogent

argument for a general identity of opposites within a common third area lies in an explication of the text of this hymn itself, for the basic opposition of terms occurs at key points in this poem, revealing not only a clear coincidence of style and language, but also the most obvious statement of a logic underlying the work as a whole.

Regard how this hymn is structured by a number of key juxtapositions. The first (Κύπριδος, ἥ τε θεοῖσιν ἐπὶ γλυκὺν ἔμερον ὥρσε/καί τ' ἐδαμάσσατο φύλα καταδνητῶν ἀνθρώπων : "Of Cypris who arouses sweet passion in the gods and overcomes the tribes of mortal men") coincides with the introduction of the hymn's narrative impetus: the sweet passion wielded by Aphrodite.⁸ Line 35 (οὔτε θεῶν μακάρων οὔτε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων) appears exactly at the point in the poem where the poet completes his three short hymns to Athene, Artemis, and Hestia and marks the beginning of the main narrative. This one line also draws a distinction between the meaning of these shorter hymns and the body of the narration insofar as it includes all beings mortal or immortal who are particularized in the hymn by the figures of Anchises and Aphrodite. It is significant that the goddesses of the preceding three hymns are not susceptible to the works of Aphrodite and form an opposition of their own to Aphrodite herself.

The next important juxtaposition occurs when Aphrodite first addresses Anchises (οὐ τίς τοι θεός εἰμι· τί μ' ἀθανάτῳ εἵσκεις;/ἀλλὰ καταδνητὴ γε : "Let me tell you, I am not some goddess. Why do you liken me to the immortals? No, I am really a mortal woman" – 109-110). Here is the first real example of a possible state of intermediation between opposites. Aphrodite denies her godhead and touches upon the affairs of men. The meeting point between realms, or intermediation in an active sense, is of course the act of love. Aphrodite's denial of her divinity is very important to the meaning of the poem since it effectively provides her an entrée – for a short time at least – into a realm also inhabited by mortals, just as it allows the mortal contact with the god.

Line 142 ([γάμον] τίμιον ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν: "[a marriage] honorable to men and the immortal gods") marks the exact end of Aphrodite's address, just at the moment the hero is about to draw her to bed on the grounds that she is mortal and that he desires her. Note the close proximity of the word ἔμερος (γάμον ἔμερόεντα – 141), a phenomenon that occurs in lines two and three and, if Porter be correct, is in itself one of the thematic repetitions of the poem.⁹ It is important that the marriage is honored by both men and gods. It is also important that Anchises states he will bed the goddess, gods and men willing or no (οὐ τίς ἔπειτα θεῶν οὔτε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων/ἐνθάδε με σχήσει... 149-150) – an empty boast to be sure if we did not realize that this is just the point: the gods and men are willing, and the formal juxtaposition of the two spheres is employed here to underline the fact. The phrase in effect sanctions the marriage.

The next reiterative affirmation employing a more or less formal relationship between men and gods appears at line 200 after the seduction and at the point where Aphrodite knows she is to bear Aeneas – that awful “grief” of her downfall. Here the effect of the intermediation between the two spheres is advanced in mortal terms: ἀγχίθρεια δὲ μάλιστα καταδνητῶν ἀνθρώπων/ αἰεὶ ἅρ’ ὑμετέρης γενεῆς εἶδος τε φύην τε: “But always your race is the most like unto the gods of all mortal men in beauty and nature – 200-201”. The line is placed in the structure of the poem just before the episodes of Gany-mede and Tithonus, two mortals as desired by gods as Anchises is by Aphro-dite. It signals the close of the main body of narration.¹⁰ Then, in the middle of the tale of the nymphs (259) there lies a line in which the two realms are placed in a disjunctive yet parallel relationship (αἶ’ ῥ’ οὔτε θνητοῖς οὔτ’ ἀθανάτοις ἔπονται): “They [the nymphs] are in company neither with gods nor mortals”. The nymphs do after all, as I have said, represent a third term of men and gods. The poem extends for 25 more lines in which Aphrodite dictates the precautions that must surround the ultimate genealogical inter-mediator: Aeneas.

The *Hymn to Aphrodite* is a statement about the relationship of men and gods in a realm where they become identical. The specific quality of this realm is sexual. It is this “sweet” sexual mixing between Anchises and Aphro-dite that forms the necessary state behind the joining and intermediation of the two opposite realms. Although Eros is not specifically mentioned, it is indeed this sexual phenomenon under another name that is acting as the intermediating principle. The line is surely direct between the active ἕμερος in this hymn and Eros as a similar third, intermediating principle in Hesiod. The principle remains in Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles. In the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, the goddess herself in her general nature forces the mixing of opposing phenomena: she mates both gods with mortal women who bear children to the immortals and goddesses with mortal men:

ὥς ῥα θεοὺς συνέμιξε καταδνητῆσι γυναιξί
καί τε καταδνητοὺς νιεῖς τέκον ἀθανάτοις,
ὥς τε θεὰς ἀνέμιξε καταδνητοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

[Aphrodite might say]
That she mixed gods with mortal women
And they bore mortal sons to the immortals,
And that she mixed goddesses with mortal men.
(50-52)

It is more important to note, I think, the symmetry in which the goddess works: gods to mortal women / goddesses to mortal men. The juxtaposition in Greek is even more striking: θεοὺς συνέμιξε καταδνητῆσι γυναιξί/ θεὰς

ἀνέμιξε καταδυητοῖς ἀνθρώπους. There is a strict parallelism between words coupled with the exact switching of sexes. The identifying area is signified by compound forms of the verb *μίγνυμι* which create a symmetrical, all-inclusive statement through an almost geometrical structuring and parallelism of opposites.¹¹ Men enter into intercourse with the gods; gods enter into intercourse with men. Anchises ennobles his race; Aphrodite is degraded among the gods. The qualities of men and gods are mixed, and it is the wide range of meanings possessed by the Greek verb “*μίγνυμι*” that leads me to believe that sexual intercourse represents here in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* not merely a sexual phenomenon but also a logical one. It is the third element that has, in effect, made more clear the nature of the opposition by creating a common area in which the two opposing members become dual and therefore identical.

★

In Hesiod’s *Theogony* Aphrodite takes her place in the genealogical scheme of things some distance away from the beginning of the universe, but Eros does not. It is Eros that best typifies the underlying third term in a poem riddled with opposition.

The *Theogony* is divided into a proem (1-115) and main body (116-1022).¹² The arrangement appears once again in the fragments of Parmenides. The proem itself anticipates the oppositional structuring of the poem proper: a general apostrophe to the Muses [A’] is divided into an alternation between a more circumscribed apostrophe of, or tale of, the Muses [a], on the one hand, and the genealogical nature of their song [b (or -a in the sense of “the other”)], on the other.¹³ This structure is not balanced in terms of the quantity of lines devoted to these two areas of emphasis, but, in my opinion, such niceties should not be expected at this stage in the development of Greek literature. What is important to note is that throughout a general context – that is an apostrophe to the Muses – runs a dyadic division between a more particular apostrophe and a strong emphasis on the genealogical content of the Muses’ song – especially in terms of Zeus’ reign. It is, of course, this reign that is going to form the culmination of the poem proper.

Hesiod opens his poem with an address to the Heliconian Muses, those divine figures who veiled in mist first sing their own, and consequently Hesiod’s song in praise of Zeus (1-10). They laud the Olympian gods (11-21), and so before the *Theogony* has run 15 lines, Hesiod has introduced the third generation of gods and their offspring, that is the Olympians: Zeus, Hera, Athena, Apollo, Artemis, and Poseidon. There follows, then, a set of famous daughters (Themis, Aphrodite, and Hebe – 16-17) that acts as a peculiar kind of filial transition to the previous generation: Dione, Leto, Iapetus, Cronos (17-18), a set of these Titan’s children: Eos, Helios, Selene (19), and finally part of the first generation itself and two important offspring: Earth, Ocean, and Night (20).¹⁴ While the generations and transitions are not in strict order, the important point is that Hesiod is generally working from the third to the

first. Zeus and the Olympians are first because they are the culmination or third rule of the poem as a whole. It is with them that the dialectic of revenge ends and Hesiod establishes a comprehensive, balanced universe – one derived by a process involving the oppositional wear and tear between generations. We are dealing with a process that possesses strong logical overtones.¹⁵

Hesiod now turns back to the Muses in a short excursus into their validation of, and inspiration for, his song and a praise of the Muses themselves (22-43).¹⁶ In the middle of 43, he again begins to speak specifically of the content of the Muses' song as he did in lines 11-21, but in this instance, he offers a historical description of the genealogy rather than an emphatic one – an opposite treatment from his previous exposition where he placed the most important generation first. From the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς) the two sexual and cosmological polarities, Earth and Heaven, beget the gods. The Muses celebrate this genealogy first (43-46). Second (δεύτερον) they sing of Zeus, father of gods and men (47-49) – once again providing us with a phrase pregnant with logical and genealogical possibilities: δεύτερον αὖτε Ζῆνα, θεῶν πατέρ' ἥδ' ἐ καὶ ἀνδρῶν – 47. The opposition between men and gods occurs in the *Theogony* as it did in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, and although it is not a thematic structuring device in the later work, it does appear in the terms of the same formal and important juxtaposition I discussed in Chapter 1.¹⁷ In short, Hesiod between lines 22 and 49 sketches the opposition between particular entities and generations that is to form the antipodal and dialectical relationships of the poem as a whole. Thirdly (αὖτις δ') the Muses sing of giants and men who delight the mind of Zeus (50-52).

Then, for the third time, Hesiod returns to the Muses in an extended praise of their birth, attributes and names (53-104), working in a clever double statement of their names (64-79) and including their benefits for man (80-103). This section ends with an apostrophe to these goddesses, asking that they grant the poet lovely song to celebrate the holy race of deathless gods: Χαίρετε τέκνα Διός, δότε δ' ἡμερόεσσιν αἰοδὴν (104). Once again, then, Hesiod turns to the nature of the Muses' song (105-113): he tells of the primary opposition of Earth and Heaven (106) in terms of their children and emphasizes the progenitors who will have a particular place in the overall opposition of genealogies in the *Theogony*: Night and Sea: οἱ Γῆς ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος/ Νυκτὸς τε δυοφερῆς, οὓς θ' ἄλμυρός ἔτρεφε Πόντος (106-107). He asks to sing of the formation of what we should call the physical world (the earth, rivers, boundless sea, gleaming stars, and wide heaven – 108-110) and finally again to praise the Olympians. The proem ends (114-115) where it began – with the Muses. Given that the whole introduction is, in general, an apostrophe to the Muses [A], one can easily note that it is patterned on the following dyadic opposition between a more circumscribed apostrophe [a] and the nature of their song [b or -a]: a (1-10), b (11-21), a (22-43), b (43-52), a (53-104), b (105-113), a (114-115). Each alternation

enlarges the fund of information. The style is, as one would expect, appositional.

This structure appears to us, perhaps, as little more than an artistic device – a type of composition which, in order to emphasize the positive nature of the third or Olympian generation, produces a recognizable, alternating pattern. It is not until 116, however, that the positive elements of the proem find not so much an artistic as a structural and logical antipodal in the negative term: Chaos.

Chaos leads off the poem proper. It is imperative, therefore, that one examines the possible meaning of this term given its structural context. To begin with, to give it some rarified idea of pure mathematical negation or nothingness would certainly be attributing overly modern, theoretical possibilities to a term whose *use*, not definition, is more important. Then too while a sensation of opening or yawning may be involved in the idea, cf. the traditional etymology from the root *cha*, meaning “gape”, “gap”, “yawn”, I cannot fully understand any jump to a “bounded interval” that would define Chaos as “a vast gap between sky and earth” as do Cornford and Kirk and Raven,¹⁸ for there is really nothing in the arrangement of the three terms in the text to justify such a configuration. “Chaos came to be first of all” (πρώτιστα χάος γένητ’... 116), then Earth (... αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα / Γαῖ’ ...116-117), and Tartarus and Eros. Heaven does not appear until 127 and is not separated from Earth by Chaos but is born of her. There is nothing in the text that would argue that Chaos lies between the two at all.

M.L. West in his commentary on the *Theogony* defines the word adequately in a lexical sense as an empty space stuffed with darkness that can catch on fire.¹⁹ I rather like this as a definition because it sums up what Hesiod himself has to say about the phenomenon without placing irrelevant strictures on the term as do Kirk and Raven. Yet, this definition does not explain why Chaos appears πρώτιστα in the body of the poem. One must ask what place it takes in Hesiod’s drawing of the cosmos. The answer, when advanced, should, I think, be on a much more structural level than has been attempted heretofore.

What interests me first is that Chaos is not mentioned in the proem at all; yet, there Hesiod has placed the dialectically arranged generations of the gods if not all their names – except, of course, for Eros, a term, as we shall see, of as much philosophical and structural interest as Chaos itself. Secondly, the fact that Chaos begins the main body of the poem and is regarded as πρώτιστα there indicates to me that something unusual might very well be signified by the term. Thirdly – and this is much more in line with a possible psychological effect of the “yawning” image that is associated with the word – the grandchildren of Chaos by Night and great-grandchildren by Eris are not only a pretty gruesome lot but also totally disassociated in marriage from the children of Earth and Heaven. There is, as the poem continues in other words, an implied negative quality and opposition in the line of Chaos in con-

tradistinction to the genealogy from Earth, who herself becomes significant in the dialectic that results in the Olympian generation.²⁰

I take these three points to indicate that Chaos is a gaping opposite, an “other”, of not only the phenomena listed in the proem but also of what is to be described in the main narrative body of the poem itself – that is, a description of the genealogical movement towards the establishment of Zeus’ reign. In logical terms, Chaos is the necessary polar opposite, in a negative sense, to the positive genealogical forces of the cosmos as Hesiod describes them. In particular it is the opposite of Earth. Chaos establishes no well-defined interval between Heaven and Earth as some would have it but would seem to indicate rather much the opposite: an unlimited “other” whose only known boundary rests against its opposite.²¹ Parmenides makes use of a similar image in his description of the home of the goddess Δίκη, that realm of true Light which he opposes to the light and dark realm of Appearance. We are told of the threshold to this noetic realm. The realm, opposite to the realm of Appearance, is defined only by the boundary of this οὐδός. We know nothing of its outer limits. In any case, Chaos, in the *Theogony* is also structurally a negative term that acts in its own right as a factor in the cosmos as a whole. It is the dyadic, polar antipodal of “the other”, and because it is such, there can be little doubt of its philosophical significance. In Hesiod’s structural use of Chaos against the genealogical force that produces the Olympians we see the archaic oppositional pattern that typifies, for instance, the Parmenidian opposition between τὸ μὴ εἶν and τὸ εἶν.

The poem itself retains the same archaic logic of opposition as the proem. It creates a dynamic pattern that eventually results in the establishment of Zeus’ Olympian reign. The new feature of this section, however, is the third underlying term which unites the oppositions and makes them whole. An archaic tripartite structure is decisively introduced in the opening lines of the poem proper.

You will remember that Earth follows Chaos at 117. She, like Chaos, is one of the primal powers, the “ever-sure seat of all” (πάντων ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ ...). Earth, we must remember, bears the race of gods that will eventually lead to the reign of Zeus. In contrast and opposition to Chaos, Earth and her offspring assume at most times a much more positive aspect. There is little doubt that the relationship between Chaos and Earth is logically oppositional because of their place in the first two lines of the narrative body.²² It is important, however, that no strict, genealogical relationship is implied between the two. That particularly tensed-genealogical type of polar opposition is reserved for Earth and Heaven (126-127). There follows then the name of Tartarus (119), a phenomenon admittedly inferior in rank to Chaos and Earth (it is, after all, intimately connected with the latter) but important, I think, because it will eventually, in the structure of the universe, form the opposite of the realm of Zeus (720-721).²³ But the third real power that occurs in these lines is Eros, and it is here again, as with Chaos, that a logical

quality seems to enter Hesiod's poem.

Eros is in neither the genealogy originating with Chaos nor the genealogy originating with Earth. Its description as the most beautiful among the immortal gods, as unnerving the limbs, as overcoming the mind and wise counsels relegates this force to an especial place in the cosmos. Eros stands here as a cosmic, generative force. The connection between it and the genealogies that follow is obvious enough, and it is especially important to realize that it is some kind of third, underlying, holistic term that characterizes the relationship between Earth and Heaven – a term that in light of our investigation of the logic of the Homeric Hymns becomes very interesting indeed, since Eros reduces both men and gods to equal status in a strictly formal way: ἡδ' Ἔρος, ὅς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, / λυσιμελής, πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων / δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίρρονα βουλήν (“And Eros, most beautiful among the immortal gods, limb-relaxing, who conquers in breasts the mind and wise counsel of all gods and all men” – 120-122). Eros is one of three important divinities accompanying Aphrodite at the moment of her appearance in the world: “with her went Eros, and beautiful Desire followed” (τῇ δ' Ἔρος ὠμάρτησε καὶ Ἴμερος ἔσπετο καλός – 201). The collocation of these two phenomena forms clear evidence of the link between the important concept of ἴμερος in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* and Eros in the *Theogony*. Then also within the purview of Aphrodite lies φιλότης (206). The occurrence of this phenomenon is even more important than the appearance of ἴμερος, for throughout the genealogical sections of the work φιλότης constitutes the generative urge. Φιλότης is also, interestingly enough, a primary structural symbol in Empedocles. There could be an argument, then, for regarding Aphrodite, Eros, and Philotēs as one and the same, much in the same way one may identify Aphrodite and Eros in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, and insofar as Eros acts as Aphrodite or Philotēs in the *Theogony* the argument holds. Yet, in Hesiod this simple identification really does not explain why Eros is placed where it is, as one of the primal powers *before* the beginning of the genealogy itself, and why it seems to be used by Hesiod as something with its own special symbolic meaning.

What is Eros, then, as a separate phenomenon – that is separated at least partially from Aphrodite whom it is said to accompany (200)? Can one go beyond the mere representation of Eros as the third given (*Da-Seiende*) along with Chaos and Earth?²⁴ I think that here, in order to understand how Hesiod must have conceived the workings of his genealogies and why he would structure a universe in such a way, it is necessary to introduce one clear premise: a theogony is a structuring of a complete and whole universe, and the various primary elements of this structuring are what must concern us most. The opposition of Chaos and Earth establishes clearly the nature of this structure. Eros, as a third element, seems to possess a logical sense that makes it a phenomenon of the same order as Chaos and Earth, but one rel-

egated to a certain heuristic action rather than an obvious structural form. To put the matter more simply: Eros is the phenomenon by which Hesiod explains the forward movement between opposites in his genealogical pattern.²⁵ It is also the principle that maintains a tension between opposites.

Hesiod in a matter of seven lines (116-122) has established an almost ideal pattern for generating his universe. It is, of course, the generation or genealogy itself that should reflect the logical schema, as indeed it does. The oppositional patterns occur in Hesiod's *Theogony* in several connected ways – that is, it is possible to discover opposition not only between the primary phenomena of Chaos and Earth but also within and between the families of each. Moreover, opposition in the poem is clearly not confined to a sexual opposition. Asexual generation, for instance, is common. It makes little difference, therefore, if sexual union is involved. What is important is any opposition at all. Take as an example the first generation from Chaos.

Hesiod tells us that from Chaos arose Erebus and Night and of Night was born Aether and Day: ἐκ Χάος δ' "Ερεβός τε μέλαιρά τε Νύξ ἐγένοντο·/ Νυκτὸς δ' αὖτ' Αἰθήρ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη ἐξεγένοντο (123-124). Here the basic opposition lies between the exactly balanced foursome: Erebus and Night/ Aether and Day. That Day should come of Night might very well be explained by a theory that Night to Day is a progress while Day to Night is a regress.²⁶ It is, of course, possible that they are merely a natural pair. That they should be present at all, however, clearly stems from the inherent opposition of Aether and Day to Erebus and Night. The dyadic polarity of Day and Night is a given. One cannot be either conceived or experienced without the other; therefore, Day and Night are present, although in fact they are without offspring.

Another type of opposition becomes involved if one traces the generations from Chaos by Night in order to contrast the generations of Earth. Night bears hateful Doom, black Fate, Death, Sleep and Dreams.²⁷ Blame, painful Woe, the Hesperides, the Destinies, the ruthlessly punishing Fates, Nemesis, Deceit, Friendship,²⁸ accursed Old Age, and Strife, who herself abhorred, is the mother of Toil, Forgetfulness, Famine, Tearful Sorrows, Fightings, Battles, Murders, Manslaughters, Quarrels, Lying Words, Disputes, Lawlessness, Ruin, and Oath. This catalogue is one of sufferings²⁹ and above all endowed with a decided negative tenor. Night is deadly (ὀλοή – 224), and her offspring are hardly less so.

The generations from Earth are, on the other hand, generally positive in character – especially insofar as they answer the generations of Chaos. Over and above the simple opposition between Earth and Chaos, the *generational* opposition of which Earth is a *polar* member is that between Earth and Heaven. Earth bears Heaven equal to herself (ἴσον ἑωυτῇ – 126), and I submit that it is the geometry implied by this phrase that creates the simultaneous identity and opposition requisite for phenomena in polar oppo-

sition.³⁰ Earth then bears by herself Hills and Pontus, and it is the child of Pontus that best opposes the children of Night. Nereus, son of Pontus, and his children are in immediate juxtaposition to Eris and hers. Nereus is Pontus' oldest son and therefore his most important offspring (compare Eris as the most important child and also eldest of Night), and, as West comments, it is unusual that Nereus would be mentioned first if it were not necessary to form a contrast.³¹

This "contrast" is, however, an opposition. Not only does there exist a feminine/masculine opposition (Night:Eris :: Pontus:Nereus) but also there is a strong opposition between the characteristics of Strife and Nereus. Strife, abhorred in herself, produces a menagerie of horrors of which Lying Words, Lawlessness, Ruin, and Oath are members. In opposition, Nereus, the old man, is true and never lies. He is always right and gentle.³² His daughters by Doris are everything the children of Night are not – lovely, beautiful, gracious, wave-calming, fond of laughter, charming, etc. His last daughter, Nemertes (Infallible Truth), by her name and her position as last in the catalogue shows herself to be the reincarnation of her father's positive characteristics. There can be little doubt that Hesiod has conceived of Nereus and his children in opposition to Night and hers.

The primary logical and genealogical opposition which Hesiod uses initially to construct his cosmos, now, after the birth of the Nereids, moves into the background to make way for, and to a certain extent contribute to, the genealogical dialectic that is to end in the reign of Zeus. The use of opposition is now directed towards defining the three major masculine powers in the structural movement of the universe: Heaven, Cronos, and Zeus.

The Hesiodic genealogy solves the problem of the one and the many, for the first members of the cosmic tale live in characteristics of all following generations and, in so doing, contribute a oneness to the universe reigned over by a multitude of gods. Yet, in order to establish in this universe the presence of Zeus and the Olympians – the system of gods that best describes the cosmos in human rather than the cosmic or purely logical terms of Chaos, Earth, and Love³³ – Hesiod initiates a movement in the narrative of his poem and in his thought itself that is best described as dialectical. The three logical configurations are represented by the three generations of which the key members are respectively Heaven, Cronos, and Zeus. The heuristic element is, perversely enough, strife in contradistinction to love – the strife between wife and husband and child and father. The nexus that creates the possibility of either Eros or Eris as the heuristic term lies within lines 224-225 where Φιλότης as an opposition to Ἀπάτη (Deceit) might well be considered also to be the opposite of the other two members of the negative catalogue: Γῆρας (Old Age) and Ἔρις (Strife). The constant term in the dialectic is the feminine element: Gaia or Earth herself.

I said earlier that the children of Gaia could be considered initially as posi-

tive in opposition to the children of Chaos. Why then in the second spawning do Earth and Heaven produce the Cyclopes and in the third, Cottos, Briareus, and Gyes, of all their children the most terrible (δεωότατοι παίδων – 155)? The answer lies, I think, in the presence of hate-filled strife, a negative element in itself, as a heuristic phenomenon already manifest in their first set of children. They produce first deep-swirling Ocean, then Coeos, Crios, Hyperion, Iapetus, Theia, Rhea, Themis, Mnemosyne, Phoebe, Thethys, and then the youngest, most wily, and most clever of her children: Cronos. He hates his flourishing father: θαλερόν δ' ἤχθηρε τοκῆα ... (138). In other words, a list of gods and goddesses of positive tone (Themis and Mnemosyne are, after all, to be wives of Zeus, and Rhea is his mother) is followed or opposed by the hate-filled son. From this point the children become more and more despicable. Heaven hides these aberrations away in the bowels of Earth herself, rejoicing in his own ill act: κακῶ δ' ἐπετέρπετο ἔργω / Οὐρανός ... (158-159), Earth revolts, turning Cronos upon his father to engage in a brutal emasculation. Characteristically the father's members produce a set of oppositions: on the one side the powerful Erinyes, the huge Giants, and the obscure Meliae; on the other, Aphrodite in all her beauty and sexuality. Earth has had her revenge and has launched the process that will result in the reign of Zeus.³⁴ She has also given birth to a set of sons who because of their fearful deed are destined to feel the wrath of vengeance (207-210). The logistics of the *Theogony* are already made clear.

In the second generation more oppositions confront an unstable reign. As Cronos was to Heaven, so Zeus is to be to Cronos. The negative catalogues do not cease in this generation. Hesiod has provided the generation's simple opposition by juxtaposing the catalogues of the children of Night and Nereus (226-264), but there is yet more. Thaumias weds Electra to produce the neutral set of Iris (Rainbow) and the Harpies (265-269), Ceto bears to Phorcys a set of horrors: the Graiae, the Gorgons (Sthenno, Euryale, and Medusa, whose head was severed by Perseus, produces Pegasus and Chrysaor who himself fathers the three-headed Geryones). Ceto continues her bizarre progeny.³⁵ The neutral Echidna, half-snake and half-nymph (ἡμῖσι μὲν νύμφην ... ἡμῖσι δ' αὐτὴ πέλωρον ... 298-299) who of herself with Typhoeon, the outrageous, terrible, and lawless, produces the hounds, Orthus and Cerberus, the baneful-minded Hydra of Lerna who is the mother of the awful Chimaera. Echidna is the mother of the Sphinx and the Nemean Lion. Ceto's youngest is the Snake. There can be little doubt of the negative quality of Ceto's children.

A positive catalogue, however, balances off the negative one once again in the list of the children of Tethys and Ocean. Their sons are the rivers; their daughters, the holy race of nymphs (337-370). They are deep-eddying, beautiful, silver-swirling, and godlike. Eurybia with Crios bears Astraeus, Pallas, Perses, three surpassing all in knowledge. Eos herself is the mother of

the powerful winds and the stars. At this point follows the progeny of Styx. She was Ocean's most exalted daughter, and it is not surprising that she assumes the special place she does in the *Theogony* as a whole. Her marriage with Pallas and her offspring tell us much about the third generation of the gods and certainly prepares us for the approaching end of the reign of Cronos. Styx is by no means a goddess of totally positive aspect. Her children are Glory, Victory, Power, and Strength (383-385). Her importance lies in her own prerogatives and those of her children, for they no longer possess qualities apart from the *τιμή* which Zeus has given them.³⁶ Zeus in his struggle against the Titans promised each god who supported him his previous prerogatives or new ones (395-396). Styx and her children accept Zeus' offer and locate themselves in that reign of the third generation of gods that, as I shall argue, mitigates or intermediates the formal opposition between the generations of Heaven and Cronos. This scene with Styx points already to the third configuration of gods. Her "neutrality" is indicative of what is to come. The Hecate episode that follows produces yet another example of a goddess taking her place in the cosmos through the honor given her by Zeus. She encompasses a set of generative and maternal traits that throw her in league with Eros and Philotês: she asks Hermes to increase the herd (444); she is the nurse of the young (452). Hecate is the positive force that balances Prometheus' negative one. As Norman O. Brown says: "The catalogue of benefactions conferred by Hecate shows her to be a goddess who combines in her own one person the attributes of the fifty daughters of Nereus . . . Prometheus, on the other hand, 'the cunning trickster' who 'quarreled with the purposes of the all-powerful son of Cronos', embodies some of the most pernicious forces among the descendants of Night: Deceit, Strife, Lawlessness, and Madness".³⁷ Once again Strife defines a negative pole. The most important point in terms of the logistics of the *Theogony* as a whole, however, is that Zeus honored Hecate above all: *τὴν περὶ πάντων/ Ζεὺς Κρονίδης τίμησε* ... (411-412). It was he who made her the nurse of the young from the beginning (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς*) — that is from the beginning of the third and final structuring and ruling of the world that Zeus' reign represents.

In the middle of the oppositional episodes of Hecate and Prometheus (404-452 and 507-616) lies the opposition that is to destroy the second generation of gods: the marriage of Cronos and Rhea. The agent of destruction is Zeus, the child of their match. Here, as it was in the case of Earth and Heaven, we are faced with a progeny comprising both negative and positive characteristics. In fact, the resemblance of this episode (453-506) to that of Earth and Heaven (134-210) is striking, and one cannot help speculating that this repetition must have a great deal to do with a certain balance and appositional identity between the first and second generations of gods. While Hestia, Demeter, and Hera are to take their place as positive members of the Olympian pantheon, the trilogy of Hades of the pitiless heart, in triad along with

the positive or neutral Earth-shaking Poseidon of the great blows and Zeus the wise, creates a spectrum that can only be compared to the structure of Hesiod's cosmos as he conceives it after the great battle with the Titans. The Olympians too possess their negative members, but their relationship to the positive ones is no longer totally antipodal. It tends to be peculiarly triadic.

In any case, the episode of Rhea and Cronos continues to parallel that of Earth and Heaven. Cronos, so that no other god might hold the right of ruling and because from Earth and Heaven he has learned that he is to be overthrown by his own son, swallows his children as Heaven forced his into Earth. As Earth was in distress so Rhea is seized with insufferable grief. She turns to her parents so that she might conceal Zeus' birth and — what is more indicative of the logistics of the work — so that she might make Cronos pay for the vengeful spirits of Heaven — that is, settle up the debt (472). Earth receives Zeus (479) and hides him away. She gives Cronos a stone which he stuffs into his belly. She also tricks him into spewing forth his children. In other words, it is Earth again who is the agent of a generation's destruction, and it is important, I think, to mark her influence as a kind of underlying ground against which the logistics of the poem play.³⁸ Her presence is of major importance for all three generations.

Zeus, then, is born, and the third generation of gods comes into power much in the same way as does the second with the significant exception that Zeus performs no brutal emasculation upon his father but brings the conflict into a more general level by freeing his father's brothers whom Heaven had enchained, thereby obtaining not only his thunderbolt and lightning but also the gratitude of a part of the second generation with whom he must battle. Zeus and the Olympians again move to destroy the reign of the second generation by freeing Briareus, Cottos, and Gyes of whom Cronos was exceeding jealous. They act as the ultimate agent by which the second reign is destroyed (617-628). The *Theogony* has now reached the point of the great war between the second and third generations, and unlike that singular act of Cronos upon Heaven that marked the movement between the first and the second, this strife is generalized. After a long war between the generations (635-636) — a war that had no end of difficult strife (οὐδέ τις ἦν ἐριδος χαλεπῆς λύσις — 637) — Zeus turns Cottos and his brother upon the Titans (644ff.). The battle becomes much worse. The sea rings. The earth crashes. Heaven is shaken and groans (678-681). Zeus no longer restrains his power (687), and soon fire engulfs the earth, sea, and even Ocean — an "Ocean" we shall soon see to be of extreme symbolic and mythical importance. The extent of this struggle is signified by Chaos' filling with heat (700) and by the seeming smash and crush of Heaven against Earth. In other words, the Olympian reign of the third generation arises from a condition not unlike the beginning of the world in which a Chaos, Earth, and Heaven have not their proper relationships and functions. The third reign originates from the almost

total destruction of the structural relationships within the first and second. The reign of the Olympians then might be said to represent a necessary genealogical and logical synthesis of the oppositions between and within the generations preceding them. There is probably no clearer example of a tripartite, oppositional logic in Greek literature than here in the lines of Hesiod's *Theogony*.

The third generation itself is one of intermediation in that it is one of conciliation. The tension of opposition still remains, but it is structured in a particular way – that is, Zeus relegates the forces of the past generations to their proper niche in the universe, thereby constructing the cosmos along his own lines in terms of an inherent opposition that usually includes that delegation of *τιμή* we have noted previously in the cases of Styx, her children, and Hecate. The Titans, the adversaries, are imprisoned beneath the earth (716-719) chained in a specific place as far below earth as heaven is above, unlike the adversaries of earlier generations who were simply hidden away in Earth's depths. Briareus, Cottos, and Gyes, Titans yet allies of Zeus, are there too, but in the position of guards, dwelling on the bottom of Ocean (734-735 and 815-819).³⁹ There are the homes of Night, or her children, Sleep and Death, and of Hades and Persephone (758-773). Styx again takes her proper place (775-777).

Zeus continues his conciliation by marrying various normative goddesses of the older order, thereby establishing the Olympian generation (886-929). First is Metis (Counsel) who conceives Athena and then is swallowed by Zeus on the advice of Earth and Heaven so that she could not give birth to the one fated to be the successor to Zeus himself and so that he himself might devise both good and evil (900).⁴⁰ Zeus has, in effect, incorporated into himself the heuristic principle that set generation against generation. The oppositions which were sustained by it are now part of a single god rather than two or more. Zeus has become a third term regulating oppositions. His next marriage with Themis (Law) produces the three Hours and the three Fates. By Eurynome, an Oceanid, he begets the three Graces. Note in the last two cases that triads of children have been produced. Perhaps such triads, e.g., Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades, represent not only a new structuring of the cosmos, but also one that is somehow more stable. By Demeter Persephone is born, the prize of that negative force, Hades. By Leto he begets the nine Muses – another triadic phenomenon. Zeus' only dual progeny in his catalogue is Artemis and Apollo. Here the polarity is sexual; its identity is clearly stated: the progeny is lovelier than any in heaven (919). In other words, the polar and oppositional nature of the poem continues in the third generation, e.g., the balanced juxtaposition of Zeus fathering Athena and Hera mothering Hephaestus (924-929), but while the tension remains, Hera did not *mix* in *φιλότης* (οὐ *φιλότητι* *μιγεῖσα* – 927) but was violent and *strove* with her mate (... *ζαμένησε καὶ ἤρισεν ὥ παρακοίτη* – 928) – still the destructive potential

of the opposition seems curbed. His last marriage with Hera produces the triad of Hebe, Ares, and Eileithuia (922). The third generation of gods is complete.⁴¹

The *Theogony*, then, reveals the following archaic features: a general oppositional structure, reflected in the dyadic arrangement of the proem and made particular by the opposition of Earth and Chaos in the main body of the work, is linked by a heuristic third term: Eros. Eros, in turn, is involved in a genealogical polar opposition that is made particular in the opposition of Earth and Heaven. This opposition linked with the heuristic element of strife and vengeance leads to a dialectic between generations. Two generations are balanced against one another and identified both by the retributive principle of vengeance and by the figures of Heaven and Cronos and their respective sons. Yet, it is the underlying third term, seen structurally in the construction of the proem, that produces the necessity and stability of the final culmination of the poem – that is, the Olympian generation. This generation introduces a triadic symbol of its own archaic stability. Reflecting triadic structures (e.g., Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades and the trilogies of Zeus' children), it structures oppositions in such a way as to indicate some intermediation or synthesis has taken place. A harmony within the cosmos is revealed as a tensioned stability.

The Hesiodic configuration is an immediate forerunner of the "hidden" harmony of Heraclitus⁴² and represents triadic structures easily seen in not only Heraclitus, but also Parmenides and Empedocles. And just as the structures of these pre-Socratics are formed or based on symbolic phenomena, so we find symbolic representation a key force in the *Theogony*. In the poem it carries both the idea of opposition and basic heuristic phenomena to a higher level.

Symbolic structuring, that is, as I have said before, that active formation of phenomena neither of the purely "objective" world as we define it today nor the purely subjective one, but belonging to the holistic, archaic category of meaning and possessed of affective, emotive characteristics, finds a clear representation in Hesiod's *Theogony*. I speak of the world structured in the reign of Zeus by the opposition of Olympus and Tartarus. This opposition, as I pointed out in an earlier context, first appears when the two are juxtaposed in lines 118 and 119, but the construction of the cosmos as a symbol does not occur until line 720 when the second generation of Titans is finally defeated.


At this point Hesiod delineates the mythical spatial and temporal dimensions of the cosmos, for he lodges the Titans in a "place" as far below earth as Heaven is above it (τόσσον ἔνεργ' ὑπὸ γῆς ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης – 720). The dimensions are given by the length of time of a falling brazen anvil: nine nights and nine days from Heaven to Earth, nine nights and nine days from Earth to Tartarus:

ἐννέα γὰρ νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέατα χάλκεος ἄκμων
οὐρανὸν καθιὼν δεκάτῃ δ' ἐς γαίαν ἵκοιτο·
ἐννέα δ' αὖ νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέατα χάλκεος ἄκμων
ἐκ γαίης καθιὼν δεκάτῃ κ' ἐς Τάρταρον ἵκοι·

For a bronze anvil dropping down from heaven
For nine nights and days would come to earth on the tenth;
And a bronze anvil dropping down from earth
For nine nights and days would come to Tartarus on the tenth.

Th. 722-725.

Note the strong structural parallelism achieved by the near identity of the first and third lines. Hesiod is creating a cosmos of symmetrical and opposed parts. He bases these parts, moreover, on a triadic arrangement that parallels the structure of the cosmos' three reigns in general and the triadic phenomena of Zeus' reign in particular. The "spatial" dimensions of the cosmos given in mythically temporal numbers is:



The opposition of Heaven (Olympus) and Tartarus is structurally and symbolically represented by the addition of a third term (Earth) and by a "temporal" equation that states that Heaven is to Earth as Earth is to Tartarus (Heaven:Earth :: Earth:Tartarus). An identical structuring lies in the thought patterns of Heraclitus. We have here a cosmos created in symbolic terms of a mythically temporal and spatial character. Hesiod's statement is simple and structurally exact in itself. The relationships can be drawn, but only in a highly schematized, geometrical fashion, so that they still retain their symbolic meanings.

Further symbolic phenomena appear in Hesiod's description of Tartarus itself. I spoke earlier of the three Titans acting as guards of their brethren enchained in Tartarus and of the further possibility of their living on the floor of Ocean. This vagueness in terms of any "real" objective, material location is one of the features of symbolic regions (consider, for instance, the Isle of Ortygia or the Land of the Lotus Eaters in the *Odyssey*); a geometrical structuring of symbolic phenomena does not, however, partake of this vagueness. Take, as an example, the description of Olympus' opposite: Tartarus. It is characteristically surrounded by a circular fence of bronze, a wall into which

Poseidon has inset gates. A triple line of night flows about its throat: ἀμφὶ δέ μω νύξ/τριστοιχεί κέχυται περὶ δειρήν (726-727). The geometric circular structure of the fence and the movement (flowing – κέχυται) of night suggest the symbolic phenomenon of which Parmenides speaks in fragment 12. There is no material or physical quality to these circles – the presence of night tends to preclude even a rational or positive condition, if we remember Night's negative position in the *Theogony* itself and in the proem to Parmenides' main work. Yet, circularity is a decided feature. This a-material yet structural characteristic of Tartarus and its neighboring regions manifests itself even further: there all in order (ἐξείης) are all the sources and limits (πείρατα) of Tartarus, sea, and heaven (736-738). Although the division is difficult to represent in schematic terms, still Hesiod's use of ἐξείης indicates that for him an order existed. Yet this order is not material, for Tartarus is a great chasm where a man would be buffeted for a year before reaching the floor (740-743).⁴³ The *πείρατα* of Tartarus are not objectively material. They are the "limits" so widely discussed in Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles.⁴⁴

It is the same in the case of those regions "adjoining" Tartarus: the home of murky Night and the halls of Persephone and Hades, the home of Styx, eldest daughter of Ocean. The location in physical terms of the home of Night (Νυκτὸς ἐρεμνῆς οἰκίαν – 744) is extremely difficult to ascertain. There is no locative in the line that places it in any relationship to Tartarus. In front of this undefined home (τῶν πρόσθ' – 746), however, stands Atlas holding wide heaven on his head and unwearying hands (746-747). The picture is a graphic one, not in objective, material, and spatial terms, but in symbolic ones. This archaic symbolism continues in the description of the house itself and its great brazen threshold. Here is the mythical point where "Night and Day drawing close meet one another, crossing alternately the great threshold of bronze" (ὅθι Νύξ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη ἄσسون ἰοῦσαι/ἀλλήλας προσέειπον, ἀμειβόμεναι μέγαν οὐδὸν/χάλκεον – 748-750). The picture is strikingly similar to the one in Parmenides' proem. Hesiod's threshold is the one point where the opposites "co-exist", and while the house of Night itself never holds them both, this symbol of the οὐδός represents a point or line where the opposites are identical.⁴⁵ The halls of Hades and Persephone (δόμοι) are equally difficult to place although they too are designated to be in some relationship to Tartarus. They are both "there" (ἐνθα) and "in front" (πρόσθεν – 767). Yet, again these are not objectively spatial phenomena and can be interpreted only in terms of a general relationship to the symbol of Tartarus itself. Its parallelism in location to the home of Night is perhaps made clear by the figure that stands before (προπάροιθε – 769) these halls – that terrible dog with its ugly stratagem. Cerberus before Hades parallels Atlas before Night. In their power and horror they act as a sign for their respective mythical region.

In this mythic and symbolic location (ἐνθα – 775) also dwells Styx, a

goddess designated a position by Zeus in the structuring of his realm. Styx is relatively negative in aspect and yet possesses prerogatives in a cosmic sense. She is described in affective, emotive terms, just as is the awful home of murky Night (Νυκτὸς ἐρεμνῆς οἰκία δεινὰ – 744) and the echoing (ἡχήμεντες) halls of Hades and awful (ἐπαινῆς) Persephone before which stands the fearful (δευός) and pitiless (νηλεῆς) Cerberus (767-770). Styx is loathed by the immortals (στυγερὴ ἀθανάτοισι – 775) and terrible (δεινὴ – 776). Moreover, as the “eldest daughter of backward-flowing Ocean” (θυγάτηρ Ἀψορροῦ Ὠκεανοῖο/ πρεσβυτάτη ... 776-777), she forms an important symbolic link between Tartarus and one of the most important symbolic phenomena in all archaic Greek thought: Ocean.

Ocean in Hesiod is the river which is *τελήεις* (perhaps “circling”)⁴⁶ and is differentiated clearly from Sea. The latter is born of Earth without longed-for love (ἄταρ φιλότητος ἐφιμέρον – 132); the former, however, is the product of the union of opposites, Earth and Heaven, and is, in fact, the first child of this first match. The importance of this phenomenon is indicated by the addition of the accompanying adjective, “deep-flowing” (Ὠκεανὸν βαθυδύην – 133).⁴⁷ This “Ocean” possesses a strong cultural meaning and maintains its force throughout epic and lyric poetry. In Homer, there is really little more help, for there Ocean is described basically as a place from which the gods spring and as a genesis of all.⁴⁸ Also in Homer as well as Hesiod, Ocean is described as “backward-flowing”.⁴⁹ Then too in Homer, the idea of Ocean as an “unceasing”, “unspeakable”, or “unreachable stream” (ροὸς ἄσπετος) appears⁵⁰ – an adjective Empedocles is to transfer to time itself (ἄσπετος αἰών – 16). Nor are the Homeric “streams of Ocean” (Ὠκεανοῖο ρεέθρα) unknown to Hesiod (695). There is, then, a definite sense of movement attributed to this mythical stream in addition to a seminal power over the birth of gods and men. There is, moreover, no real objective and material location for this region. One must suspect that we are dealing with a symbolic phenomenon possessed of strong affective qualities. This powerful symbol – one of the most significant for the understanding of the archaic mentality in general and of Parmenides in particular – must be conceived in archetypal terms as a bent line or a circle, for Ocean is the horizon. There is no better proof of the strongly subjective, mythical tenor of archaic thought than Ocean, for it can easily be proven that structurally the phenomenon is the non-material and only partially objective line at the furthest limits of a man’s vision.

Early Greek literature provides us with an abundance of clues. In more objective, quasi-physical terms, Homer and the poets tell us that Okeanos is a curved or circular line at the furthest limits of vision – this time not a vision *structured inwardly* but one *structuring outwardly*. Throughout early poetry it is the stars that move beyond, into, out of Okeanos: The Wain does not set; it is without a share (ἄμμορος) of the baths of Okeanos (καὶ τ’ Ὠρίωνα

δοκεύει, οἷη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὀκεανοῖο – *Il.* 18.488-489). The star Arcturus leaves the holy stream of Okeanos as it rises into the night sky (... τότε ἄσπερ Ἀρκτοῦρος προλιπὼν ἱερὸν ῥόον Ὀκεανοῖο – *E.* 565-566). Here indeed lies the identity of Okeanos and the sea itself: The Pleiades, for instance, plunge into the misty sea to escape the constellation Orion (εὐτ' ἂν Πληιάδες σθένος ὕβριμον Ὀρίωνος/φεύγουσαι πίπτωσιν ἐς ἡεροειδέα πόντον – *E.* 619-620). In the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* the Sun sinks earthward to Okeanos, and from deep-flowing Okeanos, Eos, Dawn, arises (Ἡέλιος μὲν ἔδυνε κατὰ χθονὸς Ὀκεανόνδε – 68; Ἡὼς δ' ἡριγένεια φῶς θνητοῖσι φέρουσα/ὠρῖντ' ἀπ' Ὀκεανοῖο βαθυρρόου – 184-185). Mimnermus sings of Dawn departing Okeanos and climbing into the sky (ἐπεὶ ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἡὼς/Ὀκεανὸν προλιποῦσ' οὐρανὸν εἰσαναβῇ – *West* 12.3-4). Stesichorus tells of Helios, having passed through Okeanos, come to the depth of night (Ἀέλιος δ' ... ὄρα δι' Ὀκεανοῖο περάσας ἀρίκειθ' ἱερᾶς ποτὶ βένθεα νυκτὸς – *Diehl* 6.1-3). Again the symbol of Okeanos as deep, as subjective, as non-physical. And again the concept of Okeanos as the line of darkness beyond which one might find the Sun.⁵¹ Each of these subjective/objective representations deal with celestial phenomena and the movement of the Sun – that is the powerful more subjective division of the world into light and dark and the logically more objective division of the world's movement into time or the flow of years: it is in Hesiod's *Erga*, for instance, that we are told when the Pleiades and Hyades and Strong Orion set, a completed, full year (πλειῶν from πλέος, “full”) so joined or fit-together (ἄρμενος) goes beneath the earth (Πληιάδες δ' Ἰάδες τε τό τε σθένος Ὀρίωνος/δύνωσιν .../πλειῶν δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἄρμενος εἶη – *E.* 615-617). Hesiod speaks here of the succession of the movement of stars that makes up the fullness of a year's time. Where do the movements of the stars achieve this fullness and completeness? At the line of Earth (χθῶν)? At the line of sea (πόντος)? At the line of Okeanos? Yes, but what are these three lines in terms of a symbolic phenomenon that structures the world outwardly? I submit that the evidence points to Okeanos and its equivalents as the curve and circle formed by a man's horizon – horizon, the meeting ground of the subjective structure of the mind and the objective structuring of the perception of physical matter.

It was this same line that Parmenides exploited so satisfactorily to himself, although somewhat confusedly to those caught in Aristotelian categories of space and time. It was surely the sense of this line to the “beyond”, the “mythical”, and the “unknown” that ultimately provided Empedocles with the concept of Titan Aether binding all things about the circle (38) and allowed Heraclitus the possibility of positing the unseen third term of the *Logos* – a structural phenomenon that lay beyond the simple dyadic line of oppositions.

NOTES

1. As I continue developing my discussion of archaic symbolism, it will become clearer that the word *σῆμα* must stand for this phenomenon in Greek thought. The connotation of an immediate "sign" or "image" also seems integral to this idea. For this reason, perhaps even *σύμβολον* could qualify as a usable word.

2. Cassirer, *op. cit.* 2. 251, considers this essential difference between archaic and Platonic thought when he comments upon Plato *Symposium* 203a: *θεός δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐγρηγοροῦσι καὶ καθεύδουσι*. The *θεός* does not mix with the *ἄνθρωπος*. No, it is a question of an association and dialectic. The actual identity or mixture between man and god, the archaic comprehension of the situation, no longer maintains its force.

3. As the *Hymn to Aphrodite* comes more and more into the critical focus of classical scholars, the structural properties of the poem are being defined with more clarity. A helpful work, drawing together the strands of research on the hymn and introducing possible further investigations is Henryk Podbielski's *La structure de l'hymne homérique à Aphrodite* (Warsaw 1971). Podbielski combs carefully through scholarship from the middle of the nineteenth century, revealing nicely the movement from concerns dealing with author, epoch, and place of origin to structural considerations of an oral, linguistic, interpretive, and geometrical nature. It was A. Ludwig's *Homerischer Hymnenbau* (Leipzig 1908) that argued a quadripartite structure to the hymn and established an interpretation of the poem in terms of the negation of the *ἔργα* of the goddess. Podbielski, with the aid of H.N. Porter, "Repetition in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite", *AJP* 70 (1949), van Groningen, *op. cit.*, and others, carefully considers the possibilities of unifying motifs and structures — obviously seeing Ludwig's incomplete but nonetheless interesting work as a strong force necessitating a structural interest in the poem. In my own opinion, H.N. Porter's article is the most valuable single treatment, for he not only views the past literature in terms of a "repetition" that will lead to a first structural analysis (249-250) but also introduces the possibility of viewing equally both formulaic and literary phenomena. It was he who noted that in the first three lines of the poem we find introduced the three words, *ἔργα*, *Ἀφροδίτη*, and *ἕμερος*, that are to occur time and time again as repetitions, forming in the work developmental and structurally unifying devices (251). He too has given us the raw data — for which I am exceedingly thankful — dealing with the instances of words for men and gods. The data, without interpretation, is itself almost enough to prove the existence of a mutual realm of men and gods. It is but one step to my own structural analysis and Charles Segal's "The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite: A Structuralist Approach", *CW* LXVII.4 (1974). Segal working independently comes upon some of the same conclusions as I. We both see that if one views the hymn structurally, the work unfolds itself in terms of a primary mediation (206). This mediating terms is Eros or Aphrodite herself (208). From this point the structuralist analysis is assured.

4. Underlinings indicate particular words that are linguistically and/or syntactically important to the study of the *Hymn to Aphrodite*.

5. One might note that the same two concepts appear in *h.h. Dem.* 260 (*ἀθάνατον κέν τοι καὶ ἀγήραον ἤματα πάντα*). Unfortunately no formulaic connection can be made.

6. These nymphs must represent an intermediation between men and gods in the realm of nature. This is not peculiar to this one hymn. Look for instance at the "bee goddesses", the teachers of divination, in the *Hymn to Hermes*, 550ff. or the *Hymn to Pan*, the piece that sets the god in his realm, i.e., nature, in a pastoral sense.

7. It is not necessary to discuss at any length the various possible types of separate occurrences or exact or inexact oppositions between terms for mortality and immor-

tality; the following data is sufficient to prove the point I wish to make clear; beneath a conscious structural use of the juxtaposition between mortal and immortal, there lies an extraordinarily high incidence of language indicating that the hymn is dealing constantly and directly with the relationship between – or I should argue “sphere” of – men and gods. One has only to look at the clustering and repetition of the following line numbers to arrive also at a proof of a *general* juxtaposition of ideas. H.N. Porter, *loc. cit.*, provides the instances of the adjective *καταθνητός*. I have incorporated his raw data with my own in the following list: the adjective *καταθνητός* modifies *ἄνθρωπος* six times in this hymn of 293 hexameter lines (3, 52, 122, 192, 200, 281). It is found with *γύνη* three times (39, 50, 250) and appears as a substantive in lines 46, 51, and 110. *θνητός* is used alone twice (145 and 259). The variation, *χαμαιγενέων ἄνθρώπων*, occurs once (108), a collocation reminiscent of the *ἄνδρας ἐπιχθονίους* of line 12. The phrase *θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων* appears twice (35 and 149). The word *βροτός* is used substantively four times (32, 167, 255, 268) and adjectivally once in line 199. There are three instances of *ἄνθρωπος* without *θνητός* (142, 188, 245). The adjective *βρότεος* occurs once (47). As one would expect because of the religious nature of the hymn, the adjective *ἀθάνατος* appears much more frequently than *καταθνητός*. Eighteen times it is used substantively (51, 55, 96, 109, 129, 147, 203, 205, 211, 214, 219, 221, 239, 240, 250, 253, 261, 268) and five times it appears as an adjective modifying *θεός* (41, 142, 167, 190, 247). The instances of various forms of *θεός* in the hymn number to 23 (32, 35, 41, 48, 50, 52, 62, 95, 109, 142, 149, 153, 172, 185, 186, 190, 195, 204, 246, 247, 275, 290, 292). Of related words, *μάκαρ* is used once as an adjective modifying *θεός* (35) and once substantively (195), *ἄμβροτος* appears adjectivally three times (62, 175, 260), and *ἄμβρόσιος* occurs twice (63 and 232).

8. In both the hymns to Demeter and Hermes the exposition contains a significant line pointing to a juxtaposition of men and gods: *ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς ἡδὲ θνητοὺς ἀνθρώπους* (*h.h. Dem.* 11) and *λήθων ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς θνητοὺς τ' ἀνθρώπους* (*h.h. Her.* 9). It cannot be too strongly argued that the opening lines of these hymns act as a prologue to the central content and that, since in all three the juxtaposition of men and gods is so obvious, the poems themselves are somehow based or dependent upon the theme.

9. Porter, *op. cit.* p. 258.

10. It is not surprising that Aphrodite immediately after the tale of Tithonus juxtaposes herself and Anchises in a formally loose but nonetheless interesting statement about men in the realm of the gods: *οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ γε σέ τοιόν ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἐλοίμην / ἀθάνατόν τ' εἶναι* ...: “I [Aphrodite, a goddess] would not take you [Anchises, a mortal] to be such among the immortals, and to be immortal . . . 239-240.

11. Perhaps the children of the second type of match are not mentioned because it is Aphrodite herself who will, by giving birth to Aeneas, satisfy that condition. After all this is what the story is all about. Line 52 finds an almost exact repetition at line 250 (*ἀθανάτους συνέμειξα καταθνητῇσι γυναιξί*) where Aphrodite speaks of her disgrace and of the fear the other immortals held of her because of her wiles and ability to mate gods with mortals – that is, the ability to force the necessity of the intermediate realm.

12. A good deal of my following analysis has appeared in *Apeiron* 8:2 (1974), pp. 1-12.

13. Ever since Paul Friedländer argued that the proem of the *Theogony* assumed the formal properties of the Homeric Hymns, “Das Prooimium der Theogonie”, *Hermes* 49 (1914), pp. 1-16, there has been a great deal of work devoted to the structure of the proem and its nature as a hymn. These studies are characterized by the varying degrees of structural complexity each critic discovers in the proem itself. For studies on this problem in recent years, see P. Walcott, “The Problem of the Prooimium of Hesiod’s *Theogony*”, *Symbolae Osloenses* 33 (1957), pp. 37-47; H. Schwabl, “Aufbau und Struktur des Prooimions der Hesiodischen Theogonie”, *Hermes* 91 (1963), pp. 385-415 and

Hesiods Theogonie. Eine unitarische Analyse (Vienna-Bolau 1966); William W. Minton, "The Proem-Hymn of Hesiod's *Theogony*", *TAPA* 101 (1970), pp. 357-377. One of the arguments is from panel-structure (Walcot) in which the story of the Muses' birth (verses 53-65) forms a central core about which flows the description of the Muses' singing and the catalogue of their song (verses 1-10 and 11-21; 36-43 and 44-52, 65-71 and 71-79; and 104 and 105-115). Within this second panel there lie two short excursions into the relationship between the Muses and humans (verses 22-35 and 80-103). The schema is A (1-21), B (22-35), A (36-52), C (53-65), A (65-79), B (80-103), A (104-115). Minton pursues this triptych nature of the proem and its relationship to the Homeric Hymns. Schwabl's studies are the most complicated of the lot. He finds a "pentadischen Grundrhythmus" that permeates the proem: "Ein pentadischer Rhythmus bestimmt Vortrag und Versführung. Das Prooimion mit seinen Teilen ist darin gesungen in 7 Pentaden, 9 Pentaden und wieder 7 Pentaden. Das Ganze durchzieht ein Spiel, das die Abschnitte bestimmt. Dieses Spiel ist neunmal da und führt vom Verse 11 bis zum Verse 99 in drei Gängen einer Motivreihe: Katalog, Motiv, Themenangabe. Die Einzelelemente dieser Motivreihe haben deutlich Funktion" ("Aufbau und Struktur", p. 414). The reader will note that my own structure is by far the most simple – a mere alternation between the easily-observed phenomena of an apostrophe to the Muses and the genealogical nature of their song. I am in total agreement with B.A. van Groningen, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-262, insofar as he sees the proem as a conflation of two strong motives or ideas. Why do I prefer such a construction over the above? First, leaving the narrower question of the hymn aside, the simple structure reveals much more clearly the introduction of the work's primary theme: the genealogical formation of the universe. Second, where one can argue that the simpler "artistic technique" could be derived directly from the appositional nature of the Greek language in which two important areas of apposition assume the form of an alternation, it is almost impossible for me to attribute any more complicated structure to Hesiod without assuming a degree of technical artistry that would combine a Vergil with an Eliot. The work to date on this problem has approached Hesiod entirely on the wrong level of linguistic sophistication. It has assumed a conscious, basically non-linguistic control of the language that is impossible to assume except in part. That "part", it seems to me, lies in an appositional alternation that lends itself to dyadic opposition – an oppositional technique one finds easily in the main body of the *Theogony* and indeed in the pre-Socratic philosophers themselves.

14. Lines 19 and 20 form the first instance of an oppositional polar entity in the *Theogony*. Note how Hesiod indicates the primary opposition of light and dark by the end-line positions of the Moon and Night and their proper adjectives Ἡὼς τ' Ἡελίου τε μέγαν λαμπρὰν τε Σελήην / Γαίαν τ' Ὠκεανόν τε μέγαν καὶ Νύκτα μέλαιναν. For another example of the "stylistic" use of opposition see my note, "On Theogony 118 and 119", *CP* LXVII.1 (1972), pp. 54-55.

15. For a similar argument see Hans Flach's *Das System der Hesiodischen Kosmogonie* (Leipzig 1874). Also in an article that has formed a basis for much of my own argument on the subject, Paula Philippson in her "Genealogie als mythische Form", *Symbolae Osloenses* 7 (1936) also insists that the idea of unity is central to the poem: "Die gesamten Erscheinungen, Kräfte und Gesetze des Kosmos bilden eine genosartige Einheit" (p. 4).

16. Snell has already spoken of "The Rise of the Individual in the Early Greek Lyric", *op. cit.*, Chap. 3, pp. 43-70, and indicated strongly that here is the major distinction between the epic and lyric mentality. Hesiod must represent some sort of transition between these categories, for not only is his consciousness as a poet great but also his consciousness of self. The Muses teach him glorious song (αἶνόν ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν Ἀοιδῶν *Th.* 22). What the Muses speak to him are ἀληθέα, although interestingly enough they also know how to speak "false things as though they were true". The question of the duality of truth and falsity will arise again when I speak of the frag-

ments of Parmenides as will the question of a substantive choice for the way of truth. No one can deny that the germ of both ideas is lodged in these lines: ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοία, / ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι (*ibid.* 27-28).

17. M.L. West in his *Hesiod Theogony* (Oxford 1960), p. 230, comments on the phrase *θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι* (223) as one mostly used as an antithesis to the immortal gods, citing lines 296 (*θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν*), 588 (*θαῦμα δ' ἔχ' ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς θνητοὺς τ' ἀνθρώπους*), and 967-968 (*ὅσσοι δὲ θνητοῖσι πᾶρ' ἀνδράσιν εὐνηθεῖσαι/ ἀθάναται...*). These are examples of what I described previously as "formal juxtapositions". Other "less formal" ones appear in lines 47, 197, 204, 220, 302, 372-373, and 407. An analysis is not necessary. What is important is that this opposition seems to be central in the literature of the period and what appeared in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* as an important thematic and structural device is maintained in the *Theogony* in a decidedly subordinate role as one type of opposition in a work structured on oppositions of a more extended and refined character.

18. F.M. Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae* (Cambridge 1952), pp. 194ff., and G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1962), pp. 26-32.

19. West, *op. cit.* p. 192-193.

20. It is Philippson, *op. cit.* p. 9, who stresses this opposition. Hermann Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich 1960), p. 318, also emphasizes the negative state of the children of Night.

21. Fränkel, *ibid.* pp. 317-318, sees in Chaos a principle much like the one I am describing: "Denn wirkliche Gegensätze sind es; die Nacht ist für Hesiod nicht der Nullzustand: Tag minus Tag und Chaos ist nicht: Welt minus Welt. Sondern Chaos und Nacht sind nach Hesiods Aussage geworden; sie sind also nicht ein rein privatives Nicht, sondern ein negatives Etwas. So sind und bleiben sie ein Zweites, anderes neben dem Positiven".

22. Cf. Philippson, *op. cit.* pp. 11-12, for a very persuasive argument in favor of the clearly formed opposition between Earth and Chaos. She does make it clear, however, that between these two opposites there is no genealogical tie or fight.

23. Should line 119 be retained in the text? I tend to argue that Tartarus (119) forms a necessary and expected opposition to Olympus (118) and hence both lines should remain. See my "On Theogony 118 and 119".

24. Cf. Philippson, *loc. cit.* p. 12.

25. There is another example of a powerful heuristic force in the *Works and Days*. There Eris in her second nature (it is interesting that here Hesiod explains this phenomenon by opposition in what we should call "ethical" terms) is described as located in the "roots of the earth" (*γαίης ἐν ῥίζῃσι* – 19). She moves the shiftless to work (*ἦτε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὁμῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει* – 20). She is a wholesome force for men (*ἀγαθὴ δ' Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν* – 24) in that she fosters healthy emulation between them. In so far as Eris is a hidden, heuristic force in the universe its resemblance to Eros in the *Theogony* is considerable; yet, one must remember that in the *Theogony* itself Eris assumes an inferior position to Eros as the offspring of Night (*Th.* 225) and is herself mother of a catalogue of horrors (226-232). While Eros in the *Theogony* is described as a purely positive and pleasant force, Eris, even in her better form, still maintains certain negative characteristics derived from her mother, Night. Eros, then, is by genealogy (or really lack thereof) a more potent and certainly purer force.

26. Cf. West, *op. cit.* p. 197; also Fränkel, *op. cit.* p. 318, where he argues that the negative phenomena must precede the positive.

27. The combination of Sleep and Dreams bears an oppositional relationship to Death in the way Day and Aether does to Night and Erebus. The positive/negative polarization of the two phenomena appears again at 758-766 where Sleep is described as gentle to men (*μελιχρὸς ἀνθρώποισι* – 763), Death as possessed of a heart of iron and pitiless (*τοῦ*

δὲ σιδηρὴν μὲν κραδίη, χάλκεον δὲ οἱ ἦτορ / νηλεὲς ἐν στήθεσσιν... 764-765). Heraclitus will use this same polarization in his words concerning sleep and death. Nor should it disconcert anyone that phenomena of less than negative tone appear in catalogues of negative terms. The tendency towards opposition is, as I said, all-pervasive. It is the same tendency that introduced Tartarus into the poem at line 119. See also fn. 28 following.

28. This is another example of a category formed by opposition. Friendship appears because of Deceit. Smaller oppositions are possible within one term of a larger opposition even if they seem to contradict the larger. It is an example of *pars pro toto* that characterizes a part of the archaic thought process. Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Mythical Thought* 2. 50.

29. Friedrich Schwenn, *Die Theogonie des Hesiodos* (Heidelberg 1934), p. 83, remarks at some length on this point.

30. West, *op. cit.* pp. 197-198: "The principle of symmetry is conspicuous in Greek cosmologies as in early Greek geography; it is assumed that the great divisions of the world are of equal size and at equal distances apart".

31. *Ibid.* pp. 232-233.

32. There is an interesting point here in the description of Nereus in relationship to the meaning of ἀ-λήθεια. The argument that "truth" is "not-forgetting" is straightforward enough if the word be analyzed as an alpha privative negating λήθη ("forgetfulness"), but etymology does require a philological or contextual proof. One step towards such a proof might appear here in the *Theogony* lines 233 through 236. Nereus is born ἀληθέα (233) and is called the old man because he is infallibly true (νημερτής – 235) and does not forget the laws of righteousness (οὐδὲ θεμίστων/ λήθεται... 235-236).

In other words, Nereus' qualities of truthfulness could easily be construed as somehow dependent on, or in conjunction with, his ability not to forget. Cf. Ebeling, *Lexicon Homericum* and the *Etymologicum Magnum* under the articles concerning ἀληθής.

33. Brown, *Hesiod. Theogony* (New York 1953), p. 17, describes Earth and Zeus as alpha and omega. Earth and the first generation from her are physical; Zeus and the Olympians are essentially "anthropocentric". He too sees the human "conditioning" of the universe in this poem as a culmination.

34. *Ibid.* p. 23: "It is the revolt of Earth against the despotism of Sky which sets in motion the whole process culminating in the supremacy of Zeus". Friedrich Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca 1949), p. 25, also comments on the perfection with which the emasculation of Heaven fits into Hesiod's theogonic construction. The movement of the narrative is dependent upon a highly tensioned opposition.

35. 295 presents somewhat of a problem because the antecedent of the subject of the sentence is not clear. Richmond Lattimore, *Hesiod* (Ann Arbor 1968), p. 223, in his genealogical tables believes that it refers to Callirhoë. West, *op. cit.* p. 249, thinks that the antecedent is more probably Ceto. I should agree because the latter is more consistent with my argument that a forceful category of negative members be of one mother in correspondence to the categories of the children of Night and Nereus.

36. Cf. Philippon, *op. cit.* p. 24.

37. Brown, *op. cit.* pp. 28-29.

38. Solmsen, *op. cit.* pp. 22-23, comments on the place of Earth in the *Theogony* and stresses the point that she is never superseded.

39. West, *op. cit.* pp. 356-359, argues for every part of the description of the underworld (720-819) except lines 734-735 and 740-745. He asserts that the former contradicts what we learn in 815-819. In the note referring to the lines themselves (p. 363), he argues that *πιστοὶ φύλακες Δῖος* "probably refers to their [Cottos', Briareus', and Gyes'] help in the battle" and that "their return to the underworld after their hour of glory is sufficiently explained by the fact that that is their home". I find this position

unconvincing because the *τιμή* of guarding Tartarus is essential to the structure of Zeus' reign. Phenomena of negative import yet helpful to Zeus, e.g., Styx, must attain positions of honor even within their negative context. For this reason alone I should argue for the inclusion of 734-735. Moreover, given the physical imprecision in respect to areas of the negative realm, the three could quite conceivably be guards of Tartarus and at the same time live on the floors of Ocean, a mythical place in itself.

40. "Ὡς οἱ συμφράσσαιτο θεὰ ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε: "so that the goddess [Metis] might contrive together with him both good and ill". Note first the *τε ... τε* construction that, as I argued in Chapter One, bespeaks a dyadic tendency. But note secondly that the oppositional structure is in the process of being subordinated to another term – the *φρῆν* implied in the verb *συμφράσσαιτο*. Even at this early date in the Greek language, opposites are coming under the cognitive or "mental" control of a third term. The step to Heraclitus and Parmenides cannot be too great.

41. The poem continues for another 92 lines, carrying on the genealogy of the cosmos into the race of demi-gods and minor gods and goddesses. The presentation, however, is by no means "cosmic" as it was up to line 929. These last lines could very easily be paralleled to the final task of Odysseus beyond his return to Ithaca – a necessary pendent that moves the epic beyond a clear-cut finality and is a kind of stylistic, psychological extension of the form of those endlines we find in the Homeric Hymns and in the *Theogony* itself: *νῦν δὲ γυναικῶν φύλον αἰείσατε, ἡδυέπειαι/ Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Δῖος αἰγιόχοιο*: "And now let us sing, sweet-speaking Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus, of the tribe of women" (1021-1022).

42. Brown, *op. cit.* p. 43, also makes this point. The relationship between the way of thought in both Hesiod and Heraclitus is a close one.

43. West rejects these lines, arguing that there is too great a discrepancy between the fall of a man and the fall of the anvil (724-725), *op. cit.* p. 364, but Hesiod is speaking here of a mythical space within the realm of Tartarus (*εἰ πρώτα πυλῶν ἐντοσθε γένοιτο* – 741), not *between* Earth and Tartarus. Besides the idea of relative weight as a criterion for the authenticity of Hesiodic lines is highly questionable: 1) no such comparison is ever stated in the text and 2) it is not the type of consideration one would expect from a mind form that tends not to equate space with physical and material properties.

44. Heraclitus 45 and 103; Parmenides 8.26, 8.31, 8.42, 8.49, 10.7; Empedocles 17.15.

45. That Hesiod is stressing the opposition is clear, for not only does he mention Day and Night (748) but draws a further opposition of attributes. The one possesses light for those on earth; the other, Sleep, the brother of Death:

ἥ μὲν ἐπιχθονίοισι φάος πολυδερκὲς ἔχουσα
ἡ δ' Ὕπνον μετὰ χερσὶ, κασίγνητον Θανάτῳ
ibid. 755-756.

46. Cf. *Th.* 242 where the Nereids are born of Nereus and of Doris, *κούρης Ὠκεανοῖο, τελέηεντος ποταμοῖο*.

47. How significant the adjective is remains largely speculative although it is interesting to note that Snell makes quite a bit out of the word *βαθύς* as a proto-philosophical phenomenon. Cf. Snell, *op. cit.* p. 17. Speaking of the words *βαθύρρων* and *βαθυμή-τας*, he says, "In these expressions, the symbol of depth always points to the infinity of the intellectual and spiritual which differentiates it from the physical". It is perhaps even more interesting that here his especial referents are Heraclitus and the concepts of the soul.

48. E.g., *Il.* 14.201 and 303 (*Ὠκεανόντε, θεῶν γένεσσω*) and 246 (*Ὠκεανοῦ, ὅς περ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται*) as examples of Homeric description.

49. E.g., *Il.* 18. 399 and *Th.* 776.

50. Cf. *Il.* 18. 488.

51. The connection between the horizon and aether is best argued by L. Woodbury, "Equinox at Acragas: Pindar, *Ol.* 2.61-62", *TAPA* 97 (1966), pp. 597-616 and H. Vos, "Die Bahnen von Nacht und Tag", *Mnem.* Ser. 4.16 (1963), pp. 18-34.

HERACLITUS

Heraclitian scholarship is characterized by decided interpretational difficulties.¹ If one surveys the body of secondary sources from Schleiermacher to the present, it is easy enough to divide the various studies into two groups plus a possible third. My own interpretation falls into the third. The scope of this study does not permit a complete analysis of nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship, but a short examination of the general history is both interesting and instructive — especially insofar as it makes quite clear the necessity of a new interpretative stance. I shall discuss in some detail an outstanding example of the first group: W.K.C. Guthrie and two strongly related examples of the second: G.W.F. Hegel and Ferdinand Lassalle. The major difference between the two groups is that while the former has zealously devoted itself to the study of specific meanings of terms within a larger “scientific” context, the latter has approached Heraclitus in terms of more general issues, e.g., logic, religion, nature. Another peculiar characteristic of this problem is that the former group is predominantly English in background and the latter predominantly German. For the sake of argument, let these two groups be henceforth named the “English school” and the “German school”.

The first school begins, as I see it, before the turn of the twentieth century with Bywater’s edition of the Heraclitian fragments and John Burnet’s subsequent analyses. Burnet described the Heraclitian worldview in terms borrowed directly from then modern scientific observation,² and this scientific stance was maintained over half a century later even though the strain is easy to detect. In 1962 Guthrie, a pupil of F.M. Cornford’s later period of Pythagorean studies, in the first volume of his ambitious work, *A History of Greek Philosophy* devoted nearly a hundred pages to his explication of Heraclitus. His efforts result in a mixture of clarification and confusion.³

Heraclitus’ “method of thinking” interests Guthrie considerably. From the fragments it is clear that this method consists neither of *πολυμαθία* or *ιστορία* but is “poetic” somewhat in the way of Aeschylus. Fragment 101 (*ἐδῖξήσάμην ἔμεωντόν*) is for the Englishman a prophetic utterance of this poetic nature.

But one wonders if Heraclitus' "poetic nature" is not in fact a difficult concept to define for Guthrie since he is forced to admit that there is a claim to inspiration on the part of Heraclitus and at the same time a condemnation of poets in general.⁴ Notwithstanding Aristotle's opinion, neither Heraclitus' language nor thought places him in the camp of the Milesians. No, he is for Guthrie both an inspired and relatively isolated thinker. Heraclitus' extreme choice of Fire as an ἀρχή because of its nature places him far outside any cosmological conceptualization of the Milesians who always considered the ἀρχή as intermediate between two opposites.⁵ Moreover — and this statement is partially true but somehow unfortunately turned considering the context — Heraclitus worked with all physical entities as somehow animated. Since the philosophical differentiation between spirit and matter was yet "undreamed of", there can be little surprise if Heraclitus goes even so far as to think of the divine principle as both "immanent" and "external".⁶ From these almost revolutionary premises Guthrie aims towards the construction of a particularly Heraclitian point of view. Yet, it is important to note that this point of view will not be linked either to the philosopher's aristocratic contempt for mankind or to the paradoxical nature of the fragments themselves. There is, in other words, no endeavor to understand the fragments in either psychological or structural terms.⁷ Heraclitus' contempt is a character trait and his paradoxical "obscurity" both a personal "delight" and the result of the inadequacy of the language of his time.⁸ Although he produces a long list of fragments that reflect an "aristocratic contempt", he never asks if there could be some connection between this "contempt" and a particular method of thinking.

The most interesting section in Guthrie's book is one dealing with the uses of the word "*logos*" up to the time of Heraclitus. The reasoning behind this philological examination is somewhat subtle, for Guthrie wishes to investigate the various meanings that could be unified into a single concept in Heraclitus' mind but which remain separate for us since we have no single word to express what the pre-Socratic meant by "*logos*".⁹ But Guthrie, however, finds difficulty in expressing a unity in meaning behind the *Logos*, even given its necessary unity from the Heraclitian point of view. He gives us, in effect, little more than a *pasticcio* of meanings that are marginally relevant to the understanding of what the concept of *Logos* might mean. One feels an overdependence upon the lexicon with its minute understanding of particular words at the expense of a larger, more informative context.

Guthrie argues that there is some naive combination of matter and spirit in Heraclitus' philosophy.¹⁰ The *Logos* is, then, part material and part spiritual. Can this combination be sustained without turning Heraclitus into a muddle-headed quack? It depends entirely on what Guthrie might mean by "material". His Cartesian mind/body division does indicate, however, that "material" in his book is "physical" and "objective". There is no symbolic nature involved. Fragment 55 (ὅσων ὅψις ἀκοή μάθησις τὰυτα ἐγώ

προτιμέω) does indeed indicate that Heraclitus was dependent upon some kind of perception, but there is no reason to believe that this "perception" should be interpreted by Guthrie's particularly objective understanding of the term. In fact, it is quite impossible that it could be. Guthrie takes it for granted, along with Burnet, that it was: perception for him is of necessity a perception of the material, physical, and objective world. For him "the material aspect of the *Logos* is fire". The fire "represents for Heraclitus the highest and purest form of matter . . . or rather soul and mind themselves, which in a more advanced [*sic*] thinker would be distinguished from any matter whatsoever".¹¹ It is difficult for me to accept as applicable to Heraclitus the basic premise of "matter" which Guthrie assumes time and time again in his study.

Guthrie, then as I read him, is so imbued with a certain physical and empirical point of view that he can think of the fragments in no other terms, and although he admits freely that what Heraclitus has to say about "matter" has nothing at all to do with what we consider to be matter, he nonetheless proceeds to approach Heraclitus in material terms, dividing the problem unnaturally into material and spiritual characteristics. If Heraclitus spoke in terms of matter, then a scientific, materialistic, and objective interpretation would be in good order; if not, then some primarily non-materialistic viewpoint is called for. In any case, it is difficult indeed to see the real value of Guthrie's analysis. The dichotomy he establishes was even on his own admission unknown to Heraclitus. Moreover, Guthrie seems incapable of telling us the meaning of Heraclitian thought as a phenomenon in itself, although he does tend to ask the correct questions — e.g., "What does *logos* mean?" His explication of the fragments in terms of harmony as a "state of precarious equilibrium" between "forces",¹² in terms of empirical observation,¹³ in terms of a materialism which "Heraclitus had the intelligence to perceive and the courage to assert" in his doctrine of uninterrupted flux,¹⁴ and in terms of the lack of logical consistency,¹⁵ is too obviously an avoidance of any comprehensive interpretation of Heraclitus. His stance smacks much too much of Aristotle.

The second school, if anything, tends to err on the side of overgenerality and a distinct preference for the philosophical stances of German Idealism. It was Schleiermacher who first dealt with Heraclitus in a comprehensive sense. His book is an excellent criticism of the sources of the fragments that lists each genuine fragment of Heraclitian doctrine as he sees it with commentary and translation.¹⁶ He does not insist on the strict *ipsissima verba*, however, as does Diehls, and therefore has only made a collection of possible Heraclitian ideas — although, as Lassalle says, with high critical ability.¹⁷ His commentary is interesting but does not reveal the critical stance of the second school. Hegel is fundamentally more interesting on the question because of the remarkable similarity between his own logical processes and those of

Heraclitus himself. His exposition of Heraclitus' philosophical content is given in and for his own terms and concepts, and the form of analysis is, therefore, rather like Aristotle's in *Metaphysics A*. But Hegel's exposition possesses one distinct advantage over that of Aristotle and of the first school in that he is capable of clarifying a method or structure of thought that lies behind the fragments in general rather than merely a select group of them – a distinct critical advantage.

"Bei Heraklit ist also zuerst die philosophische Idee in ihrer spekulativen Form anzutreffen . . . Hier sehen wir Land; es ist kein Satz des Heraklit, den ich nicht in meine Logik aufgenommen".¹⁸ Hegel evidently sees his own logic in that of Heraclitus – that is a similar hierarchical and heuristic movement that is structured upon a dialectic of opposites (*Gegenstände*). As he says, in Heraclitus there is a speculative method of thought that is capable of dealing validly with Becoming as well as with the One.¹⁹ There exists a "truth of becoming" whose primary characteristic is its oppositional nature – a nature that allows the presence on an equal basis of Being and Not-Being.²⁰ Hegel, as I read him, has uncovered the most pertinent characteristic of Heraclitian thought: the structure of an oppositional logic divorced from, but regulating entirely, the objective world of naive sense perception.

Hegel also refuses to deal with Heraclitus as an "obscure" philosopher. Critics as early as Cicero have argued on the side of obscurity (*De Nat. Deor.* I.26, III.14; *De Finib.* II.5). Hegel asserts, correctly I think, that anyone who argues that Heraclitus wrote obscurely by intention contributes nothing to the understanding of the problem and reveals, if anything, the shallowness of his own mind.²¹ Hegel faces Heraclitus squarely where others seem prone to excuse.

It seems to me possible to argue that both Hegel and Heraclitus comprehend the world from a speculative point of view that suggests the phenomenological realm between subjective and objective reality I have described in a previous chapter. Hence there is a likelihood of strong relationships between the Hegelian *Vernunft* and the Heraclitian idea of *φρόνησις*. Olof Gigon 25 years ago indicated that he too appreciated the subjective quality of *φρόνησις*. He calls it the Heraclitic "subjektive Korrelat".²² Hegel endeavors to describe the incorporation of the objective world into the phenomenological state of consciousness in terms of human experience: "experience is called this very process by which the element that is immediate, unexperienced . . . externalizes itself [i.e., is felt by the subject as "external to himself"], and then comes back to itself from this state of estrangement, and by so doing is at length set forth in its concrete nature and real truth, and becomes too a possession of consciousness".²³ There is then some indication that *φρόνησις* is for Hegel, as I shall show it is for Heraclitus, a logical way of thinking structured on opposition or "otherness". This type of thinking is indicative of man's true character – his *ἦθος* that in this particular instance is *θεῖον* (78). Hegel phrases it

this way: "man is explicitly man only in the form of developed and cultivated reason, which had made itself to be what it is implicitly".²⁴

One could also impute an aristocratic or hierarchical ordering of consciousness to both men. In both there is a journey towards some kind of total comprehension. Yet, the acknowledgement of this "journey" must entail also the Hegelian and Heraclitian emphasis upon "becoming" or "*Werden*" since any movement in awareness necessitates the concept of change. As I shall show subsequently, Heraclitus believed that man moves from an unconscious state (a condition of *καθεῦδον*) towards a comprehension of the state that is structured by the *Logos*. This movement, again, is one formed upon opposites.

Ferdinand Lassalle, Hegel's pupil, examined the symbolic qualities of the logic of opposition. It was he who argued that a number of words found in Heraclitus are in fact symbols for the same principle or idea.²⁵ Fire, Time, Flowing, etc., all represent in themselves a unity made up of a type of oppositional process between Being and Not-Being.²⁶ Lassalle finds these symbols of a religious nature.²⁷ (I shall eventually argue that they were originally literary or poetic.) But he also conceives of them in logical terms, and this is his important contribution to our own understanding of Heraclitus. For Lassalle these various literary or religious symbols represent in logical terms phenomena associated with a certain type of perception that forms a part of a larger dialectic directed towards what I should call the comprehension of the underlying *Logos* itself.²⁸ Admittedly the logic of Idealism is speaking too strongly in Lassalle's analysis, but it is important that the symbolic as well as the structural nature of Heraclitian thought is stressed here. Lassalle has endeavored to place certain symbolic phenomena into a logical context that in itself implies the phenomenological ground of human comprehension, and while the Hegelian influences are obvious, it seems to me that both Hegel and he have indicated the central feature of Heraclitus as we have him in our present collection of fragments.

It is, then, the structure and symbol of Heraclitian logic that interests Hegel, Lassalle, and us. To begin with, both Germans describe an oppositional character that is all-inclusive but not static — that is, opposites are not a simple *x/-x* but an "*Identität des Widerstrebenden*".²⁹ Hegelian and Heraclitian opposites are not, then, opposites *on one plane of thought or consciousness* as they are for someone who might see logic working linearly and mathematically within the framework of objective sense perception — a framework which I think to Hegel would be based on *Nichtsein* and to Heraclitus on *καθεῦδον*. It is the hierarchical movement of opposites, the heuristic logic that continually puts phenomena into correlated oppositions, that characterizes both men's thought — and, for that matter the archaic mentality in general.

The two areas of interpretation I have described above indicate that a third point of view might solve the dilemma of a certain overly-scientific philology

on the one hand that cannot see the forest for the trees and of a certain overly idealistic philosophy on the other that sees the forest but neglects the trees. I am referring to the phenomenological view towards which men like Hegel and Lassalle admittedly point but do not actually encompass — one based on the symbolic and structural principles I have previously set forth.

The key to this third point of view lies in the works of Hermann Fränkel who has, in my opinion, opened the field for the present study. On the one hand, he has shown himself to be within the lines set by Hegel and Lassalle. For him the *Logos* is “der Sinn und Grund der Welt”.³⁰ He asserts the essential unity of opposites. The opposition and unity of “day” and “night” in 57 represents for him the substantive ground of both; their opposition implies this unity. From an analysis of this opposition Fränkel pinpoints the meaning of the dynamic relationship between the two opposites: “Dem Umschlag von Nacht zu Tag, und von Tag zu Nacht, ihr wechselseitiges Entstehn auseinander und Vergehn in einander, ist der Grund ihres Daseins und der Inhalt ihres Seins”.³¹ On the other hand, Fränkel has come upon the structure of Heraclitian thought in a much clearer and simpler manner than did Hegel.

This discovery came to light in the *American Journal of Philology* in 1938 with an article entitled “A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus”. The argument was that behind the fragments there lay a transcendental logic, an indirect means of extrapolation whose form Fränkel called “the device of the double proportion”. The pattern was expressed — *with the reservation that it was only loosely mathematical* — as $A:B :: B:C$. Of the several fragments used to illustrate this logic — including the theretofore rather puzzling 52 — the clearest example was probably 79 (ἀνὴρ νῆπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἄνδρός). Fränkel considered that here were revealed three planes — God, man, and child (A, B, and C). In the transitions from A to B and B to C the degree of perfection decreased and the degree of imperfection increased in equal measure. Another example of this proportion lies in the God/man/ape configuration of 82 and 83. The “geometrical mean” in both examples is man, the phenomenon with whom Fränkel thought Heraclitus was especially concerned. I shall deal more closely with these logical and interpretational problems later.

Fränkel saw that in his hierarchical yet nonmystical³² mode of thinking — a mode certainly consonant with his own character — Heraclitus came down heavily in favor of not only man’s spiritual nature but also man himself whose very foot could blot out the sun but could not, wandering in any direction, reach the limits of the living soul.³³ “Logic”, therefore, seen in these structural terms, became for Heraclitus a suprapersonal power, both common and universal, through whose agency man could rise into a higher state of comprehension. In short, it was Fränkel’s argument that through a particular logical device, Heraclitus expressed the hope for man’s hierarchical ascendance into a more complete consciousness.



The basic terms of Heraclitian thought (that is, its symbols or the significant words that recur) *and* the relationships that draw the thought into comprehensible patterns have never been considered as the primary key to any understanding of Heraclitus. Yet, if one, following Harold Cherniss,³⁴ makes a valiant attempt to discard the general Aristotelian prejudice of mind and then considers the fragments in simple symbolic and structural terms, a rather novel picture of the pre-Socratic world must perforce arise. It is the *Logos* that emerges as the primary symbolic and structural phenomenon in Heraclitus. It regulates a myriad of lesser symbolic principles from fire to most of the very language he employs. Heraclitus uses these minor or secondary symbols to reveal more clearly the nature of the *Logos* itself.³⁵

Heraclitus himself speaks of oracular signs that symbolize and do not hide: "the prince whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks nor hides — no, he uses symbols" (ὁ ἀναξ, οὐ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει — 93). The symbol of the *Logos* is, in our terms, philosophical in inspiration; its logical symbols are, however — although there should be no excessive surprise in the fact — clearly grounded in lyric and epic literature and used widely by the other pre-Socratics. There are several of these "minor symbols". Take, for instance, "gold". When Heraclitus speaks of preferring sweepings to gold (9), he speaks most assuredly of those who prefer to ignore the *Logos* — a *Logos* he clearly indicates in 22 that is not material gold but a symbolic one: "Those seeking gold dig up a great deal of earth and find little". Perhaps it is men's logical conjectures themselves that he sees symbolized as "beautiful objects of children" (παιδῶν ἀθύρματα — 70)³⁶ — "beautiful" in the sense that they might relate to the *Logos*, "of children" because children are magical beings not yet fully human and hence nearer to the gods or the *Logos*.³⁷

There is some indication that the circle is also important for Heraclitus: "Common are the beginning and end in a circle" (ξυγόν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλον — 103). Parmenides (5) also uses the symbol, as does Empedocles to an even fuller extent (17.13, 26.1, 35.10, *et al.*). For Heraclitus it very possibly has something to do with a certain circular dialectic the *Logos* is capable of following. The road in Heraclitus symbolizes both the oppositional and tensed structural quality of the *Logos*: "The road up/down is one and the same" (60).³⁸ The road may also indicate dialectical as well as oppositional qualities within the structure of the *Logos*: "The way of the clothcarder is straight and crooked". It too is "one and the same" (59).³⁹ In other words, could it be that the *Logos* moves back and forth in an oppositional fashion while maintaining a forward course? I shall proffer examples of this dialectic subsequently. The *δδός* or heuristic quality of the *δδός* maintains important symbolic connotations in Heraclitus. One may not forget where this road leads (71) — i.e., to a total comprehension of the *Logos* itself.

The underlying, tensed quality of the "logical" structure is represented

also by Eris. The symbolic term is one previously exploited by Hesiod in the *Theogony* where, as I stated in the previous chapter, its heuristic force is comparable to that of Eros. Here again it takes on the unifying and connecting power of an underlying third term. War is “father and ruler of all”. It creates opposites: men and gods and, among men, some slaves and some free (53). “It is necessary to know that war is common” (80) – it shares that attribute with the *Logos* in fragment 2. Heraclitus continues his identification of symbols by equating Δίκη with Eris (Strife). Just as all things come into being according to the *Logos* (1), so “all things come by Eris and Need” (εἰδέναι δὲ χρή τὸν πόλεμον ἔόντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔρω, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ’ ἔρω καὶ χρεῶν – 80). Strife is a symbol of a third term uniting the oppositional structure of the *Logos*. It is a symbol easily taken from Heraclitus’ Hesiodic background and one of several, along with χουσός and Δίκη that Heraclitus reduces to a simple equation with the *Logos* or its parts.

The sun is used at times as a symbol too. It is not always clear how much importance Heraclitus puts in it since, after all, he refuses to abide with purely objective astrological phenomena (consider for instance the possible collective meaning of fragments 42, 105, and 120). But if one were to take the sun as a phenomenological symbol within the realm of symbolic perception – that is, a sun whose nature, as Hesiod does not know, is directly concerned with unity or being one (Ἡσιόδῳ ἀγνοοῦντι φύσιν ἡμέρας ἀπάσης μίαν οὖσαν – 106) – then it very likely becomes another symbol for πῦρ. The important fact is that we have already seen the sun and light used in symbolic senses in the lyric poets, and again it is not unusual that Heraclitus would adopt the symbol for his own use. Heraclitus speaks of the circular boundary of bright Zeus (οὐρός αἰθρίου Δίος – 120) with much the same meaning as Mimnermus (Diehl 10) and makes the rather difficult statement that the “sun is new each day” (νέος ἐφ’ ἡμέρῃ – 6) which I interpret as a way of drawing attention to the insubstantial nature of the objective sun that is always being created anew and which may be covered by a man’s foot (3) and does set (hence being “new each day”). What Heraclitus is pinpointing is a symbolic phenomenon that does not set or rise (16). Then too the sun probably forms a simple equation with the symbol, Fire – in their affective qualities, the major mark of all symbolic perception, they hold much in common. And it is this Fire or light that man “touches upon” or “kindles” for himself, even at night when the physical sun does not shine and he cannot see it (ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἰρρόνῃ φάος ἄπτεται ἑαυτῷ ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὕψεις... 26).


The predominant secondary symbol in Heraclitus, then, is Fire, πῦρ. It is the main symbol for the *Logos*. Fire with its accompanying images of movement and color is a phenomenon used extensively in Homer and the lyric poets. It should not surprise us that Heraclitus picked it as his primary symbol. At many times in the literature the phenomenon is largely non-material, non-prosaic. Take, for instance, Homer’s comparison of god-like Hector to a

flame (... φλογὶ εἴκελον Ἑκτορα δῖον – *Il.* 13.688) or the anger in Antinous' eyes that burn like fire (... ὅσσε δέ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἐκττην – *Od.* 4.662). In the *Hymn to Pythian Apollo* (440-445) the god's flame (φλόξ) and his shining, brilliant appearance are used with definite religious and spiritual overtones. Radiance and light are indications or symbols of the god himself.⁴⁰ The symbolic importance of fire may also be seen in Hesiod's *Theogony* at the point when Zeus no longer holds back his might but hurls his lightning against the enemy. He hurls "an awesome flame". The earth burns. Fire is all about. An "unspeakable flame" (φλόξ ἄσπετος) rises to the upper air, and thunder and lightning blind his foes (*Th.* 689-699). The destruction of one realm and establishment of another takes place in a great holocaust of light and fire. There are hundreds of other examples of fire as a phenomenon with wide non-materialistic overtones in the literature – Pindar, for instance, made wide use of it – e.g., *Ol.* I.1. The point is that as a symbol it came ready-made for Heraclitus, and it should not surprise us that he should turn to such a traditional phenomenon for the symbol of his *Logos*.⁴¹

For Heraclitus the symbol of the thunderbolt steers all much in the same way it does in the above example from Hesiod's *Theogony* (τὰ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός – 64).⁴² The phenomenological cosmos was, is, and will be everlasting Fire, kindling and quenching in measure (κόσμον τόνδε ... ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστω καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεζῶν, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα – 30).⁴³ Fire's most salient feature is this ability to measure and be a measure (μέτρον), and it is by this feature that it is tied so strongly to logic. "Fire having come will judge and will take hold of all things" (πάντα γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρῖναι καὶ καταλήψεται – 66). This "judgment" has immediate reference to Fire's ability to measure. The "measure" is exchanged for all things in the phenomenological realm just as goods are exchanged for gold, and gold for goods – gold being in itself a secondary symbol⁴⁴ – (πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός – 90). The ideas of measured, oppositional, and dialectical change are symbolized by Fire. It represents a logical realm of exchange and mixture (the same logical "realm" of the Homeric Hymns and Empedocles) in which opposites are identical and become manifestations of the *Logos*. Fire acts, then, as a third term, underlying and connecting specific terms in a logical proposition. The opposites day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, satiety/famine are manifestations of one god (ὁ θεός) who like fire when mixed with spices allows a man to name anything according to his pleasure (ὁ θεός ἡμέρη εὐρρόνη, χειμῶν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός, ἀλλοιούται δὲ ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ>, ὁπότεν συμμιγῇ θυνώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐκάστου – 67).

In considering the solstices or circular turnings (*τροπαί*) of Fire, Heraclitus speaks of sea formed of the opposites, earth and *πρηστήρ* (an indication of celestial fire).⁴⁵ Sea is another symbol of a third term uniting and partially

identifying earth and fire (πυρός τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμιν γῆ τὸ δὲ ἡμιν πρηστήρ – 31). He points out that in its transformation the sea is measured or balanced out (μετρέεται) by what I take to be the same *Logos* which existed before sea became earth (<γῆ> θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ – 31). *Logos* and Fire are one and the same third term or area uniting opposites and making them identical. At another point, although there exist no *ipsissima verba* to verify the statement, fire is said to “live the death of earth”, hence continuing the dialectic until the thought comes full circle – i.e., fire, as the third term intermediating the life and death of earth, itself is intermediated by air. Water intermediates the life and death of air, and finally earth that of water (76).



Here is a good example of a major symbol (πῦρ) – itself defined by the opposition of life/death – being reduced to an equality with a set of other symbols that are also structured by the same opposition.⁴⁶ Yet, in logical terms it is quite clear that all these symbols represent in this case what the one symbol of πῦρ does at other times: the measure or third term between opposites – that is, all minor symbols through Fire point to the primary symbol of the *Logos*.

What is Heraclitus' *Logos*? It is an omnipotent sign ruling both the subjective and objective world of perception and experience. Here is a phenomenon, we are told, according to which all things come into being (γιγνομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ... 1), that makes itself known to men – at least those who are capable of understanding it – in terms of words and deeds which Heraclitus has taken upon himself to set out in some detail (1). The phenomenon is also common, although in no way private (ἴδιος). It pertains not at all to men's separate and idiosyncratic nature but to the way he thinks, that is to his φρόνησις (fragments 2, 113, and 114).⁴⁷ One may easily consider the *Logos* to be a psychological, subjective phenomenon, deeply-rooted and dynamic. The home of the *Logos* is the ψυχή which in itself has no limits, because it possesses the dynamism of the *Logos* so deeply (... οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει – 45). Men, when associated with the *Logos*, are separated from the day to day world so it sometimes appears strange to them – that is, the objective, material world does not always seem to reflect the formal and

holistic nature of the *Logos* itself, as of course it cannot because of the necessary objective *and* subjective orientation of the phenomenon at hand: “The *Logos* with which above all they are continually associated – [the *Logos*] by which they control all – from this they are separated, and these things with which they fall in during the day appear strange to them” (ὥ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διωκοῦντι, τούτῳ διαφέρονται, καὶ οἷς καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται – 72). No, one of the most distinctive characteristics of the *Logos* is its holistic character – that is, it is one and makes all things one: “Having heard not me, but the *Logos* it is wise to agree that One is all things” (οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσας ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἔστω ἐν πάντα εἶναι – 50).⁴⁸ The *Logos* is by nature religious in orientation, for the One that alone is wise may or may not be called by the name of Zeus (ἐν τῷ σοφὸν μῦθον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα – 32).⁴⁹ This One, this omnipotent psychological and experiential symbol, alone is wise. It is a phenomenon that is supreme since it is separated from all things (... σοφὸν ἔστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον – 108). It has something to do with the knowledge of a judgment or opinion (γνώμη) concerning how all things are guided through all things (εἶναι γὰρ ἐν τῷ σοφὸν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὅκη κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων – 41).⁵⁰ There is, in other words, some sort of method or structure involved in the concept, for, in addition, the *Logos*, this One, is inherent in everything, lies behind change, and structures reality in terms of oppositions: “The same thing is within, living and dead and both wakeful and sleeping, both young and old, for those things having undergone a change are these and these having undergone the change back are those” (ταῦτό τ’ ἐνὶ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός καὶ [τὸ] ἐρηγορός καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν. τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κακεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα – 88).

In what we should call the subjective realm, this one is best described in terms of the elusive *φύσις* of man that hides as does the *Logos* (fragment 123); in the objective realm of political life, however, the one assumes the form of *νόμος*: “It is *νόμος* to be persuaded by the will of one man” (*νόμος* καὶ βουλῇ πείσεσθαι ἐνός – 33). The traditional opposition of *φύσις* and *νόμος* assumes in Heraclitus characteristics of a true phenomenological concept. He, no doubt, assumes some original archaic distinction between the two. In any case, objectively one must defend *νόμος* just as one would one’s *πόλις* (44). All men speaking with *νόος* must put firm trust in this common, omnipotent phenomenon, just as the city does in law. This *νόμος* is, in fact, the omnipotence of the *Logos* as it is revealed in objective, political law: “Speaking with *νόος* it is necessary to put firm trust in the common thing of all just as the city [must] in the *νόμος*, and much more firmly, for all human *νόμοι* are nourished by one divine [*νόμος*]. It has strength over as much as it wishes, is sufficient for all, and prevails over [all]” (ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρή τῷ ξυνῶ πάντων ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις, καὶ πολὺ

ισχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται – 114).⁵¹ In either realm the *Logos* is possessed of extreme power: it is omnipresent; it is impossible to avoid (τὸ μὴ δυνόν ποτε πῶς ἄν τις λάθοι – 16).

The *Logos* reveals itself directly in language. Heraclitus declares that it has something to do with what people say or hear: “A stupid man is wont to be all aflutter at every *Logos*” (87). “In Priene was born Bias son of Teutames whose *Logos* is more than the others” (39). “Of as many men as I hear *logoi* from, no one comes to this, so as to know that σοφόν is separated from all” (108). These three fragments reveal that *logoi* are qualitative phenomena – that is, some *logoi* are better than others. They are better because they tend to describe or communicate the condition of the one supreme *Logos* which is “separated from all”. We have, then, a *Logos* here that is some sort of explanation of things, and it appears to me that the connection between this “explanation” and the *Logos* itself could possibly have something to do with the structure or intent of this explanation – that is, how oppositional or specifically logical, i.e., “possessed of the *Logos*” it might be. There is some evidence, for example, that it was Bias who uttered first the “Heraclitian” aphorism contending that the many are bad and the few good (οἱ πολλοί, κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί – 104).⁵² The aristocratic intent is clear, and if indeed the point may be pressed to the extent that the second half of the fragment be Bias’ too, then we are presented with the whole oppositional structure of Heraclitian thought. One could then argue that it was the “logical” way in which Bias expressed himself that attracted Heraclitus.

The *Logos*, then, is primarily a linguistic and philosophical phenomenon through which man must comprehend or learn his position in the world – hence the Heraclitian invective against those who have no *logos* or some *logos* of an inferior form. Heraclitus makes a straight appeal to symbolic reality. These “educational” fragments assume a certain social or political color. Heraclitus, the aristocrat, disparages the thought of the rabble. They are to him donkeys who prefer sweepings to gold (9). “Gold” (χρυσός) is, of course, the “gold” that is the *Logos*.⁵³ All uncomprehending “animals” are “pastured (νόμος/νομός) with a blow” (πᾶν γὰρ ἐρπετὸν πληγῇ νέμεται – 11).⁵⁴ The rabble are dogs who bark at those they do not know (97). In their search for happiness they are cattle munching vetch (4). They are pigs who, happy in the mire, know not pure water or they are yardbirds (13 and 37).⁵⁵ Upon his own countrymen, those whom he listed, no doubt, among the stupid who are “wont to be all aflutter at every *logos*” (87), Heraclitus piles especial scorn. He prays for wealth that the wicked among them might be convicted (125a). Their sin? To have expelled a man because he was valuable. Let their city be left to boys, and let them be removed to a man (121). Children, after all, are nearer to the *Logos*.⁵⁶ Heraclitus who saw the need of a dependence upon a correct comprehension states without qualm that one

man was worth ten thousand if he be the best (εἰς ἐμοὶ μῦριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ἦ – 49). The best men “take one thing in place of everything else” – that is, eternal fame – while the many are in a state of satiety like flocks of animals (αἰρεῦνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντὶ ἀπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα – 29).⁵⁷ The desired nature (φύσις) of man, then, is a phenomenon both excellent and hidden (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ – 123),⁵⁸ but the best men know and guard the things that are trustworthy. Retribution (Δίκη) overtakes those who do not (28). As an educator Heraclitus is an aristocrat. His polemics on behalf of the *Logos* are directed squarely against the masses and their inability to grasp it. His praise lies with one man from without the many who seeks the hidden “nature” that is the *Logos* and himself (101). Heraclitus is closer to Socrates than Plato could ever admit.

More particularly, Heraclitus is also found on the attack in behalf of the *Logos* in terms of νόος or “mind”. “Much-learning (πολυμαθίη) does not teach one to have intelligence (ἔχειν νόον) for it would have taught Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus” (πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὐτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον – 40). Pythagoras wins the almost sophistic opprobrium of being the “founder of wranglers” (κοπίδων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός – 81). Heraclitus accuses Hesiod of not knowing that day and night are one – he is no teacher, he does not see the essential unity of the One or *Logos* (διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον ἐπίστανται⁵⁹ πλείστα εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εἰρρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἓν – 57). Hesiod comes under attack once again for not *knowing* the essential unity or φύσις of every day (Ἡσιόδῳ ἀγνοοῦντι φύσιν ἡμέρας ἀπάσης μίαν οὖσαν – 106). The major thinkers before Heraclitus are “singers of the people” who do not, in Heraclitus’ specific logical sense, see that the opinions of the many are bad and the few are good. They are not conscious of the *Logos*. They are not noetic: “For what νόος or φρήν have they? They are persuaded by singers of the folk and use the assembled crowd as a teacher, not knowing that the many are bad and the few are good” (τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δῆμων αἰδοῖσι πείθονται καὶ διδασκάλῳ χρεῖωνται ὁμίλῳ οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί – 104). The men preceding Heraclitus not only fail to grasp the aristocratic dependence upon the few who are capable of comprehending the *Logos* but also, in consequence, ignore the noetic (νόος ἢ φρήν) – a realm that looms large in any consideration of the *Logos*. For Heraclitus the logician it is important always to ἔχειν νόον (40).

The rituals of religion have nothing to do with the comprehension of the *Logos*. The mystery rites with their bacchants and maenads result in unholy – i.e., not “logical” – initiation (14). Better to perform rituals over dung than human bodies. Certainly bodies should be thrown out first. They have no meaning whatsoever (νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι – 96). Heraclitus

rails against the procession and phallic hymns to Dionysus and Hades (15). Rites have something to do with healing (*ἄκεια* – 68), but for Heraclitus “sacrifice” seems to involve the pure experience of one man – not the sacrifices unconsciously followed by the many (69).⁶⁰ Pure sacrifice for Heraclitus is “logical” in character and has very little to do with traditional ritual or religious experience, for the traditional blood sacrifice is for Heraclitus a double blunder, “as if someone stepping into mud would wash it out”. Such acts are “mad” along with prayers to statues and temples. Men involved with such insanity do not know “what a sort god and heroes are” (5). The trappings of religion allow man to avoid the real meaning of the *Logos*. They are of little help. Heraclitus rejects these customary approaches; they evidently somehow deny the noetic quality of the experience.

In this search for the *Logos*, man must guard against a series of pitfalls. A multiplicity of experience and reactions yields no insight; “it is not better for men to become as many things as they wish” (*ἀνθρώποις γίνεσθαι ὅκοντα θέλουσιν οὐκ ἄμεινον* – 110). Man easily forgets his way (*τοῦ ἐπιλανθανομένου ἢ ἡ ὁδὸς ἄγει* – 71), for man’s nature (*ἦθος*) possesses no critical judgment or means of knowing (*γνώμη*) – that is, the province of the gods, or, as I shall indicate subsequently, of an especial noetic realm within man (*ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει* – 78). Many escape knowing by disbelief (*ἀπιστίῃ διαφυγγάνει μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι* – 86) – evidently again following other inconsequential paths on which he staggers like some drunk led by a boy. His *ψυχή* is “wet” – that is, it is not functioning properly. It has lost its fire. Man’s critical faculties are debauched; he may easily have a wet *ψυχή* (117). Men generally are an unimaginative lot. They cannot grasp the underlying relationship between opposites: e.g., life and death; for many it is far better to conceal their real lack of understanding of the *Logos*. Perhaps Heraclitus believes that in this way they will not lead others onto the paths of disbelief: “There await dead men things they neither hope for nor imagine”; “it is better to conceal ignorance” (*ἀνθρώπους μένει ἀποθανόντας ἅσσα οὐκ ἔλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέουσιν* – 27; *ἁμαθίην γὰρ ἄμεινον κρύπτειν* – 95). The many do not comprehend in terms of their *φρόνη* “logical” phenomena even when they encounter them, and having learned or been told, still have not really comprehended, although they fancy they have (*οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὅκοσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἔωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι* – 17).

In another group of fragments Heraclitus seems to point to man’s perception of the world as his most faulty, yet potentially most reliable, possession. Man’s best perception possesses strong psychological overtones. This ambivalence towards perception indicates that Heraclitus’ perceptive principles are by no means of an immediate and easily grasped variety. In fact, he is working well within a context of symbolic perception. He sees men “deceived by the knowledge of visible things” (*ἐξηπάτηνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν*

τῶν φανερώων ... 56). Homer, for instance, was deceived – even though he was the cleverest of all the Hellenes – by a simple paradox involving children and lice (56).⁶¹ Because of his γνῶσις Homer is unable to catch the fallacy. Heraclitus is attacking directly a faulty way of thinking that perceives the world without appreciation of its logical complexities. Homer's thinking appreciates, according to Heraclitus, only what is visible – hence it is confused. Man's eyes and ears deceive if the ψυχή or the phenomenological ground is barbarian – that is, not working properly: “Bad witnesses are the eyes and ears for men when they possess barbarian life-forces” (κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀρθαλμοὶ καὶ ὤτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων – 107). Heraclitus clearly rejects sense perception in its most uncomplicated sense: “If all things that are were smoke, nostrils would distinguish them” (εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπνὸς γένοιτο ῥῖνες ἂν διαγνοῖεν – 7). The point is, of course, that γνῶσις (διαγνοῖεν) is hardly in the nose nor in any of the five senses. Its “space” is elsewhere. People “hear” yet do not “understand”; they, the deaf, are at the same time “present” and “absent” (34). They know neither how to listen nor how to speak (ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ' εἰπεῖν – 19). They act and speak like sleeping men – men who have no comprehension of the *Logos*. This state is not necessary, for “men must not act and speak as if they were asleep” (οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν – 73). No, Heraclitus argues for a special type of sight and hearing – one that concerns itself with μάθησις and is obviously related to simple sense perception but at the same time somehow divorced from it: “Of as many things [as there are] sight, hearing and understanding, to these I give honor first” (ὅσων ὅψις ἀκοή μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω – 55).⁶² Heraclitus forbids men to conjecture at random about the greatest things (47) but to inquire as philosophers into a great many things (35) – always, one suspects, with a “logical” intent in mind. Yet, this “understanding” or collecting facts (μάθησις) – cf. fn. 45 – is not total comprehension of the *Logos*, for Heraclitus sees this ultimate phenomenon as something that is “not to be searched out and without passage” (ἄπορον). Man must simply sustain hope that he might discover the “unhoped for”: “If one does not hope, one will not discover the unhoped-for, for it is not to be searched out and has no means of entrée” (ἐὰν μὴ ἐλπεται, ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἔον καὶ ἄπορον – 18). In other words, whatever the *Logos* is, it must be comprehended by more than μάθησις before it loses its non-obvious character and becomes absolutely clear, unadorned, and without the incense of obscurity as are the words of the Sibyl (92).

Long before Socrates, Heraclitus conceived the “clearing ground” of the comprehension of the *Logos* to be the self. This is why he terms self-conceit a sacred disease (46) – “sacred”, perhaps, because it is located in the one phenomenon capable of understanding or “seeing” the *Logos* and a “disease” because like all disease it can either indicate a subsequent healing of the patient or his ultimate demise. Ὕβρις could easily be the fatal plague to the

self. One must quench it over any ordinary conflagration (ὑβρω χρη σβεννύναι μάλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν – 43). After many false starts and blunders, man may come upon the *Logos* within himself if he follows that which is best and makes use of his *νόος*. He must seek for himself, for in this way Heraclitus himself found success (ἐδίδξατο ἑαυτὸν – 101). This one short phrase is probably the most telling of all in terms of the region inhabited by the *Logos* and indicates clearly, as Snell points out, that the all-important divine or logical element is anchored for Heraclitus in the “depth of the soul”.⁶³ Heraclitus claims that it is inherent in all men to know themselves and to think soundly (ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν – 116). Evidently there is some connection between the self and thinking or the mind that Heraclitus especially wants to emphasize in terms of the *Logos*. In any case, a man’s self is extremely important and central for Heraclitus – so important, in fact, that he is moved to point out that as far as man himself is concerned, the sun is only the width of his foot (εὗρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου – 3). Once again Heraclitus de-emphasizes the force of what we should call a totally objective worldview. The sun is not to be measured by a foot; its “measures” lie symbolically in *πῦρ*.

As for the various symbols or words used to express the realm of the *Logos*, it is extremely difficult to differentiate completely between *νόος*, *ψυχή*, *φύσις*, and *φρήν*. Each word seems to be used to express the most excellent area or function within man. The concept of *νόος* is involved with a certain commonality or collective consciousness; men “speaking with *νόος* must put a firm trust in that which is common to all” (ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρη τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων ... 114). So too is the use of the *φρήν* common to all (ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν – 113), and insofar as it is regulated by the *Logos*, it maintains its general commonality. If it does not, the process of *φρόνησις* reverts to the undesirable private realm of the many: “Therefore it is necessary to follow the common, but although the *Logos* is common, the many live as if they had a private use of the *φρήν*” (διὸ δεῖ ἔπεσθαι τῷ κοινῷ· τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν – 2). Wisdom (*σοφίη*) and sound thinking (*σωφρονεῖν*) depend upon perception regulated by *φύσις*, for “sound thinking is the greatest excellence, and wisdom is to speak the truth and having taken heed to act according to nature” (*σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθεία λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας* – 112). This could equally well be said of the *νόος* or *φρήν*, and just as *φύσις* hides itself (123) so does the *νόος* and *φρήν*. All the terms seem involved with a view of a man’s self or what ultimately must be designated as his *ψυχή*.

Heraclitus has much to say about this rather undefined phenomenon, and although I have clearly indicated that I prefer the translation of “life-force” for this phenomenon, several other meanings seem to be impinging on the word at this particular state of its development, e.g., “life”, “spirit”, “soul”,

“self”. Heraclitus distinguishes specific types of *ψυχαί*, claiming that some are “barbarian” and hence are incapable of interpreting properly the evidence of the ears and eyes (107). The greatest foe of the *ψυχή* is *θυμός* or desire, for whatever desire wishes, it buys “at the price of the *ψυχή*” (*θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν ὃ γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται* – 85). Overly strong emotions can, then, have deleterious effects on the symbolic realm. They are death or wetness for the *ψυχή* (36). A drunken man possesses a “wet” *ψυχή* and consequently is led and tripped up by his inferior – a boy not yet come to man’s estate. He loses his path. He is no longer in the realm of the *Logos*. (*ἀνὴρ ὁκόταν μεθυσθῇ, ἄγεται ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀνῆβου σφαλλόμενος, οὐκ ἐπαίων ὅκη βαίνει, ὑγρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων* – 117). In contradistinction, the best and wisest soul is the dry one (118). Its behavior does not lead it into false paths, for it behaves logically and hence reflects the “dryness” induced by the symbol of *Logos* itself – *πῦρ*. *Ψυχαί*, then, as the interpreters of perception, as representative of the ground of symbolic perception, lie as the third term bridging the primary opposites of life and death. They may be said to perceive in both realms of experience (98).

As a third term, the *ψυχή* is a firm representative of the symbolic realm – i.e., one instrumental in manipulating material reality. It is the *ψυχή* from which one may not hide, since, unlike the sun taken literally, it has not the physical ability to disappear from view: “How”, indeed, “would anyone avoid that which never sets?” (*τὸ μὴ δύνόν ποτε πῶς ἂν τις λάθοι;* – 16). There are no limits one can discover to the *ψυχή*, even if one were to travel down the whole way. The depth and structure or boundaries of the *ψυχή* is regulated only by the *Logos* (*ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαδὺν λόγον ἔχει* – 45).⁶⁴ This *Logos* of the *ψυχή* is not only unlimited but also self-increasing (*ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὐξων* – 115). In other words, the *ψυχή* has an infinite experience in both of two oppositional states (Life and Death). The only “boundary” is the “logical” one between opposites. The oppositional nature of the *Logos* necessitates the dyadic experience of the *ψυχή* at all levels and at all times. The *ψυχή* increases itself constantly because of the infinity involved at each extreme. Opposites meet only at the juncture of opposition. There is no definition in Heraclitus of outer or externally polar boundaries. There is, then, a strong parallel between the further limits of Heraclitus’ *Logos* of the *ψυχή* and the unbounded Chaos of Hesiod’s *Theogony*.

The function of the *ψυχή* comes out clearly in those fragments dealing with sleeping and waking. Whether awake or asleep, a man possessing a faulty *Logos* will miss many things. There is, in fact, little difference between some men awake or asleep.⁶⁵ Yet, even sleeping men have their place as workers and sharers in the cosmos (*τοὺς καθεύδοντας ἐργάτας εἶναι καὶ συνεργοὺς τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γυομένων* – 75), although it is certainly neither necessary nor desirable that men act and speak as do the sleeping (*οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ*

καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν — 73). In Heraclitus there is a movement towards, and an arrival at, a conscious state and light as there is in Parmenides, and I think that both men acknowledged the comprehensive and contradictory character of this consciousness or cosmos.

It has become clear by now that I understand Heraclitus' use of "κόσμος" to be in a partially subjective, non-material sense and that I believe that there is some indication that Heraclitus does too. To begin with there are certain statements that bring into question any dependence upon the objective or material cosmos. Heraclitus sees himself opposed to Homer. He attacks him directly (42). One of the reasons, we know, is that Homer was an astrologer (αστρολόγον τὸν Ὅμηρον — 105) — that is, he put the *Logos* in the stars, not in the *ψυχή*. There is, moreover, some question as to how we are to take the fragment concerning the bounds of dawn and evening: "The limits of dawn and evening are the Bear and opposite the Bear the boundary of clear Zeus" (ἡοὺς καὶ ἐσπέρας τέρματα ἢ ἄρκτος καὶ ἀντίον τῆς ἄρκτου οὗρος αἰθρίου Δίος — 120). Unlike the sky the *Logos* possesses no visible limits because of its subjective or phenomenological properties. What measures there are are necessarily "logical" ones. The sky at most could represent only a macrocosm of the structure of the mind.⁶⁶ In objective terms — that is, in ones the masses might take — the fragment could be negative in intent. In logical or phenomenological ones, however, it could be positive — that is, insofar as the sun and stars symbolized the phenomenon of the *Logos* — an internal and partially subjective phenomenon. The intolerable idea is a total objectification of the *Logos*. Remember that the cosmos he considers the most beautiful is the one he likens unto sweepings piled up at random (ὥσπερ σάρμα εἰκὴ κεχυμένων δὲ κάλλιστος [δὲ] κόσμος — 124). I understand this to mean that there is no purely physical cosmos, that physically what Heraclitus is describing looks as if it is "piled up at random". It is, however, the hidden *Logos* that gives the phenomenological cosmos its measure. "The cosmos is the same in all things and was made neither by men nor gods" (κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν ... 30). It is collective or common — that is within man but not created by him.

Twice, moreover, Heraclitus relates man's condition directly to a conception of the cosmos — especially for men awake and, one suspects, properly attuned. Their cosmos is collective or common and unified: "Men asleep are workers and sharers of things becoming in the cosmos"; "for men awake the cosmos is one and common" (τοὺς καθεύδοντας ἐργάτας εἶναι καὶ συνεργοὺς τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γυνομένων — 75; τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι — 89).⁶⁷ There are, in other words, at every turn indications that the *Logos* Heraclitus describes is lodged, not in some objective world or material cosmos, but in some kind of partially subjective or phenomenological inner structure. Men's perceptions based on the physical world are faulty; based on the phenomenological or symbolic one, however, they become true. Man may,

therefore, see the truth in symbols of a proper sort. His eyes are more exact witnesses than his ears (ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ τῶν ὠτῶν ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες – 101a).

How then does Heraclitus describe this structure of the inner cosmos? In what ways does he transform his symbolic phenomena into structural ones? The philological and logical ground of the Heraclitian *Logos*, a noetic and logical device, is the well-known, but little understood, use of opposition. For us at the simplest level, oppositions are stated by a syntactical placement back to back. Take, for instance, the simple opposition of immortals and mortals in 62 (ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι ...). The opposites have no syntactical relationship except their immediate correlation with one another. It is in the placement of the words themselves that Heraclitus reveals the archaic sense of identity in opposition. In 67 he once again makes use of this syntactical juxtaposition: “The god is day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, satiety/famine” (ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμῶν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κóρος λιμός). And yet another example is 60: “The road up/down (ἀνα κάτω) is one and the same”. This type of immediate juxtaposition extends to ideas of different grammatical forms – e.g., “it in changing rests” (84).⁶⁸

Grammatically, a slightly modified method of presenting opposites is to link them by a conjunction. This method is especially effective in those fragments which suggest or actually state a third term. Fragment 65 is merely a statement of connected opposites: “Need and satiety”, but a statement such as “the way of the clothcarders is straight and crooked” (εὐθεῖα καὶ σκολιή – 59) “the same thing is inherent in one, living and dead, and awake and asleep and young and old, for the former having changed is the latter and the latter changing back is the former” (88) are structural phenomena pointing to a third term (the “road” in the first case and “the same thing” in the second) which is the unifying principle of the *Logos*. The “river fragments” make a similar use of connected opposites: “It is not possible to step twice in the same river . . . they scatter and combine . . . both approach and depart” (ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ ... σκιδνησι καὶ πάλιν⁶⁹ συνάγει ... καὶ πρόσσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι – 91). This “approaching” and “departing” is, however, in a strict dyadic form and thought, for as Heraclitus says elsewhere, “upon men stepping in the same rivers different and again different (ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα) waters flow” (12).⁷⁰ It is the dyadic phrase ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα that dictates the oppositional nature of the fragment itself because of the strict sense of disjunction yet identity the words imply. Yet, everywhere the *underlying third term*, or the *Logos* as unity, is symbolized by the river – the river that elsewhere unifies life and death, the ultimate opposition for man: “We step in the same rivers and we do not; we are and we are not” (ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ... εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμεν – 49A). In describing the “joints” or harmony of his “logical” structure, Heraclitus again makes use of both the oppositional mode of speech in its simplest form and also that mode in its conjunctive one:

“Joints are whole *and* not whole, brought together/separated, in tune/out of tune, *both* from all things one *and* from one all things” (συνάψεις ὅλα καὶ οὐκ ὅλα, συμπερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶδον διᾶδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα – 10). I shall speak at greater length concerning these “joints” subsequently; merely note here that Heraclitus has hit upon a convenient and natural syntactical, appositional mode to express the underlying unity of his thought by placing opposites either back to back or connecting them conjunctively.

Oppositions may also be detected in total sentences in which more complicated ideas are juxtaposed or where one half of an opposition is implied. Whether a third term is expressed or not, in many instances an inclusion of both ideas in a single and simple sentence permits a remarkable degree of unity in expression. One may also begin to recognize in certain of these statements some of the secondary dialectical properties of Heraclitus’ logical structure.

In the uncomplicated sentence “if there were no sun, it would be night” (ἥλιος ... εὐφρόνη – 99),⁷¹ Heraclitus makes use of the opposition between light and dark, as did Hesiod, to reveal the polarity that occurs within his logic. That one opposite must imply the other is revealed in those fragments in which only one of the pair is fully stated. “Things await men who are dead that they do not expect or imagine” (27) – i.e., a content of death, albeit unknown, is implied by the content of life which does not find statement in the fragment. “Doctors cutting and burning are accused of taking no worthy pay for their acts” (58). They deserve their pay, however, for the doctor’s act – a kind of third term – necessitates cutting and burning – phenomena that in themselves imply their opposite, curing and health. Or consider: “They would not know the name of justice, if these things [presumably “unjust things”] were not” (23). Justice assumes its definition by injustice. Δίκη, a term I take to be synonymous with the *Logos* in its aspects of the “right way”,⁷² interestingly enough is structured by its opposite.⁷³ The one cannot exist without the other. Both are combined by a logical third term. Men, however, see not this connection and assume things to be *either* unjust *or* just: “On the one hand to the gods all things are beautiful, good, and just, but men have assumed some things unjust and others just” (τῷ μὲν θεῷ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια – 102). The unified, dualistic *Logos* lies as a third term behind the solely disjunctive view of opposites in the realm of men. We shall see the phenomenon once again in Parmenides. This one fragment suggests a strong resemblance between the Heraclitian and Parmenidian logical structures.

War for Heraclitus, as the third term, “has established some as gods and some as men; he has made some slave and some free” (53). Opposition by correlation is accomplished by the familiar μέν ... δέ construction in the Greek. In another instance, sea, as a third term, unites good and bad. It is

good for fish and bad for men (61). Positive and negative qualities are inherent in one unifying phenomenon.⁷⁴ Another excellent example of a third term posited in order to unify opposites occurs in 63 (ἐνθα δ' ἐόντι ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φύλακας γίνεσθαι ἐγερτὶ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν). Some "being" arises that awakes – i.e., brings into full consciousness of the *Logos* – and guards the opposites of the living and the dead.

When opposites are linked by certain verbs, the dynamics of the structured opposition become clear. For instance, "cold things grow warm, a warm thing cools; moist dries, parch is moistened" (τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὑγρὸν αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται – 126). Sickness makes health sweet and good, famine/satiety, weariness/rest (νοῦσος ὑγιεῖν ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, λιμός κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαυσι – 111). The negative opposition can force a movement to the positive. There is a positive orientation of the one to the other, suggesting the similar orientation of *θυνητός/ἀθάνατος* in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*. The life-death opposition is also an active phenomenon. In a fragment that is clearly based on the oppositional nature of alpha privatives and the characteristically Greek realm of identity and opposition between mortals and immortals, Heraclitus reveals a dynamic movement in the *Logos*: "(immortals/mortals)/(mortals/immortals), living the death of those, and dying the life of those" (ἀθάνατοι θυνητοί, θυνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες – 62). A similar opposition is formed, as I see it, when Heraclitus opposes wet and dry *ψυχαί*. To become wet is a delight for an improperly guided *ψυχή* and a death for the properly guided one. Defined ultimately by the dryness of his *ψυχή* – i.e., by his comprehension of the *Logos* – man, as the unifying third term in which the warlike opposition occurs, "lives the death" that is the wet *ψυχή*, while in man the wet *ψυχή* lives or takes life from the death or lessened comprehension of man: "For souls it is a delight or death to become wet . . . we live their death and those live our death" (ψυχῇσι τέρψω ἢ θάνατον ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι . . . ζῆν ἡμᾶς τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον καὶ ζῆν ἐκείνας τὸν ἡμέτερον θάνατον – 77). Within one area there is a constant opposition and identity of terms, moving dynamically from one state to the other.

Heraclitus goes beyond merely expressing certain conditions in which the oppositional nature of the *Logos* is realized. There exists a specific set of fragments in which this nature itself is more closely discussed. These are fragments dealing with the dynamics, the "joints", "harmonies", and "measures".

In a world of fluids where parts are impossible to identify, Heraclitus saw the symbols of the unifying dynamics of the *Logos*. I have already discussed the phrase *ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα* in reference to rivers (12) as one that establishes the dyadic nature of Heraclitus' logic, as does the indistinguishable mixture of earth and sea within the convenient third term, *πρηστήρ* in 31. The dynamics of the logic are also represented by the stirring of the barley drink that separates into two parts if not kept in motion (125). The phenomenological cosmos

or *Logos* is in a constant state of tension and movement between opposites. As in a river there is a continual “scattering and combining” (*σκιῖδναι καὶ συνάγει*), approaching and departing (*καὶ πρόσσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι* – 91), the former of the two changes into the latter and the latter, changing back, is the former (88). It is quite clear that the “joints” or the way the *Logos* is constructed are dyadic structures of reciprocal oppositions: “Joints whole and not whole, a thing brought together/torn apart, consonant/dissonant, and from all things one and from one all things” (*συνάψεις ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαθερόμενον, συνᾶδον διᾶδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνός πάντα* – 10).

These “joints” or “harmonies” are real only in the unapparent phenomenological world; the apparently paradoxical connections we actually seek in the physical world – i.e., those oppositions to which Heraclitus has devoted so many fragments – are only weaker examples of the stronger (*ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς κρείττων* – 54). “That which is opposed is in agreement and from differing things comes the most beautiful means of joining” (*τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν* – 8).⁷⁵ The masses “do not understand how a thing differentiated from itself agrees”, that “a joining together is a changing to the other side (*παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη*), just as in the case of the bow and the lyre” (51). The structure of the *Logos*, then, is formed about tensed dyadic “junctions”, like the tensed part of the bow or lyre (see also 48) – junctions that change constantly from one to the other; the dynamics of the flux rest upon a stable dualism of opposites.

The tensed polarity of opposites results in a measured regularity in the universe – that is, certain “culminating” boundaries.⁷⁶ They are symbolized, I believe, in Heraclitus’ use of the “seasons that bring all things” (100).⁷⁷ These “measures” are established patterns of logical behavior. The symbol of the sun, for instance, maintains its measures. If it did not the oppositional nature of *Δίκη* – i.e., the *Logos* – would set it astraight (“*Ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μὴ Δίκης ἐπικούροι ἐξευρήσουσιν* – 94).⁷⁸ There are several instances in the literature before Heraclitus that could have influenced his use of the word.⁷⁹ There “measures” are also ever-moving or fulfilling active phenomena that do not possess the clear-cut markings of a physical boundary. The idea of “culmination” or “completion” is an important consideration in the word’s meaning. Take for instance the last two lines of Solon’s short poem concerning the ten ages of men. The ten ages are fulfilled (*τελέσας*) according to measure (*κατὰ μέτρον*): *τὴν δεκάτην δ’ εἴ τις τελέσας κατὰ μέτρον ἵκοιτο/ οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος ἔων μοῖραν ἔχοι θανάτου* – West 27.17-18). Many examples in earlier literature concern the “measure of manhood” (*ἥβης μέτρον*),⁸⁰ and again stress the idea of “culmination”. There is a very interesting instance of the word at *Od.* 4.389 and 10.539 (*μέτρα κελεύθου* – “measures of a path”) that suggests the possibility of some underlying direction in Odysseus’ voyage. Here too we see the im-

portant coupling of “measure” and “path” that on a symbolic level constitute an obvious influence on Heraclitus’ use of ὁδός – a phenomenon in itself directed by underlying forces of a logical and therefore a “metrical” nature. We meet this “way” once again in Parmenides. In Hesiod it is clear that μέτρα measure a kind of unseen, underlying path of the sea. He promises to show Perseus the “measures of the loud-roaring sea” (δείξω δὴ τοι μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης) – that is, the sea lanes with their indefinite boundaries given form only by the ultimate destination of the ship.⁸¹ Most important for us, “measure” in pre-Heraclitian literature meant an unseen, phenomenological, somehow geometrical “proportion”, something that had to be guarded and employed with “due measure”: μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρὸς δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος (“Guard your measures. In all things due measure is best”) – E. 694. It would have been quite natural and easy for Heraclitus to adopt such a use of the word in his own thought, creating in his concept of “μέτρον”, “a sure and necessary rhythm which is maintained in all change”, on which “rests the certainty ‘of a hidden harmony that is better than the visible harmony’”. It is only in order to assure himself of this hidden harmony that Heraclitus turns back again and again to the contemplation of change”.⁸²

Heraclitus’ concept of the measured oppositional and structural nature of the *Logos* – this ἁρμονίη of the μέτρον – led him to express not only an oppositional structure involving a third connecting or underlying term but also to express a structure and its dynamics in which this third term unifies and identifies phenomena that are by nature qualitatively superior or inferior to one another. This was, of course, Hermann Fränkel’s major discovery.⁸³

Fränkel labels the logical apparatus of the Heraclitian dialectic “a geometrical mean”, “a device to express the inexpressible and to explain the unexplainable”. Given three planes, there is a movement embracing lowest and highest by means of the middle term. A good example of such a movement is found in 79: “A man is called foolish before god just as a child before man” (ἄνθρωπος νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωπερ παῖς πρὸς ἄνδρος). “Thus”, as he says, “man, being the geometrical mean, may be called wise when compared to a boy, and childish when compared to god. He combines opposite qualities”. However, it would seem that another point of the proportion god:man :: man:boy is to express the superior term (god) in terms of the relationship between god and man and man and boy. There is a definite sense of a higher-lower relationship in the fragment. 36 is another case in which a mean is used to make the logic include a higher and lower term: “For ψυχαί it is death to become water, for water it is death to become land. Water comes out of earth and ψυχαί from water”. Ψυχαί:water :: water:land. In the alternating course of the logic, emphasis seems to be placed upon ψυχή as the desired point of departure and point of arrival while water is the mean or third term between the lowest and highest elements. The combination of fragments 82 and 83, neither of which are considered *ipsissima verba* but are

obviously close paraphrases, form a third example of such a proportion: "The most beautiful ape is ugly compared to the race of men"; "the wisest of men will appear an ape in relation to god in wisdom, beauty, and everything else". God:man :: man:ape. The same dynamic hierarchy applies as it did before. As Fränkel comments, "the essence of the pattern is that mundane values, when compared to the paramount, are tantamount to their opposites, the non-values". "The pattern implies . . . the statement that the middle element B (man), when considered from a higher standpoint, is no better than its apparent opposite C (ape). Thus Heraclitus can reduce the equation to a shorter form by simply asserting that B virtually amounts to its opposite C". The thrust of the dynamic is at the expense of the lowest term and depends upon a constant shifting in the definition of the third or mean term.

It should be clear by now that the structure of the thought purposely overrides or defines its hierarchical nature. Yet another way by which the structure deals with qualitatively disparate phenomena occurs when oppositions entailing a third term are used to imply a three-termed opposition of one order higher. At these times the superior term of the first three-termed opposition is in itself a mixture of opposites and becomes a mean in an opposition of a higher order that cannot be expressed as mathematically as the above examples. In discussing the "solstices of fire" (31), Heraclitus makes the seemingly uncomplicated statement "the transformations of fire: first sea — on the one hand, half the sea is earth; on the other, half is *πρηστήρ*" (*πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμῖς γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἡμῖς πρηστήρ*). The opposition originally is earth/sea/*πρηστήρ*. But the implication is clearly sea/*πρηστήρ*/*πῦρ* because the *πρηστήρ* is a mixture of fire and water. A three-termed opposition implies within it a three-termed opposition a degree more advanced.⁸⁴ 26 is another clear example of this type of structural impetus: "Living and asleep man approximates a dead man; awake he approximates one who is sleeping" (... *ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεώτος εὕδων, ἐγρηγορώς ἄπτεται εὕδοντος*). The first opposition is death/sleeping-life/waking-life; but just as sleeping-life touches upon death and waking-life, so waking-life must touch on sleeping-life and something higher which I should call "true life". So the following opposition is therefore implied: sleeping-life/waking-life/life. The process here is again more geometrical since the middle term of the larger proportion (death:sleep-waking :: sleep-waking:life), considered from the point of view of real life, is no better than its apparent opposite: death. An even stronger way of fashioning the same thing is to state, as does fragment 21, that normal life awake is death, putting sleep aside entirely, thereby making normal life the middle term in the incomplete opposition: death/normal life/() which demands "true life" to fill the void. When the highest term is not apparent the structural force engendered by identical oppositions appears all the more powerful.

The presence of both a structural force and a "mean principle" yields the

possibility of a second mean. This second mean reveals the circular nature of the logic and resolves the dynamics once again into a stable structure. Through a geometrical progression a complete cycle of mutual relationships come into being. 76, a close paraphrase of the *ipsissima verba*, presents us with a fine example of this enlarged geometrical proportion: "Fire lives the death of earth and air lives the death of fire, water lives the death of air, earth that of water". Earth:fire :: fire:air :: air:water :: water:earth. The dialectic here is circular, and the structure steadfast.

To what extent other fragments in the Heraclitian corpus reflect the impetus of the third term is largely conjectural. Fragments may indeed be considered as belonging to larger proportions. Fränkel, for instance, observes that this is probably the case with 117 ("A man whenever he is drunk is led being tripped up by a boy not yet come to man's estate . . ." [boy:man :: man:god]). I have given some indication that such an approach is possible in my foregoing comments. This sort of piecemeal examination may even give some place for a fragment as short and normally incomprehensible as 74 "children of parents" [child:parents :: parents:(god?)] or for a fragment as strange as 20 which might express some sort of logical relationship between children, parents, and a higher term: "Having come into being they wish to live and possess their fate, but rather they desist and leave their children to possess theirs". Perhaps even 52, that peculiarly winsome fragment, "time is a child playing a game of draughts; the kingship is in the hands of a child", is related to the same expanded opposition and is intended to emphasize some sort of structural potential inherent in even the lowest term of the comparison.

The point is that the structure of the three-termed proportion exists in Heraclitus and does encompass and define certain seemingly hierarchical properties. These hierarchical thrusts form a dialectical peculiarity which might best be described as a "structural transformation of the third term": an opposition entailing a third term is used to imply a three-termed opposition one order higher or more advanced. These transformations, if regarded "logically", create a circle, and what is then most evident is an archaic structuralism, a particular type of philological phenomenism, that works or appears through the major holistic symbol of the Heraclitian *Logos* — one that works so clearly in fact that Heraclitus, the Obscure, should become for us Heraclitus, Logician of the Archaics. The logics of Parmenides and Empedocles form a variation on a logical type established long before by Heraclitus. Their works represent, in great part, a more conscious and precise explication of the permanent nature of archaic thought.

NOTES

1. Certain sections of the following chapter have appeared in *Apeiron* VII. 2 (1973), pp. 23-37.
2. Burnet in his *Early Greek Philosophers* (London 1963, first edition 1892) contends, for instance, that the Heraclitian concept of Fire ($\pi\acute{\upsilon}\rho$) must be understood in physical terms as a material phenomenon which "of its own nature would pass into everything else, while everything else would pass into it". It is easy enough to see why Heraclitus should choose fire "if we consider the phenomenon of combustion" (p. 145). The Heraclitian $\pi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho$ is for Burnet simply a "hurricane accompanied by a fiery water spout" (pp. 148-149), and night and winter were produced from the earth and sea because Heraclitus "saw, of course, that the valleys were dark before the hill-tops" (p. 155).
3. One might expect G.S. Kirk's *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge 1954) to be a better example of modern English scholarship on Heraclitus. I have selected Guthrie not only because of his later date of publication (Cambridge 1962-1965), but also because he seems more willing to make a comprehensive statement concerning the content of Heraclitus as a whole, while Kirk limits his comments to an arbitrary selection of the "cosmic fragments". Kirk, although he reveals clearly the speculative weakness of the "school" does supply some helpful emendations and translations of specific concepts. It is impossible to gainsay his aid in this major respect. One might also choose M. Marcovich's *Heraclitus Editio Maior* (Merida 1967) but, although he has performed an admirable and invaluable task in bringing together critically the opinions and texts of both "schools" involved, Marcovich has avoided, in my opinion, any truly comprehensive statement of the Heraclitian worldview because, like Guthrie, he is too dependent upon the categories of post-Aristotelian philosophy (e.g., his insistence that Heraclitus "envisaged" four levels of the *Logos*: logical, ontological, epistemological, and ethical, p. 87, cf. also p. 305).
4. W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge 1962), I. 414.
5. *Ibid.* p. 457.
6. *Ibid.* p. 471.
7. The attempt at structural analysis has fallen to G.E.R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge 1966), who for all his good intentions — I commend him heartily for his use of twentieth century anthropology (cf. his introduction) — unfortunately becomes lodged in the rigid and little useful categories of "polarity" and "analogy". Like Kirk at so many junctures, Lloyd seems to begin to see the proper position only to fall back upon unhelpful philological, linguistic, and "scientific" assumptions.
8. Guthrie, *op. cit.* pp. 410-413.
9. *Ibid.* p. 424.
10. *Ibid.* p. 6. For an even more interesting account of the juxtaposition of "unconsciousness" and "subtle thinking" see p. 428.
11. *Ibid.* p. 432.
12. *Ibid.* p. 440.
13. *Ibid.* p. 452.
14. *Ibid.* p. 467.
15. *Ibid.* p. 479.
16. F.E.D. Schleiermacher, *Dritte Abtheilung zur Philosophie II, Sämtliche Werke* (Berlin 1838), pp. 1-146.
17. Ferdinand Lassalle, *Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen von Ephesos* (Berlin 1858), p. 9.
18. G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, Sämtliche Werke* 17 (Stuttgart 1928), p. 344.

19. *Ibid.* p. 344. "Das Sein ist das Eine, das Erste; das Zweite ist das Werden – zur dieser Bestimmung ist er fortgegangen. Das ist das erste Konkrete, das Absolute als in ihm die Einheit Entgegengesetzter. Bei ihm ist also zuerst die philosophische Idee in ihrer spekulativen Form anzutreffen . . ."
20. *Ibid.* p. 349. "Heraklit sagt, Alles ist Werden; diess Werden ist das Princip. Diess liegt in dem Ausdrucke; das Sein ist so wenig als das Nichtsein; das Werden ist und ist auch nicht. Die schlechthin entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen sind in Eins verbunden; wir haben das Sein darin und auch das Nichtsein".
21. *Ibid.* p. 347. "Heraklit hat als dunkel gegolten; und ist berühmt wegen seiner Dunkelheit. Cicero hat einen schlechten Einfall, wie es ihm oft geht; er meint, er habe absichtlich so dunkel geschrieben. Es ist diess aber sehr platt gesagt, seine eigene Platttheit, die er zur Platttheit Heraklits macht . . . Seine Dunkelheit, welche ihm auch den Beinamen 'der Dunkle' (σκοτεινός) zuzog ist wohl mehr Folge von vernachlässigter Wortfügung und der unausgebildeten Sprache . . ."
22. Olof Gigon, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie von Hesiod bis Parmenides* (Basel 1945), p. 203.
23. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (London 1961), p. 96.
24. *Ibid.* p. 83.
25. Lassalle, *op. cit.* pp. 16-17. "So sind Feuer, Zeit, Kampf, Nothwendigkeit, Weg nach Oben und Unten, Fluss, Gerechtigkeit, Friede, u.s.w. (πῦρ, χρόνος, πόλεμος, εἰμαρμένη, ὁδός ἄνω κάτω, Δίκη, Εἰρήνη, etc.) mitwelchen Benennungen wir – mit noch vielen andern – in seinen Fragmenten sein Princip bezeichnet finden, nur gehäufte Namen, nur die verschiedene sinnliche Aussprache eines und desselben Begriffs, ein und dasselbe bedeutend und in ein und derselben Hinsicht gewählt oder vielmehr nur, was sich später klarer herausstellen wird, verschiedene Wendungen und Abstufungen oder Potenzirungen desselben Begriffs".
26. *Ibid.* p. 18. "So ist das Feuer die dem heraklitischen Princip, der processirenden Einheit von Sein und Nichtsein, dem Werden, entsprechende Existenz".
27. *Ibid. passim* especially pp. 19, 39.
28. *Ibid.* p. 38, cf. p. 40.
29. Gigon, *op. cit.* p. 199.
30. Hermann Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (New York 1951), p. 476.
31. *Ibid.* p. 478.
32. Hermann Fränkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus", *AJP* 59 (1938), p. 319. Fränkel is quick to point out that fragments 14 and 15 speak out flatly against any unreasoned mysticism.
33. *Ibid.* p. 328. Cf. fragments 3 and 45.
34. *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore 1935).
35. Bruno Snell (*op. cit.*, p. 146) shows clearly that he is well on the way towards comprehending the symbolic nature of the *Logos* within man. He says, "In as much as the *Logos* pervades everything it manifests itself in the individual also; and yet it is set apart from all (fr. 108) since it transcends the particular. The mysterious essence, the vital tension, reveals itself through significant particular events which man uses as symbols to apprehend the divine". Strip this statement of its transcendental and mystical tone in addition to the idea that the symbols involved are solely "events" and not tangible "objects" and it applies easily to the symbolic phenomenological realm we are investigating at the present time.
36. See Homer *Od.* 18.323 for a similar use of ἀθύρματα.
37. The study of liminal periods and their importance to ritual action has been pursued actively in the field of anthropology. E.g., Arnold van Gennep, *Les rites de passage* (Paris 1909); Robert Hertz, "Contribution à une étude sur la représentation collective de la

mort", *Année sociologique* 10 (1907), pp. 48-137; A.M. Hocart, "The Age-Limit" and "Childhood Ceremonies", *The Life-Giving Myth and Other Essays* (London 1970, first published 1952), pp. 149-155; Victor Turner, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period and Rites of Passage", *Forest of Symbols* (Ithaca 1967), pp. 93-111. The primitive attitude towards children could easily be at work in this fragment of Heraclitus.

38. Kirk prefers to regard this fragment as "another statement of an instance in which apparent opposites are only relatively opposed" (*op. cit.* p. 112), and while a relative point of view is possible (i.e., depending upon the person's position at the top or the bottom), there also is the absolute possibility of a person in the middle of the road, looking up and down and comprehending that the road itself is both "one and the same", acting as a third term connecting opposites. While I partially agree with Kirk (*ibid.* p. 109) in that the statement is "devoid of general physical application", still its symbolic rather than physical nature surely is more important.

39. Kirk, *op. cit.* pp. 97-104, makes an argument for the reading of *γραφέων* for *γναφείω*. Would, however, Heraclitus be interested enough in writing *per se* to aphorize such a concept? The question perhaps is moot, but for the time being Marcovich's reading (*op. cit.* pp. 163-164) of *γνάφων* from *γνάφος*, "a cylindrical carding comb or roller . . . able to fulfil a rotary movement as well", appears more appealing.

40. Ἐνθ' ἐκ νηὸς ὄρουσεν ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων
 ἄστέρι εἰδόμενος μέσῳ ἡματι· τοῦ δ' ἀπὸ πολλὰι
 σπινθάριδες πωτῶντο, σέλας δ' εἰς οὐρανὸν ἵκεν·
 ἐς δ' ἄδυστον κατέδυσσε διὰ τριπόδων ἐριτίμων·
 ἔνθ' ἄρ' ὃ γε φλόγα, δαΐε πφανσκόμενος τὰ ἄ κῆλα,
 πᾶσαν δὲ Κρίσην κάτεχεν σέλας·

There from the ship arose lord Apollo, the far-working,
 Appearing like a star in the middle of the night. From him
 Flew about many flashes of light. The bright flame reached heaven.
 He entered the sanctuary through precious tripods.
 There kindled he a flame, making manifest his shafts.
 The bright flame held fast all Crisa.

41. It should perhaps be noted that *πῦρ* in the Greek language itself is never in the plural and that *φλόξ* appears in the plural only later (Aristotle *Meta* 341b.2, *Mu.* 392b.3, 400a.30, Orphica *L.* 178, Micias Epigrammaticus fragment 74.48). The singularity of fire or flame immediately draws the words away from a purely physical world where fires and flames are perceptively obvious and into a realm of thought that is easily interpreted in symbolic terms.

42. I agree with Kirk, *op. cit.* p. 356 in his understanding that in this fragment there is implied an identification between fire and thunderbolt.

43. It is in his understanding of *πῦρ* and its relationship to *κόσμος* and *Logos* that I disagree with Kirk most strongly. He claims that this fragment (30) represents the cosmos as "a huge bonfire" (*op. cit.* p. 317) – an idea derived immediately from Burnet's consideration of the phenomenon of "combustion" (*op. cit.* p. 145) – and weighs the idea that *Logos* and *Kosmos* might be equated (in my own view creating an unnecessary confusion between an active logical principle and the more passive ground on or in which the *Logos* acts). He speaks of the *Logos* as "a constituent formula which applies to all things, which inheres in and actually is a part of all things, and therefore [?] could be treated as concrete [?]" (*op. cit.* p. 315). At this point he goes on to display his reluctance to grasp fire as a symbol: "But fire cannot be identified with the formula of the underlying identity of opposites based upon regularity of exchange, because it has or displays that formula itself [?], and is qualified as *ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύ-*

μενον μέτρα". If Kirk could have conceived of fire, not as a physical phenomenon – i.e., the cause of the "huge bonfire" – but as a symbol which, like all symbols, may be identified with anything and necessarily must display the phenomenon with which it is identified – in this case the formula of the *Logos* – he would have had little trouble with the simple and immediate relationship between Fire and *Logos*. An overly physical, materialistic, and objective point of view (I detect it even in his use of "concrete" for instance) has led Kirk far astray at this one crucial point. Others have thought differently. Lassalle in the middle of the last century clearly recognized the symbolic properties of Fire in Heraclitus, and C.S. Jung in his speaking of the concept of *πῦρ ἀείζων* places the term in its primitive, symbolic context. He argues that it "borders on the primitive notion of an all pervading vital force, a power of growth and magic healing that is generally called *mana*". This primordial archetype "dates from the time when consciousness did not *think*, but only *perceived*" (*Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *Collected Works* IX:1 [New York 1959], p. 33) – "the eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears" (101a). Nowhere is the division between the scientific and the phenomenological points of view clearer than between Kirk and Jung on the phenomenon of *πῦρ* in Heraclitus.

44. Cf. fn. 53.

45. It is to Kirk's credit (*op. cit.* p. 331) that he identifies *πρηστήρ* with *celestial* fire.

46. This double position of Fire as a symbolic phenomenon is not confined to archaic Greek alone. Eric Turner, *op. cit.* p. 84, in a chapter entitled "Color Classification in Ndembu Ritual", notes a parallel structuring of color in the *Upanishads* to his observation of an African ritual. There are three basic colors: red (fire), white (water), and black (earth). Fire is the primary symbol. When reduced to a second level, however, we find that red Fire is fire, white Fire is water, and black Fire is earth. Fire takes its proper position as a color among colors on the secondary level. The elegant formulation of the *Upanishads*, however, maintains the underlying power Fire assumes from its primal position as a symbol.

47. Concerning the phrase *ξυνός γάρ ὁ κοινός* in fragment 2, I am inclined to agree with Kirk (*op. cit.* p. 57) that a gloss by Sextus is probable. It is difficult indeed to establish enough of a difference in meaning between the two words to make any such statement clear in Greek.

48. Kirk (*ibid.* p. 68) puts forth an interesting translation for *ἄμο – λογ – εἰν* in the present fragment: "to tune in with *λόγος*". I shall deal extensively with this "tuning in" subsequently in my discussion of the non-obvious nature of the realm of the *Logos*. At present I wish only to point out this possible use of the verb as an affirmation of the "logical" idea Heraclitus is advancing.

49. The "many-named" aspect of Zeus appears in Aeschylus fragment 70: *Ζεὺς ἐστὶν αἰθέρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανός/Ζεὺς τοι τὰ πάντα χῶτι τῶνδ' ὑπέρτερον*. It will not be irregular then, as we shall see, that the *Logos* too possesses many names that act as signs or symbols (*ὁ ἄναξ οὐ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει* – 93). It is interesting, however, that these "many names" are capable of assuming oppositional structures: *θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐρρόνη, χειμῶν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός ... ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐκάστου* (67).

50. Kirk, *ibid.* pp. 386-391, argues that this fragment is corrupt, and I tend to agree at least insofar as I have accepted his reading *ὅκη κυβερνᾶται*, over Diels' *ὅτῃ ἐκυβέρνησε*. The method of this "One" is by far the most important factor here. Certainly it is not man's *γνώμη* that guides all things through all things but man's comprehension of *how* things are guided. The structure or method is what Heraclitus is indicating.

51. Kirk, *ibid.* pp. 54-55, declares that "for Heraclitus the relationship between particular men or things and the one universal formula or law was both *μίμησις* and *μέθεξις*". In the present context this statement is extremely interesting because it throws light on the common (*ξυνός*) or collective workings of the *Logos*.

52. Cf. Diels *Vors.* I.10.6.1 for the supposed abbreviated statement of Bias (οἱ πλεῖστοι ἄνθρωποι κακοί).

53. We find Heraclitus making use of “gold” once again: “For men who are looking for gold dig up much land and find little” (χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὗρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον – 22). One must link this fragment to 90 (πυρὸς τε ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός) to see that Heraclitus makes use of gold as a symbolic phenomenon – the “gold” again of Pindar’s *First Olympian* (1-2). The symbolic value of gold has been well-attested by modern anthropology: cf. Hocart, *op. cit.* pp. 97-104, 159 and Robert H. Barnes, *Kélang: A Study of the Collective Thought of an Eastern Indonesian People* (Oxford 1974), pp. 60-63, 105-108, *passim*.

54. Kirk, *op. cit.* p. 262, interprets this fragment in a rather pessimistic fashion: “On the whole I think it as likely as not to be a concrete illustration of the universality of strife: the opposition between man and beast may typify that between man and his surroundings, or the action and reaction between all things absolutely”. It is a bit questionable, I think, to see “strife” or “man” in this statement unless “man” be the uncomprehending animal “pastured with a blow” because of his stubborn refusal to comprehend the *Logos*. If anything, what is active in the verb *νέμεται* is some archaic identity between a “pasture” and a “law”. Heraclitus presents us here with a politically “objective” statement, dealing with the treatment of men who cannot comprehend. One must keep an eye on what is important – i.e., the *Logos* and man’s comprehension of it.

55. The appearance of ὕδωρ in fragment 13 (ὕες βορβόρῳ ἔδονται μᾶλλον ἢ καθαρῷ ὕδατι) again suggests the affective symbolism of Pindar. “Pure water” could very easily be the “pure water” of the *Logos*. Through symbolic interpretation the fragment becomes an absolute statement pointed towards the *Logos*, not a relativistic one in terms of *Dissoi Logoi* as Kirk sees it (*op. cit.* p. 80).

56. Cf. fn. 37.

57. The idea of κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν as the aristocratic choice is, of course, one of the primary driving forces of Pindar’s own poetry as we have it. Both Heraclitus and Pindar presuppose that the aristocratic nature will choose excellence. According to them a good character ἦθος is both inborn and excellent: ἄμαχον δὲ κρύψαι τὸ συγγενὲς ἦθος – 01. 13.13; ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας θεῖον δὲ ἔχει – 78. For Heraclitus a man’s character (ἦθος) is his δαίμων (ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων – 119). He makes, therefore, the δαίμων a subjective phenomenon of sorts – perhaps even related to that which is somehow θεῖον in man himself. Given the aristocratic nature of Heraclitus and the lyric period in general, it is not at all surprising to see him, like some Callinus or Tyrtaeus, praising the honor of those killed in war (ἀρηιμάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι – 24). The general aristocratic background has led Heraclitus, in a completely natural way, to praise and to examine a quality in man that is especial and excellent – the *Logos*. The insight lies as one of his greatest debts to his literary and cultural background.

58. Kirk, *op. cit.* p. 231, puts this fragment in a group of others he claims indicate that while the *Logos* can be apprehended, most men ignore it. “Ignore”, I think, is not quite the correct word, for man’s “ignorance” is too blatant and too depraved as far as Heraclitus is concerned. I should tend to argue that most men lack the excellence to comprehend the phenomenon and hence reject it.

59. And once again a word with Socratic-Platonic significance appears. How far *did* Heraclitus influence these later men anyway?

60. There are no *ipsissima verba* to ground 69, but the paraphrase in Iamblichus goes: θυσιῶν τοίνυν τίθημι διττὰ εἶδη· τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀποκεκαθαρμένων παντάπασιν ἀνθρώπων, οἷα ἐφ’ ἐνὸς ἂν ποτε γένοιτο σπανίως, ὥς φησιν Ἡ., ἢ τινων ὀλίγων εὐαριθμήτων ἀνδρῶν· τὰ δ’ ἐνυλα κτλ.

("I establish two forms of sacrifice: those of men who are completely purified in every way – such sacrifices as rarely might come about in one [person], as Heraclitus says, 'or [they are the sacrifices] of a few easily-numbered men'. The other sacrifices are material ...").

61. The paradox of children killing/bringing fleas depends upon the double meaning of λαμβάνω "to kill" and "to take". This type of paradox is found in connection with the bow (103) and good and bad fortune (25).

62. What Heraclitus means by μάθησις is not extremely difficult to understand. A single translation as "perception" could easily confuse the disjunction in "perceptions" Heraclitus must be endeavoring to establish – of course, it is extremely difficult to speak of "perception" without the presence of αἴσθησις. I should tend to reject Marcovich's translation of μάθησις as "perception" and prefer his possibility of "one's own experience" (Marcovich, *op. cit.* p. 21), but I think that neither suggest the possibilities inherent in "understanding". If one considers this fragment in conjunction with 95 and 17, one comes to the conclusion that μάθησις is a very strong term but not a supreme one. One must hide its lack (95). Yet, μάθησις is decidedly secondary to φρόνησις, for one may possess the former without the latter (17), and it is the latter – real comprehension – that is all important. It is, perhaps, too sophisticated to look upon μάθησις as *Verstand* and φρόνησις as *Vernunft*, but, from the present examples, the subordination of the former to the latter and the truly comprehensive nature of the latter coupled with a certain acquisitive and perceptive nature of the former makes the analogy tempting.

63. Snell, *op. cit.* p. 145.

64. As Snell points out (*op. cit.* p. 17), the idea of the depth and profundity of soul comes about from the lyric poets and their use of βαθύρρων and βαθυμήτης. "In these expressions, the symbol of depth always points to the infinity of the intellectual and spiritual, which differentiates it from the physical" (p. 18).

65. Also, with an improper ψυχή "as many things as we see awake are death, and as many things as we see sleeping are sleep" (θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὀρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ εὕδοντες ὕπνος – 21). In the proper ψυχή sleep would be death and awakedness life.

66. I am inclined to agree with Kirk, *op. cit.* p. 293, that the present fragment deals with the sun's movement, but I do not question Kranz, as does he, concerning the equation of the "boundary of bright Zeus" with the "measures" of 94 which the sun will not overstep. Both may be phenomenological lines.

67. It is important that Diels does not consider the second half of 89 to be *ipsissima verba* – that is, the portion that places those asleep totally within a private world. For my part I consider these words a much later addition – one intended to create syntactical oppositions where probably only a verbal one existed – that is, Heraclitus is merely saying that for those awake *and those properly attuned* the cosmos is common and not private. Certainly this is the most satisfactory way of reconciling this fragment with 75 which allows a sleeping man a place in the cosmos too and with 26 which argues, as I see it, that asleep or awake a man without *Logos* is as good as dead (... ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεώτος εὕδων, ἐγρηγορώς ἄπτεται εὕδοντας).

68. Kirk, *ibid.* p. 252, is probably correct in taking 84a and 84b (κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι) to represent the oppositional paradox: "change is rest, no-change is weariness". Yet, to describe the combination in terms of paradox is to play too easily into the hands of those who dismiss Heraclitus because of alleged "obscurity" and the use of "hidden meaning".

69. I agree with Kirk, *ibid.* p. 312, when he argues that πάλιν should be excised; it ruins the elegance of the oppositional statement.

70. Kirk's argument, *ibid.* pp. 368-369, against the authenticity of the last half of this fragment as it is given in Diels (καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμῶνται) is very

convincing, and although indeed there might be some connection in content between this phrase and the idea of a drunk $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ in 117, still its place in the present fragment is puzzling because it bears little relationship with the main and self-sufficient idea.

71. I agree with Kirk, *ibid.* p. 165, that the major purpose of this fragment is to establish a particular connection between day and night and that the phrase, $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha\ \tau\omega\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\rho\omega\nu$, adds nothing but confusion to the simple idea involved and, therefore, should be removed (pp. 162ff.).

72. Kirk, *ibid.* p. 128, advances the view that $\delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\eta$ is "the right way".

73. Kirk, *ibid.* p. 183, argues in a similar way.

74. The sophistic nature of this fragment is quite clear. Documents such as the *Dissoi Logoi* abound in such arguments as they do in "paradoxes" like the bow (48). In Heraclitus, however, the point is not the practical or legal application of his statements, as it is for the sophists, but their structural and symbolic import. In other words, Heraclitus made use of any type of example as long as *structurally* or *symbolically* it revealed the phenomenological conception of the *Logos*.

75. The definition of " $\acute{\alpha}\rho\mu\omicron\nu\eta\eta$ " as "means of joining" could derive from *Od.* 5.248 in the description of Odysseus' building of the raft.

76. The "measured regularity" of the universe must, of course, deal directly with Heraclitus' use of " $\acute{\mu}\epsilon\tau\rho\alpha$ ". Perhaps the secret of their meaning lies philologically in the word's use in Homer where attributes of force or power and expanse in a very active sense are evident – e.g., *Il.* 11.225, *Od.* 4.668 or 4.385 where a measure is used in the sense of the "measure of depth", *et al.*

77. I am thankful to Kirk, *op. cit.* p. 305, for arguing that this fragment must have something to do with the $\acute{\mu}\epsilon\tau\rho\alpha$ underlying all things.

78. Kirk again, *ibid.* p. 287, has found the best interpretation: "Heraclitus in this fragment is simply stressing this accepted element of regularity in the sun's behaviour: the sun has $\acute{\mu}\epsilon\tau\rho\alpha$ to which he adheres".

79. *Vide me* "On the Archaic Use of Metron", *CW* (1976). Some of the following evidence combined with other pertinent information may be found more widely examined there.


80. *Il.* 11.225; *Od.* 4.688, 11.317, 18.217, 19.532; *h.h. Dem.* 116 and 221; *Hes. E.* 132 and 438; fragment 205.2.

81. For a very good discussion of the measures of the sea, see A.S.F. Gow, "ΜΕΤΡΑ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΗΣ", *CR* 45 (1931), pp. 10-12. Gow in discussing *E.* 648 brings to bear the evidence from *Od.* 3.179 ($\acute{\pi}\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\gamma\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\mu}\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\tau\rho\eta\sigma\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$) which he sees clearly as a way to indicate the traversing of the sea (p. 12). He also makes the all-important connection between *E.* 648 and *Od.* 4.389 and 10.539 ($\omicron\delta\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\mu}\acute{\epsilon}\tau\rho\alpha\ \kappa\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\omicron\upsilon$).


82. Cassirer, *op. cit.* 2.134.

83. Fränkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus", pp. 309-337.

84. I find Marcovich's commentary most interesting on this one point – not so much in what he says but in how he *diagrams* the situation involved (*op. cit.* p. 287):



He indicates clearly (p. 285) that the central underlying term of the given collocation of words is "sea" ($\acute{\pi}\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu\ \theta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha$). The interesting thing now to note is that, given the implication of a three-termed opposition a degree more advanced, the diagram must be:



As is the case in this structural, transformational logic, Fire maintains its symbolic supremacy even when appearing as a term that is symbolically of equal rank with others. Fire or *Logos* is the transformational symbol that lies steadfast behind the structure of all change.

PARMENIDES

The philosophical relationship between Heraclitus and Parmenides is somewhat difficult to determine clearly. The philological one is not. One cannot argue with any degree of certainty from the *ipsissima verba* of Parmenides that he attacked Heraclitus, thereby setting up an opposition between his views and those of the earlier philosopher. The strong opposition between the two was developed later by Plato, Aristotle, and subsequent writers strongly influenced by them. These men sought a contrast between Heraclitus and Parmenides and argued generally that the former's thought was best characterized by the theory of all things in eternal flux — the *πάντα ῥεῖ*. Plato, of course, restricted this principle to the sense-world and located the object of true knowledge as eternal Being in a realm of Ideas.¹

Plato carefully develops an opposition between the two pre-Socratics. He assigns Parmenides to the school that speaks of "Being" and Heraclitus, along with Protagoras and Empedocles, to the school that argues "Becoming" (*Tht.* 152e). At 179e-181a, he opposes Heraclitus and the Ephesians to Melissus and Parmenides. The latter according to Plato teaches that reality "is one and unmovable". "How are we to deal with these combatants?" he asks (*τούτοις οὖν, ὧ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα* ...). Again in the *Cratylus* he passes along the information that "Heraclitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest" (402a). At 440c he contrasts Heraclitus and his followers to those who argue that "there is this eternal nature in things". He obviously has Parmenides in mind. Finally in the *Sophist*, Plato has Parmenides testifying against the audacious implication of any statement that argues "what is not" has being (e.g., 258b). There can be little doubt that Heraclitus is the butt of this outrage.

Aristotle does not deviate from the lines Plato previously established. In *Metaphysics A*, he states that it was one of Heraclitus' doctrines that "the whole sensible world is always in a state of flux and that there is no knowledge in it" (987a). Earlier, in order to demonstrate his own causal principles, Aristotle has listed Heraclitus under those who espouse material causes (984a). Parmenides and the Eleatics, however, do not bear upon his investigation

(986b). Parmenides is pertinent only insofar as he was compelled by his assumption that Being is One to posit two causes or first principles – Fire and Earth which Aristotle transmutes into Hot and Cold (a set of forms found in Heraclitus 126 but never in Parmenides as we have him).² In other words, there is no attempt on Aristotle's part to compare the two philosophers and, in fact, a real desire to place Parmenides outside of his investigations entirely. Through the writings of Plato and Aristotle, then, Heraclitus and Parmenides come to be regarded as separate and antipodal, or at least incomparable, intelligences – a point of view that facilitates their neat categorization as mere “foundation-stones” and “important stages” in one's study of the history of philosophy.

The premise that such a dichotomy and opposition existed between the two has extended, in some circles, to the present day. Among the Germans, Hegel made no specific statements regarding a Parmenidian attack upon Heraclitus. He sees Parmenides' view not only as a contrary to Materialism but also as one that does not put together the soul from parts or independent forces.³ In his discussion of Heraclitus, he does mention a dialectical opposition of Heraclitus to the Eleatics but does not signify Parmenides by name.⁴ He cites Zeno however. Moreover, although Hegel accepts the *πάντα περὶ* theory as Heraclitian from Plato,⁵ he does not juxtapose it with Parmenidian doctrine in his own work. One could surmise that Hegel saw no strong opposition between the two pre-Socratics evidenced in their writings. Certainly, considering his dialectic, such a relationship would have been meaningful to him.

It was Bernays in the nineteenth century who found what he thought was proof of this opposition in the text of Parmenides' writings (*Heraklitische Studien* [1885], pp. 62ff. – the original article was published in 1850), but it was Diels whose work in 1897 seemed to establish the case. It was he who insisted that Heraclitus was among the *βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν* of Parmenides 6.4.⁶ A. Patin two years later, with profuse thanks to Diels, expanded upon the possible points of contact and opposition. He ends his long article with a vehement *ad hominem* attack upon Zeller whom we shall see held quite a different view of this problem.⁷ T. Gomperz in 1901 writes that the Parmenidian theory of Being was “derived point and pith from the reaction against the doctrine of Heraclitus . . .”⁸ H. Slonimsky in 1913 is still regarding the two philosophers in Platonic terms of appearance and reality.⁹ W. Kranz nineteen years later does not vary from the view that the two pre-Socratics were at intellectual odds.¹⁰

The English also have representatives holding this position. Burnet in his *Early Greek Philosophy* in 1914 argues “that Parmenides wrote after Heraclitus, and in conscious opposition to him, seems to be proved by what surely must be an express allusion in his poem. The words ‘for whom it is and is not are the same and not the same and all things travel in opposite direc-

tions' (fr. 6.8) cannot well refer to anyone else . . ."¹¹ Cornford in his *Principium Sapientiae* maintains that the traditional Platonic dichotomy between change and unmoved reality, the senses and the mind, characterizes the two philosophers.¹² Gregory Vlastos in 1955 argued strongly that 6 clearly shows Parmenides' attack upon Heraclitus, citing the phrase *ταὐτὸν κοῦ ταῦτόν* (6.8-9) as parallel to Heraclitus' *ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα* (10).¹³ W.C.K. Guthrie puts himself squarely in the same tradition: "Some of the language used by Parmenides seems only explicable on the assumption that he is deliberately echoing phrases of Heraclitus in a spirit of criticism".¹⁴

In recent years, however, there has been a definite thaw in the hardline conservative position. Taran does not believe that Parmenides attacks Heraclitus in fragments 4 and 8, although he does argue that Heraclitus is probably attacked in 6.¹⁵ Kirk also assumes a somewhat moderate stance, arguing that Parmenides' Way of Seeming could represent his "own abnegation of the compromise offered by the Heraclitian opposite-doctrine". He hastens to add, however, that the passage attacking the "third way" is probably not directed against Heraclitus since "Heraclitus certainly never identified being and not-being, and the 'backward-turning' path is in meaning very different from the 'method of joining which operates in both directions' of fr. 51 . . ."¹⁶ Raven in his own book, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, sees no link between the *βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν* of fragment 6 and Heraclitus. Concerning the whole question of the *παλίντροπος κέλευθος* ["the backward-turning path"], he says, "Apart from difficult questions of chronology, it seems to me unlikely that Parmenides should have inserted into an attack upon all his fellow-men a sentence aimed at an individual".¹⁷ N.B. Booth in an article in *Phronesis* in 1957 reveals the ultimate triviality of the conservative position. Citing the opposing views of Bernays, Diels, Zeller, and Tannery, he concedes: "So far as I can see, all these views are tenable", but he then goes on to point out that they are not ultimately helpful for an understanding of Parmenides.¹⁸

The liberal position may most easily be traced back to Zeller in the last part of the nineteenth century. In reply to Schuster he rebuts any argument drawing the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian distinction between Parmenides and Heraclitus.¹⁹ After careful evaluation of the evidence, his verdict is "no contest". I summarize his arguments because of their importance as a turning point in the criticism of this problem:

Zeller sees no sufficient points of contact between Heraclitus and Parmenides to make us think that one refers to the other. He argues, as does Reinhardt more broadly later, that Parmenides was the older of the two, but his in my opinion mistaken view does not affect his conclusions. He agrees that Parmenides attacks those *οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν νενόμισται*. "Aber dass Sein und Nichtsein dasselbe seien, hatte Her., wie bemerkt, nicht gesagt; auch sein *εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν* hat nicht diesen Sinn . . ." Zeller argues that the formula was introduced by Parmenides ". . . um den Widerspruch auszu-

drücken, in welchen die von ihm bestrittene Vorstellungsweise gerathe". Yet this "mode of conception" entailed a belief in (1) a Non-Being and (2) a genesis and decay. Certainly, claims Zeller, Parmenides would have extended his argument to Heraclitus specifically if he had thought Heraclitus represented this "mode" — "so weist doch nichts darauf hin, dass Parm. bei seinen Aeuserungen speciall an Her. gedacht habe". Parmenides describes his opponents as the ἄκριτα φύλα, but Heraclitus agrees entirely with Parmenides in his devaluation of sense in comparison to Reason.

Zeller also points out that Parmenides in the second part of his poem does not oppose light and dark in the same way as did Heraclitus because Heraclitus is not ultimately dualistic in his oppositions. Parmenides, however, in his exposition of the δόξαι βρόττειοι designates only two μορφαί which explain all things — he does not mention a third — as does Heraclitus in fragment 31 (earth, sea, and πρηστήρ). Moreover, he designates these μορφαί not as fire and earth but as light and dark. This "gibt keinen Grund zu der Vermuthung, dass er dabei Heraklits drei Elementarformen speciall im Auge habe". If he had any system in mind it was probably the simple dualistic system of the Pythagorians. The resemblance between Parmenides' παλίντροπος κέλευθος and Heraclitus' παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη depends upon how each man used παλίντροπος — "eines ziemlich häufig vorkommenden Ausdrucks". The meaning is not the same in each case. In Heraclitus it refers to a returning from Opposition to Unity; in Parmenides it concerns that which comes into opposition with itself "indem es aus seiner ursprünglichen Richtung in die Entgegengesetzte übergeht". In other words, Heraclitus implies a stable term where Parmenides does not.

Finally, Zeller states that the fact that Heraclitus said εἰδέναι χρή τὸν πόλεμον and Parmenides denies existence to one member of the Being/Not-Being pair proves nothing, "denn die Behauptung, es müsse ein Nichtseiendes geben, fällt mit der, dass es Streit geben müsse". There is in effect no real ground for finding contradictions between the two. While one might not agree entirely with Zeller's interpretations of either Parmenidian or Heraclitian doctrine — especially his emphasis upon Heraclitus' "drei Elementarformen" — still the fact remains that he considered that any vehement opposition between Heraclitus and Parmenides was fictitious.

Subsequent German criticism was surely affected by Zeller's stand. It was Reinhardt in 1916 who broke away from the traditional view entirely, not only by revealing the substanceless nature of the whole question concerning Parmenides' attack upon Heraclitus in his argument that the former preceded the latter, but also more importantly by pointing to the underlying use of oppositions as a strong and important similarity between Heraclitus and Parmenides. He has in fact provided the basis of my own view.²⁰ By 1930 we find the Frenchman, Tannery, arguing that Heraclitus and Parmenides never heard of each other.²¹ Riezler in 1934 indicated that both Heraclitus and Par-

menides were concerned with the One; he argued that Heraclitus' *ἐν* and Parmenides' *ἐόν* must bind together the *πολλά* (Untruth and Appearance).²² At the same time Cherniss' famous and important study, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore 1935) appeared and with it the Aristotelian interpretation of the pre-Socratics and its continuing tradition received a decisive blow. It is not surprising then to find Nestle in 1940 noting that both Parmenides and Heraclitus deny sense perception. What is surprising, however, is to find once again the conservative argument that, in the presentation of their particular "kernel of reality", they are antipodal — Heraclitus placing this "kernel" in movement or change, Parmenides in its opposite.²³ The conservative view is obviously still strong even if the important Platonic distinction between the two in terms of the evaluation of sense perception is denied.

Verdenius maintained Zeller's original stance much better in 1942 when he refuted again the main arguments in favor of the view that Parmenides attacked Heraclitus, adding the brilliant possibility that "only Heracliteans made absolute motion the ultimate principle of reality" — thereby exonerating Heraclitus himself from the charge. He cites *Theaetetus* 181a as proof of this point.²⁴ This type of argument could easily explain Parmenides' possible misunderstanding of Heraclitus — an idea I shall develop subsequently. Gigon three years later refuses to make Heraclitus and Parmenides logical antitheses as does Plato. He sees them posing entirely different philosophical questions.²⁵ He, like Reinhardt, puts a good deal of emphasis upon the oppositional nature of Parmenides' thought.²⁶ Werner Jaeger, relying somewhat on Cherniss, makes it quite clear that criticism had been waylaid by Plato and Aristotle and that some new approach was called for. He insists, with good reason, that the words *πάντα ῥεῖ* on which Plato based his arguments about Heraclitus never are to be found in the *ipsissima verba* of Heraclitus himself. Jaeger suggests that this idea was stated by his later followers such as Cratylus or the Heraclitians mentioned by Plato in *Theaetetus* 180e (cf. also *Crat.* 440c).²⁷

In the most recent past two studies have at last succeeded in moving beyond the ruins of Plato's and Aristotle's views on the relationship between Parmenides and Heraclitus: J. Mansfeld's *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die Menschliche Welt* (1964) and A. Mourelatos' *The Route of Parmenides* (1970). Both rely extensively upon the epic background for their understanding of Parmenides. The former has discovered strong similarities between Parmenides and Heraclitus by assuming that they drew on a broad cultural reserve. He examines closely not only the epic but also the lyric influences on the two minds.²⁸ Pindar, Parmenides, and Heraclitus come to possess a great deal in common.²⁹ Mansfeld's position obviously harkens back to Reinhardt's in the essential comparison, rather than opposition, of the two pre-Socratics. It shows also, however, the powerful influence of the new approach to the pre-Socratics: a philological and intra-cultural comparison of the "philosophi-

cal" body of literature with the "poetic" — a study carried on for years by Hermann Fränkel and enunciated most elegantly in his *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (1951). This is Mourelatos' approach in the brilliant first chapter of his book. He asks the all-important question: "What is the relation of vocabulary, imagery, and myth to the argument in the poem?"³⁰ He establishes the epic vocabulary of Parmenides and the various "themes" or "motifs", at last arguing that from the image of the "route" there arises a new concept of the nature of thinking and knowing.³¹

I substantially agree with the basic comparative approach of Reinhardt, Fränkel, Mansfeld, and Mourelatos, although I should not place as much emphasis on the innovative quality of Parmenides' insight as does the last. My own particular method, however, is symbolic and structural, and in these respects little has been done with the text of Parmenides with the partial exception of the vocabulary and motif study of Mourelatos. Taran, for instance, denies a recourse to symbolism in Parmenides.³² Havelock points to definite symbols in the proem of the work but does not develop their meaning *qua* symbols.³³ It was left to Jung to detect the psychological and cultural symbolism inherent in the work of Parmenides. He indicated that the *σπεφάνη* Cicero discusses in his *De Natura Deorum* is in fact an archetypal representation of the divine.³⁴ Cicero's "unbroken ring of glowing lights encircling the sky which he [Parmenides] entitles god" is surely the phenomenon described in fragment 12. Jung also connects it with the "circular motion of the mind which everywhere returns into itself" (5).³⁵ The symbolic nature of Parmenidian thought represents an observable phenomenon that in my opinion should be examined thoroughly. It is in the proem to his work that this nature is most easily detected.

★

"For mythical thinking the relation between what a thing 'is' and the place in which it is situated is never purely external and accidental".³⁶ It is, therefore, no accident whatsoever that Parmenides has opened his philosophical poem with a proem constructed of symbolic phenomena in a symbolic realm. There too the dyadic logical structure is clearly set forth. The proem represents in an extended and elaborated sense the symbolic elucidation of statements that appear in the poem proper in a more purely logical context.

There are several obvious similarities between the opening lines of Hesiod's *Theogony* and Parmenides' proem. This phenomenon has already drawn some scholarly attention.³⁷ The superficial details are easily noted. Both men through an especial relationship with the divine are given a particular type of divine knowledge as a gift. The intercourse between a man and the gods is totally personal. In both cases the author mentions his own involvement: "The goddesses said to *me* first this word" (*Th.* 24); "the mares that carry *me* as far as my desire . . ." (Parm. 1.1). There is a strong affirmation of the subject's participation in the realm of knowledge,³⁸ and as this region is devel-

oped in the proem of each work – but especially in Parmenides’ – we realize combinations of subjective and objective phenomena that point to the phenomenological realm of which I spoke earlier.

What the divine bestows in each case is Truth: Δίκη offers Parmenides “well-rounded truth” (*Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος* – 1.29) and the Muses know how to utter *true* things (*ἴδμεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι* – *Th.* 28). Yet, it is even more interesting to note that in both cases the divine reveals its ability to lie also: *ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα* – *Th.* 27 (“We know how to speak many false things as true ones”); *χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυνθῆσθαι ... ἥδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθῆς* – *Parm.* 1.28-30 (“You must learn also the opinions of mortals in which there is no true reliability”). There is, in other words, a dyadic opposition between truth and falsehood established in both instances. It was Parmenides who set out to investigate it further.

The proem is characterized by phenomena in pairs. Parmenides mentions the axle of the chariot on which he rides. On both ends he describes the “whirling wheels” (*δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν/κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν* – “for it was being urged forward by two circles roundly-whirling on both sides” – 1.7-8). We have, then, the symbols of the double circles – the dyadic and dynamic polarization that will later yield the structure of Parmenidian logic. The archaic logician makes use of the Dual case in his description of the gate with its two doors (*πύλαι*).³⁹ More importantly this “gate” concerns itself with the opposites, the symbolic paths Day and Night (*ἐνθα πύλαι Νυκτὸς τε καὶ Ἥματός εἰσι κελεύθων* – 1.11). For these gates Δίκη possesses “inter-changeable keys” (*κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς*) – keys that somehow manipulate the gates in order to allow the changing of the opposites Day and Night.⁴⁰ The most important dualism of the proem is, however, that established at the end between Truth and Opinion, the principal duality of the poem itself and the duality which somehow will formulate the substance of Parmenides’ teaching. He presents it in highly symbolic language:

*χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυνθῆσθαι
ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμέσ ἦτορ
ἥδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθῆς*

It is necessary that you will learn
Both the unmoving heart of well-circled Truth
And the false notions of mortals, in which there is no true faith.
(1.28-30)

The correlation and association of opposites is accomplished by the correlative conjunctions *ἡμὲν ... ἥδέ*, and with them Parmenides establishes clearly the poem’s dyadic logic.

Affective light imagery bespeaks the non-objective or phenomenological

realm into which Parmenides has purposely set his work. The image of the axle is made to glow in the naves (ἄξων δ' ἐν χροίῃσιν ἔει σύριγγος ἀντήν/ αἰδόμενος – “the axle in the naves hurled forth the cry of a pipe, glowing . . .” 1.6-7). Then too the “noise” of the axle tells us immediately that it represents some unusual phenomenon. Sound and light are ritualistic and hence symbolic. Parmenides is well aware of their power. We are in no normal “everyday” realm. The underlying light/dark imagery with its oppositional overtones is drawn clearly in those lines devoted to the “daughters of the sun” (Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι) who, leaving the palace of Night (δῶματα Νυκτός), hasten on towards the light (εἰς φάος) pushing back the obscuring veils (καλύπτρας) on their heads:

Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι προλιποῦσαι δῶματα Νυκτός,
εἰς φάος, ὥσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας
(1.9-10)

The image is made more logical by the juxtaposition of Day and Night in the next line (Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἥματος – 1.11). What again “Light” and its representation means in the proem specifically is another question. Our subsequent discussion of 10, 12, 14, and 15 should clarify the matter, but at this point I am inclined to accept Fränkel’s argument that Light is a positive phenomenon – one beyond a mere light-dark opposition – and that Light is involved in the knowledge of true Being.⁴¹ This double position of Light – part of an opposition in one sense, transcending the opposition in another – might very well rest upon the idea of a progression from dark to light I mentioned earlier in connection with Hesiod, or it may involve a dialectical movement behind oppositions which I have indicated as being common both to Hesiod and Heraclitus.

Another symbol one may detect in Parmenides’ proem is the circle. We are told of the “rounded wheels” (κύκλοι – 1.8), which, I have indicated, might refer to the logical polarity of the main body of the poem. There is also the image of the sun whose daughters (Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι – 1.9) “hasten to the light”. The same symbols appeared in Heraclitus (e.g., 3 and 6) and will appear even more strongly in Empedocles (71.2) as one of the four principal “elements” of the world and as the symbolic equivalent of πῦρ – the ὠγύγιον πῦρ (primeval fire) that hides in the microcosm of the κύκλωπα κούρην (the eye’s rounded pupil – 84.7-8). The symbol of ἥλιος holds a universal importance as the rounded image of light. Parmenides makes a slightly more positive statement of its value as a simple third term underlying the confused world of human Δόξα, but it is clear that Light serves the further purpose of symbolizing a more complicated, circular phenomenon of a logical type as does πῦρ in Heraclitus. It is in symbolic terms “the unmoving heart of well-rounded Truth” (Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμέος ἦτορ – 1.29).⁴² The two circular

images seem to lead up to a central logical symbol: *Logos* or Truth. There can be little doubt that Parmenides is confining his symbolization to logical phenomena within the realm of the non-objective space in the proem.

The most important use of non-objective or symbolic space occurs in Parmenides' description of the gates of the paths of Day and Night (1.11) and the domain of *Δίκη* that lies behind or on the other side of those doors. Here again strong parallels between Parmenides and Hesiod must be noted in addition to those between the former's conceptualization of this symbolic space and the space of the "horizon" which I described earlier. The non-objective character of the horizon could give us, I think, invaluable clues to how Parmenides structured his logic in his proem.

Hesiod in the *Theogony* speaks of the awful "House of murky Night" (Νυκτὸς δ' ἐρεβεννῆς οἰκία δειρά – *Th.* 744) in front of which stands Atlas upholding wide heaven on his head (τῶν πρόσθ' Ἰαπετοῖο πάϊς ἔχει οὐρανὸν ἐβρύν/ ἐστηώς κεφαλῇ ... 746-747). The heaven, then, is *outside* of the House of Night. The great bronze threshold of this House is the point where Night and Day meet and are one. The House never shuts in both simultaneously (Νύξ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη ἄσπον ἰοῦσαι/ ἀλλήλας προσέειπον ἀμειβόμεναι μέγαν οὐδὸν/ χάλκεον· ἡ μὲν ἔσω καταβήσεται, ἡ δὲ θύραζε/ ἔρχεται, οὐδέ ποτ' ἀμφοτέρας δόμος ἐντὸς ἔεργει – "Night and Day coming nearer greet one another as they make interchange over the great brazen threshold. The one will go down within while the other goes out at the door. Never does the house shut in both" – 748-751). The one or the other is always taking her turn about or over (ἐπιστρέφεται) the earth, while the other waits within for the time of her own way (ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐτέρη γε δόμων ἔκτοσθεν ἐοῦσα/ γαῖαν ἐπιστρέφεται, ἡ δ' αὖ δόμου ἐντὸς ἐοῦσα/ μίμνει τὴν αὐτῆς ὥρην ὁδοῦ ... 752-754).

What comes to the eye as "Parmenidian" in this description is (1) the use of the participle *ἀμειβόμεναι* – a word we find in an adjectival form in the proem to describe the keys in the possession of *Δίκη* that open the gates of Night and Day (*κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς* – 1.14) and (2) the "road" of the respective journeys of Day and Night which immediately brings to mind the ways of Day and Night in Parmenides (*κέλευθοι Νυκτὸς τε καὶ Ἡματος* – 1.11). There is also that mythical structure: the House or Home of Night (Νυκτὸς οἰκία – *Th.* 744) of which the later writer made use (*δῶματα Νυκτὸς* – 1.9). The two passages, then, speak of the same phenomena in a somewhat similar way. These two passages must be studied closely in order to appreciate fully Parmenides' logical symbolism.


How does he construct this symbol? What are its parts? The most difficult thing to conceptualize is the relationship of what is "inside" and "outside" of the House of Night. It is said in Hesiod that either Night or Day is lodged "inside" the house while the other is "outside" (*Th.* 751-754). Parmenides implies the same thing by having the daughters of the sun put aside their veils

only when they leave the “House of Night” (ὅτε σπερχοῖατο πέμπειν/ Ἥλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός/ εἰς φάος ὡσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας – “Whenever the daughters of the sun hasten to escort [me] to the Light, leaving the House of Night, pushing back from their heads the veils with their hands” – 1.8-10). In Hesiod’s case the strict parallelism of ideas is aided by the parallel endline phrases “ἐκτοσθεν ἐοῦσα” and “ἐντὸς ἐοῦσα” (Th. 752 and 753). It is important, I think, that the relationship of Day and Night within Parmenides’ “House” is much more vague. The “inside” of his “House” is going to be used for something quite especial, even though in terms of mythical space, it is identical to Hesiod’s. Parmenides wishes to imbue it only with a strong logical meaning.

At this point it is necessary to remember that mythical or phenomenological space does not possess qualities of objective space recorded by simple sense perception. I have already indicated that the mythical realms of Hesiod are such phenomena. In both Hesiod and Parmenides, then, the “House of Night” must be considered first in phenomenological terms. Hence any description of events *within* the “House” are symbolic, but not actions within physical space. In both authors we are faced with a rather complex combination of the visual and the symbolic. Hesiod especially indicates that this is the case, for he places Atlas, *holding heaven, outside of* the House. The heavens are perceived by man. In other words, Hesiod seems to indicate that what man perceives simply is *on this side of* the “great threshold of bronze” (μέγαν οὐδὸν χάλκεον – Th. 749-750). I am of the opinion that Parmenides also indicates that the world of physical perception is *this side of* the House of Night. The paths of Day and Night (κέλευθαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἥματος) are both essentially *on this side*. They are phenomena of the world of mortals in which mortals cannot see unity (μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν· τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἔστω “for they have established [as] forms two means of knowing, the unity of which need not be” – 8.53-54).⁴³

The whole argument must hinge on where and what actually are the Hesiodic threshold (οὐδός) and the Parmenidian gates (πύλαι) which possess their οὐδός too (12). To explain this, I should like to draw once more upon the perceptive experiences of one man that are, in fact, common to all men. The “threshold” or “gates” to which Hesiod and Parmenides refer is their horizon or that point where day becomes night or night turns to day and where *they meet and are one*. The arc of day (the heaven Hesiod’s Atlas holds upon his head) is described by the movement of the sun. There are lyric examples I have already cited and analyzed that indicate the early Greeks perceived the movement of the sun in this way. The arc of night is inscribed by the moon (νυκτιφαῆς περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς – “Nightshining wandering about the earth, a light belonging to another” – fragment 14) – a moon that is always “gazing towards the rays of the sun” (αἰεὶ παπταίνουσα πρὸς αὐγὰς ἡελίου fragment 15) – again the primal heuristic significance of

Light. The arc of night begins once the sun has set below a man's horizon – at which time the arc of the moon appears, very possibly from a different direction but necessarily moving above man in an arc as does the sun the next morning (as Hesiod says both day and night make a turn over the earth – *γαῖαν ἐπιστρέφεται* – *Th.* 753). The one disappears into the other only at the point of a man's horizon. What becomes of the phenomena after their disappearance is another question entirely. Perhaps for Hesiod they are lodged somehow in the House of Night, but for Parmenides Day and Night are perceptual phenomena that are separated by the gates (*πύλαι*) – that is, separated by a man's horizon. What lies *beyond* that horizon is entirely another matter. Parmenides, then, conceptualized the situation in the following manner and by so doing combined the perception of his “objective” world with the possibility of a symbolic one. The phenomenological implication should be obvious:



- A Parmenides, a man, all men
- B The hemisphere along which the sun or moon (Day or Night) describe their arcs
- C Horizon or “gates of the House of Night”, i.e., the intermeditation between Parmenides’ objective and symbolic world
- D The “House of Night”, i.e., the “other world”
- E The way of Parmenides

To what, then, may we compare the “House of Night”? As I have indicated previously Hesiod regards his “houses” as non-physical, symbolic spaces. There is always the sense of the “other world” about them. Pindar in *Nemean* 6 places all reality or being in that “other world” that lies on the “brazen sky” separated decisively from the world of man:

ἐν ἀνδρῶν,
 ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν
 ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι· διείργει δὲ πᾶσα κεκρυμμένα
 δύναμις, ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐδέν, ὃ δὲ χάλκεος
 ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν ἔδος
 μένει οὐρανός.

One is the race of men,
 One of the gods. From one
 Mother we both draw our breath. But a power all-decisive
 Separates [the races of men and gods] so that the one is nothing,
 While the other remains the brazen, ever-sure seat –
 The heaven.

(Ne. 6.1-4)

He indicates a genealogical connection between men and gods and therefore, as in Hesiod, a possible correlation, but “visually” there is an inalterable dichotomy between a realm of nothing (τὸ μὲν οὐδέν) and the positive realm of the gods. The same type of dichotomy seems to be at work in Parmenides. At least, Truth lies behind the πύλαι within the House of Night – a Truth that, as I shall argue later, is a third term that lies behind the oppositional structure of the world of Δόξα. It is also in opposition to the world of Δόξα, just as Chaos is in opposition to everything in the *Theogony*. In fact it is so described. The gates of the doors as they swing back make, or bring to view, a gaping chasm (ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων/ χάσμ' ἀχανεὺς ποίησαν... 1.17-18). The logical “other” is produced in both Hesiod and Parmenides by the same image – chaos, chasm, a gaping.

I am convinced that when Δίκη, the goddess who controls oppositions, who handles the interchangeable keys of Day and Night, the goddess whom Bacchylides pictures at one point holding the scales that measure opposition,⁴⁴ opens the gates for Parmenides, she is in fact allowing him to pass into a region where he will learn an underlying Truth that unites and makes one the apparent oppositions of the simply perceived world. This unity is in fact what this very region symbolizes for Parmenides. The goddess herself⁴⁵ when she addresses Parmenides within her home (δῶ – 1.25), reaffirms the ultimate logical purpose of the region. Parmenides is to be given universal knowledge: “You must learn all things [– how similar is this to Heraclitus’ “philosophers must inquire into a great many things” – 35? –], both the unmoving heart of well-rounded Truth [i.e., the secret of where he is at the present time], and the opinions of mortals in which there is no true belief. Yet, you will learn even how these opinions are truly *necessary* and pervade all things”.

χρεῶ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
 ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμέος ἦτορ
 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθῆς.
 ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσῃς ὥς τὰ δοκοῦντα
 χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντός πάντα περῶντα
 (1.28-32)

Again a symbol — in this case the “House of Night” — is used by Parmenides with a logical intent. The region into which he has been allowed is the underlying third term that unites and explains the opposition of the objective world.

The dynamic “third term” in Parmenides is, of course, the ὁδός he travels to this “region beyond the sun”. The symbols of the “road” and the “path” form the structure of the man’s thought.

Eric Havelock has, I think, contributed a great deal to our understanding of Parmenides’ uses of these terms. Mourelatos acknowledges his own debt.⁴⁶ In a short article entitled “Parmenides and Odysseus” (*HSCP* 63 [1958], pp. 133-143), he pointed out the epic roots of Parmenides’ imagination. He too saw the journey or ὁδός on which the poet-philosopher is driven as a symbol among a set of others — all of which are “designed to recall and reinforce certain contexts of experience which interpenetrate the philosophy of the whole poem”.⁴⁷ Havelock was certainly correct in tracing the Parmenidian ὁδός διζήσιος⁴⁸ to the idea of the νόστος in Homer. Both Odysseus and Parmenides are on voyages that extend “beyond normal human latitudes”. As it is with Odysseus so it is with Parmenides. The latter’s “journey is also an excursion beyond the bounds of accepted experience”.⁴⁹

Havelock noted that in the poem as a whole “the word ὁδός and its correlatives κέλευθος and ἀταρπός occur thirteen times . . . The journeying metaphor is indeed obsessive”.⁵⁰ Of course, not all of these words apply directly to Parmenides and his own journey, and those that do not, as I indicated above when I spoke of the κέλευθοι of Night and Day, are decidedly inferior to his own. It is the ὁδός of Parmenides himself that is one of the primary symbols in this work. It is a “fated road” in a lyric use of the word: μοῖρα δ’ ἐτέραν ἐπόρουν’ ὁδόν — “But Destiny furnished another path” (Bacchylides [Snell] 17.89). It is the strong one, as Hesiod states, that leads to Right: ... ὁδός δ’ ἐτέρῃρι παρελθεῖν/ κρείσσων ἐς τὰ δίκαια — “but the stronger path is to go the other way into just things” (*E.* 216-217).⁵¹ Parmenides conceives the ὁδός as leading not to the “just things” but to the goddess Δίκη herself. It is in the proem that he establishes the intended latitudes and dimensions of this “way”.

I have indicated above how the ὁδός of Parmenides must have “worked” diagrammatically in terms of the visual and phenomenological world. We are given several indications that the ὁδός is as I have drawn it — i.e., a third

way in addition to the paths of Day and Night, and moreover, one which exhibits strong subjective qualities. In the opening line we are told that the mares carry Parmenides as far as his “desire” or “heart” might go (ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμός ἰκάνουι – 1.1). The goddesses *then* draw him onto the “resounding” road (ἐς ὁδὸν πολύρρημον – 1.2) – again, as was the case with the axle and is the case with the noisy sockets opening doors (1.17-19) – an “unnatural” sound signifies a journey into an “unnatural” realm. Parmenides has begun his journey to the realm of Truth.⁵² The daughters of the sun escort the chariot towards the sun and subsequently to the gates on Parmenides’ horizon. These gates separate the paths of Day and Night. Parmenides’ path is a *third way*. Once his horizon is touched and Δίκη opens the gates, the ὁδός has entered a realm governed by logical principles. It at this point becomes an ἀμαξιτόν – that is a broad high-road (1.21). Parmenides’ ὁδός has become the royal way. This is the ὁδός travelled seldom by men – τήνδ’ ὁδόν (ἧ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν) (1.27) – another indication that we are outside of the normal physical realm. From this point in Parmenides’ poem, ὁδός assumes the strictly logical meanings which I shall examine subsequently. It is, however, not unusual that it would do so. Parmenides has carefully developed its transformation of meaning within the proem itself.

There exists also in Parmenides a set of less important, although easily-recognizable, symbols. These phenomena he places in “The World of Appearance”, and hence we may assume that they have not the logical validity of Light, the Goddess, or the Way. Taran labels many of these as “astronomical” and groups them under the category “The World of Appearance”.⁵³ Generally the “astronomical” rubric is a good one – especially insofar as he discusses the dichotomy between Night and Day. What is interesting is that astronomical or astrological phenomena are described in symbolic terms. Take for instance 10. The clue to its symbolic content lies in the second line in which the goddess tells Parmenides that he will know the nature of αἰθήρ and all of the σήματα in it (εἴσῃ δ’ αἰθερίαν τε φύσω τὰ τ’ ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα/ σήματα ... 10.1-2). We are obviously in a context of strong archaic language. The two symbols she mentions are “the pure torch of the resplendent sun” (καθαρᾶς εὐαγέος ἡελίοιο/ λαμπάδος ... 10.2-3) and the “round-face moon” (κύκλωπος σελήνης). Both symbols are given active qualities: the sun is performing “destructive works” (ἔργ’ αἰδηλα), the moon, “wandering works” (ἔργα περίφοιτα) – the latter, especially, very likely refers to the arc of night we mentioned above in connection with the proem. Both of these “symbols” belong to Parmenides’ graphically perceptual world and are surely linked in his mind to the world of δόξα, just as are the πείρατα of the stars that are bound by the Necessity also found in this fragment (ὥς μιν ἄγουσ(α) ἐπέδησαν Ἀνάγκη/ πείρατ’ ἔχεω ἄστρων – 10.6-7). These πείρατα are visual boundaries and not logical ones. One would expect that logical πείρατα, if they exist for Parmenides, are not physical in this sense at all. The “House of

Night” is a boundless Chaos. It too very probably, like Heraclitus’ *ψυχή*, would have no *πείρατα*.

In fragment 11, “How the earth and sun and moon and the common aether, and the milky way and the outermost Olympus and hot strength of the stars strove to come into being” (*πῶς γαῖα καὶ ἥλιος ἡδὲ σελήνη/ αἰθήρ τε ξυνὸς γάλα τ’ οὐράνιον καὶ Ὀλύμπος/ ἔσχατος ἡδ’ ἄστρων θερμὸν μένος ὠρμήθησαν/ γίγνεσθαι*), it is somewhat difficult to comprehend the value Parmenides put in the symbols he lists. The vocabulary is archaic and pre-Socratic to be sure. One would be overly zealous to insist at this point that the fragment represents some sort of total denial of its contents because Being does not come into being (8.3) and therefore the symbols in 11 are not symbols at all but mere false indicators of the objective world of appearance. It is possible, for example, that the phrase “Ὀλύμπος ἔσχατος” should be considered in merely perceptive or objective terms, but there is also the underlying possibility that the subjective meaning dealing with the phenomenological horizon might still be at work. Ἥλιος is a symbol to which Heraclitus refers (3), and σελήνη is found also in Parmenides 10 and 15. Both are common in Empedocles and the other pre-Socratics. Then too we find here in 11 that concept of *ξυνός* of which Heraclitus makes such effective use (e.g., 2). There is, in other words, strong symbolic potential to this fragment as there was in 10. Parmenides assumes a position that necessitates a strong denial of phenomena within the purely visual world, but it seems to me that these phenomena retain symbolic power insofar as they may be identified with the symbols of the logical world. Hence, they assume the same position as does light in Parmenides’ cosmos: the symbol assumes its full status only in the logical realm.

Several of the other fragments are more structurally symbolic – that is, they are constructed in order to emphasize a certain oppositional – i.e., logical – nature to the world. “On the right, boys; on the left, girls” (*δεξιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κόρας* – 17). Whether 18 is a part of a treatise on homosexuality, hermaphroditism, both,⁵⁴ or neither is difficult to tell. What is sure is that there is a definite dyadically structured unity between opposites involved: *femina virque simul Veneris cum germina miscent . . . si virtutes permixto semine pugnent/ nec faciant unam permixto in corpore, dirae/ nascentem gemino vexabunt semine sexum*. (“When woman and man mix together with the seeds of Love . . . if when the seed is mixed the powers war and do not make a one in the mixed body, fearfully will they vex the nascent sex with a twin seed”.) It would be both interesting and helpful to know what were the exact words Parmenides himself used for “*faciant unam*” and “*gemino semine*”, and it is important to remember that we are dealing with a Latin translation. Perhaps one should not extend speculation beyond noting an underlying structure of dyadic opposition. Similarly 13, “She [the *δαίμων* of 12] devised Eros as the first of all gods” (*πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα*

θεῶν μητίσαστο πάντων ...), could be a logical statement referring to a third underlying term similar to Hesiod's Eros. In any case, there is no real reason from the fragment itself or from its context in later authors (cf. Diels, *Vors.* 1.243) to attribute to it a negative connotation.

It is fragment 12, however, we must study with some care if we are to grasp fully the powerful symbolic properties of Parmenidian thought. Here is one of a handful of incontrovertible examples of mandala symbolism of which Jung speaks. This fragment draws the representation of a symbol – a sort of logical archetype – for Parmenides' philosophy as a whole and must either be removed partially from the category of Δόξα or must stand as a proof that the category possesses a more universal relevance than is normally supposed. Parmenides makes the logical condition of “Being” graphically symbolic in this fragment:

For the narrower [rings] are filled with unmixed fire,
And those that are on them with night, and between rushes
a portion of flame.
In the middle of these is the goddess who guides all things.
For overall she begins painful birth and union,
Sending the female to mate with the male and conversely again
The male with the female.

αἱ γὰρ στενωτέραι πλήνται⁵⁵ πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιω
αἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵεται αἴσα·
ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ·
πάντα γὰρ <ἦ> στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξις ἄρχει
πέμπουσ' ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῇν τό τ' ἐναντίον αὐτῆς
ἄρσεν θηλυτέρῳ·

The biological connection between this fragment and 13, 17, and 18 is obvious and needs no comment. What is important here is the opposition of light and dark that assumes a circular configuration in the rings of Fire and Night and the centrality of the δαίμων who rules all. This δαίμων is an example of an archetypal goddess who both begins and rules (ἄρχει – 12.4) over synthesis and creation. She is the unifying term within opposition – the “eternity” that evolves into logical “Being”. This mandala is an archetype of Parmenidian Logic – an ultimate sign or symbol that takes precedence over the secondary, and not so powerful, σήματα of the “astronomical” fragments. Yet, in fragments 10, 11, and 12 knowledge is imparted symbolically by the opposition of light and dark and by limits, circles, horizons, or rings – the all-important shapes of the mandala. In 10 this mandala encompasses the sweep of the sky and the force of Necessity which lead and fetter this sky in order to hold the limits of the stars ὥς μιν ἄγουσ(α) (ἐπέδησεν Ἀνάγκη/ πείρατ’

ἔχω ἄστρον – 10.6-7). These dynamic bonds instituted by Necessity represent just as much a tensed principle of structure as do the *μέτρα* of Heraclitus and the *δύνη* of Empedocles. Parmenides' cosmology is – as it was with Heraclitus and is with other pre-Socratics⁵⁶ – archetypal in nature. The predominant graphic characteristic is that of a circle or sphere derived from oppositions. It is comparatively simple to see how this type of structure makes itself felt in those fragments attributed to the first half of the main body of the poem itself.

These fragments introduce the Parmenidian examination of pure Logic – the Logic the proem places symbolically in the House of Night. The goddess herself initiates the oppositional nature of the logical archetype which combines and unites the oppositions themselves – it is this underlying, unifying nature that Parmenides is told he is to comprehend:

Come, I shall tell you. Pay attention to what you've heard,
Which is [an account of] the only ways of inquiry that can
be conceived.

The one how it is not possible not to be
(This is the path of Persuasion for it follows Truth);
The other that it⁵⁷ is not and that it must not be.
This I tell you is an utterly inscrutable way,
For neither would you come to know what indeed is not
(that's impossible)
Nor would you express it.

εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἐγὼν ἐρέω κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,
ἀίπερ ὁδοὶ μῶναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·
ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστω τε καὶ ὥς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείη γὰρ ὁπηδεῖ),
ἡ δ' ὥς οὐκ ἔστω τε καὶ ὥς χρεῶν ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,
τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπενθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπὸν·
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)
οὔτε φράσας (2).

It is the *μῦθος* of the goddess that represents the underlying unity or third term in this statement. Her account is twofold. It will trace the way of Being and Not-Being. Parmenides makes the basic logical opposition very clear. There are only two roads of inquiry: (1) on the one hand (*ἡ μὲν*) “how it is and is not possible not to be” and (2) on the other (*ἡ δ'*) “that it is not and that it must not be”. The archaic sense of opposition is carried not only in the *μὲν ... δέ* correlation but also in the obvious care Parmenides has taken to make lines three and five as absolutely parallel as possible. The first two feet of each line contain the major idea. The third foot is identical in both as is

the fifth and sixth. The oppositional division of the logical world is clear. The first way is the “path of Persuasion” which “follows Truth”. It is not, note, Truth itself and hence points towards the existence of a third term. This third term, as I shall discuss subsequently, possesses the characteristics of the positive term of the initial logical opposition. It also underlies and unites the initial opposition itself. The present fragment under consideration *logically* advances the twofold logic of Being and Not-Being while maintaining Truth (the *μῦθος* of the goddess) as the substantive third term within or behind the logic of oppositions. We shall see that fragment 8 also reveals the substantive character of “Being” as the same type of logical term underlying logical opposition.

Fragments 3, 4, and 5 represent clear examples of the symbolic and structural properties of Parmenides’ “Way of Truth”. I have indicated previously that the “House of Night” represents a logical or noetic realm for Parmenides. In it lies true Being. It is not surprising, therefore, to be told that “To think and to be is the same thing” (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι – 3) – cf. also 8.34 and 8.35-36: “For without Being you will not find thought in what is expressed (οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔοντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφρατισμένον ἐστίν/ εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν). 4 is a somewhat difficult fragment in that a context would be helpful, but when Parmenides speaks of “things absent being present to the mind” (ἀπεόντα νόῳ παρεόντα – 4.1) it is possible, I believe, to understand these phenomena to be the logical phenomena lodged in the “House of Night”. It is *νόος* that connects the phenomenon of Being in its unchanging realm and Being in the mixed realm of perception or *Δόξα*: “Being holds fast to Being” (τὸ ἐὼν τοῦ ἔοντος ἔχουσιν – 4.2). *Νόος* – a third term drawn from the realm of intellectual experience – connects Simple Perception and Truth – the former which tends “to disperse Being everywhere in order” (σκιδνάμενον πάντῃ πάντως κατὰ κόσμον – 4.3), that is, to mix it with Non-Being in irrecconcilable opposition (cf. 8.53-63 & 9), and the latter which tends to bring Being together as a simple unity *συνιστάμενον* – 4.4)⁵⁸ (cf. 8.42-49). 5 is a simple archaic statement stressing the underlying importance of Being to Parmenides’ logical argument. The phrase “It is the same to me from whence I make a beginning, for thence I shall return anew” (ξυνὸν δέ μοι ἐστίν, ὁππότεν ἄρξωμαι· τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὐθις) is a verbal statement of the symbol of the circle and must be related to Heraclitus 103 (ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου περιφερείας – “For common is the beginning and limit in the circumference of a circle”).⁵⁹ Note the use of *ξυνός* in both cases and remember that in Heraclitus it is intimately related to the *Logos* and hence Logic (e.g., 2). In Parmenides this phrase does not refer to a “circular argument” but to the inevitable end which is *νόος* – Being. The verb (ἄρξωμαι) reminds one immediately of the journey of the proem – except this time the way is more purely logical. The fragment’s geometric and graphic connotations indicate its archaic nature.⁶⁰

Fragment 6 necessitates a close interpretation because of one great crux: who are the *βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν* and what position do they maintain so that Parmenides finds them so distasteful? I have already indicated that I do not believe that this fragment is lodged against Heraclitus and am very favorably disposed to Verdenius' idea that the *βροτοὶ* are, if any school at all, followers of Heraclitus who did not really comprehend their master's doctrines. The goddess opens the fragment with a reaffirmation of Being in verbal and noetic terms: *χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἔόν ἔμμεναι* ... ("It is necessary to say and to think Being to be . . ."). She then reiterates the logical opposition involved: *ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι/ μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν* ("For there is 'to be' and nothing is not" . . . 6.1-2), and forbids Parmenides to ponder the former way as she forbids him to ponder the latter: (*πρώτης γὰρ σ' ἄρ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>/ αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν/ πλάττονται* ... "For from this first way of inquiry I bar you. But then [I bar you] from this [way] on which indeed mortals knowing nothing wander" – 6.3-5). The important point is that she orders him to consider both alternatives in his mind: *τά σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα* ("these things I command you to think about" – 6.2). Parmenides is setting forth a logical opposition comprehended or understood by some kind of noetic activity.

What exactly is the way of "mortals knowing nothing" that Parmenides rejects? To begin with, these men are "double-headed" (*δίκρανοι* – 6.5). They are the uncritical herd (*ἄκριτα φύλα* – 6.7) "by whom Being and Not-Being are considered the same and not the same and whose way [of inquiry] constantly returns [to this observation]" (*οἷς τὸ πέλεω τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτ' ὁ νενόμισται/ κοῦ ταῦτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπὸς ἔστι κέλευθος* – 6.8-9). Parmenides is attacking those whose way or, perhaps, method does not perceive the term that must define or regulate the play of opposites.⁶¹ From our study of Heraclitus, it should be clear that he does not fall within this category whether Parmenides thought so or not. In any case, in 6 Parmenides is attacking an unsophisticated dualistic view of the world which gives autonomy to the way of Not-Being. As he says in fragment 7, this way never shall be forced, namely that Things-That-Are-Not exist (*οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα* – 7.1). Simple sense perception or ordinary habitual experience (*ἔθος πολύπειρον* – 7.3) indicates its autonomy; reason does not. The eye, ear, and tongue are at fault; the critical judgment given to Parmenides by the goddess will solve the dilemma between Being and Not-Being if he will but use it:

*μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
νωμῶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχῆεσαν ἀκουήν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηρῳ ἔλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ρηθέντα.*

Let not habitual experience force you along this way:
 To direct an aimless eye and ringing ear and tongue,
 But make a distinction by Logos concerning the much-contested
 proof
 Uttered by me.

(7.3-6)

The same basic distrust of sense perception was also a characteristic of Heraclitus. It is extremely interesting that both men rely upon the critical tool of the *Logos* to arrive at an underlying reality, that is, "Being".

Fragment 8 contains the most detailed descriptions of Parmenides' Being in symbolic and structural terms. It is a good proof that symbolism exerted a strong influence over Parmenidian thought. Being is described in archetypal terminology in the sense that it is separated into a class distinguishable from patterns of the objective world. Parmenides himself describes the characteristics of Being as signs or symbols (*σήματα*): "There is yet a telling of the way remaining — namely, that it is, and on this way there are a multitude of symbols" (*μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο/ λείπεται ὥς ἔστω· ταύτη δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασσι/ πολλὰ μάλ' ...* 8.1-3). These symbolic descriptions are perhaps not as graphic and geometrical as ones we have met in the past — an indication, I think, that one of the differences between Heraclitus and Parmenides is the latter's insistence upon a more logical than universal symbolic realm. Yet, these symbolic characteristics are all formed, except one, with the archaic alpha privative prefix. They are, in other words, concerned with the "other world". Being is described as "unborn", "imperishable", "whole", "unmoving", and "without end" (*ἀγένητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἔστω,/ ἔστι γὰρ οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον* — 8.3-4). The symbolic state of Being is carefully separated from its logical antithesis Not-Being. It lacks any past or future and is altogether, one, and whole in a kind of eternal present (*οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστω ὁμοῦ πάν,/ ἔν, συνεχές* — 8.5-6). It exists, then, outside of the normal sequence of time with which we moderns are acquainted and partakes of the acausal, immediate time sense of the archaics.⁶² It is speech and the noetic realm that will keep Being apart in this condition: *οὐ γὰρ φατόν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔστω ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι* ("for it is neither possible to speak nor to think how it is not" — 8.8-9). *Δίκη*, the balancing symbol between two worlds, holds Being fast in its permanent condition and maintains it in utter contradiction to the everyday world: *τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι/ οὔτ' ὀλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδησιν/ ἀλλ' ἔχει* — ("On account of this *Δίκη* has not, slackening with chains, released [Being] either to become or to be destroyed. No, she holds [it] . . ." — 8.13-15). The whole point of this necessary dichotomy is a logical and hence structural one: Being/Not-Being: *ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷδ' ἔστω/ ἔστω ἢ οὐκ ἔστω ...* ("The critical decision concerning these things depends on this: is or is not . . ." — 8.15-16). Again Par-

menides demands that we opt for the way of Being in contradistinction to the unthinkable (ἀνόητον) and unnameable (ἄνώνυμον) way of Non-Being (8.16-18). Note again the alpha privative used for an initial archaic disjunction: Being, then, is noetic and nameable. Its other qualities that indicate its archetypal unity are that it is indivisible and homogeneous in content (οὐδὲ διαμετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὁμοῖον – 8.22). “All is full of Being” (πᾶν δ’ ἐμπλέον ἐστὶν ἔοντος – 8.25).

Being is restricted in an unmoved state by πείρατα (ἀκίνητον ... ἐν πείρασι – 8.26). Its condition has no beginning nor ending ἄναρχον and ἄπανστον (8.27). Once again it is defined by a succession of archaic alpha privatives. The tensions involved in this state indicate that forces at work in Heraclitus and the lyric poets are still operative in Parmenides. He attributes a set of qualities to Being that bespeak another world. The dynamics of Being create Being itself into a sphere or circle. It is “powerful Necessity” that creates this sphere, holding Being in chains and constraining it in a circle (κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη/ πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἄμφοις ἑέργει – 8.30-31). Destiny (Μοῖρα) is synonymous with this Necessity (8.37-38).

The tensed boundaries of Being complete it and give it unity: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πείρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστὶ/ πάντοθεν (“But since there is an extreme limit, it is completed from every direction” – 8.42-43). What is created is a well-rounded sphere (εὐκύκλου σφαίρης – 8.43), the graphic symbol of the Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλῆος ἦτορ we met in the proem (1.29). This sphere is of equal strength from the middle in all ways (μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντα – 8.44) and in all directions equal, reaching its limits uniformly (οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει – 8.49). Cornford’s commentary on this “Sphere of Being” is helpful at this point in explaining the almost physical dynamics of the phenomenon. He argues that Parmenides by this sphere is denying the void as a nothing “that would interrupt the continuity of Being and make it a plurality”. Parmenides wishes to avoid “any variation of density such as might destroy its equilibrium and cause it to break into opposites preying on one another”.⁶³ Although Cornford’s exegesis is perhaps a bit too physical in description, there can be little doubt that he too sees the form of Being as graphic and geometrical. It lies between thought – a strongly subjective phenomenon – and objective visual “reality”. It is, in other words, Parmenides’ greatest phenomenological creation. Ἔστι or Existence is for him symbolic.

At this point (8.50-51), the goddess turns away from her trustworthy account concerning Truth and addresses herself to the belief of mortals (δόξας βροτείας – 8.51), demanding that Parmenides learn by listening to the “deceptive order of my words” (μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων – 8.52). *It must be noted from the start that she does not claim the belief of mortals to be the same as Not-Being* – a logical term on a grander scale, a χάος of a Hesiod and not the world of man. There is no reason, in

other words, why we should not discover positive symbolic phenomena in this realm too.

In the realm of human Δόξα, with its deceptive ordering, mortals make a total dichotomy between opposites that is unwarranted. They do not see an underlying unity or third term – i.e., Being (μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δῶο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν· τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἔστω – 8.53-54). “Οὐ χρεῶν” must indicate here the position of the people being criticized and “μίαν”, I think, refers to the unifying term or the logic of Being whose existence they refuse to see. In other words, for them there is no area of identity between opposites. As the goddess said earlier, “As many things as mortals establish in the conviction they are true, all these will be [only] name” (τῶ πάντ’ ὀνομα(α) ἔσται, / ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ – 8.38-39). This false naming extends to Being and Not-Being (εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί – 8.40). It is in this that they go astray – namely, that they create total oppositions and symbols of a similarly antipodal nature: τὰντία δ’ ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ’ ἔθεντο / χωρὶς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων (“They have judged the living body oppositely and have established symbols apart from one another” – 8.55-56).⁶⁴ On the one hand they create the “etherial flame of fire” (φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ – 8.56) which is everywhere identical with itself but not identical with its opposite (... ἐωυτῷ πάντοσε τωυτόν, / τῷ δ’ ἐτέρῳ μὴ τωυτόν – 8.57-58). This opposite phenomenon is dark night which is likewise identical with itself but not with the sun (ἀτὰρ κακείνο κατ’ αὐτό / τὰντία νύκτ’ ἀδαῆ ... 8.58-59). Mortals do not see the identity between these symbols. “In this way they have gone astray” (ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσὶν – 8.54).

The realm of Δόξα, seen correctly, maintains a unity of sorts through its mixture. There is no major dichotomy composed of polar opposites. Fragment 9 states this clearly: Once everything is named Light and Night everything is full of both equally (πᾶν πλέον ἔστω ... ἴσων ἀμφοτέρων) since there is nothing which does not belong to either. A.H. Coxon has pinpointed this “mixture-concept” of Parmenides – a logical device carried even further in Empedocles. He argues that the poet-philosopher saw all physical and visual phenomena as a “union of opposites” or “correlatives”. He sees this conception of Mixture as “the ground-basis of Parmenides’ whole view of the physical universe. Out of the two ‘forms’ arise in accordance with the laws of necessity the heavens, the sun and moon, and the ‘burning might of the stars’ ”.⁶⁵ Coxon then points out that Parmenides “elaborates the mixture concept down to the details of a physiological theory”.⁶⁶ This would explain the inclusion of 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the corpus. In any case, the difference between the world of Δόξα and the world of Truth is that this symbolic mixture characterizes the former while a clear cut logical dichotomy characterizes the latter. What is not allowed in the world of Δόξα is allowed tangentially in the world of Truth because of the underlying substantive nature of Being.


Both the realms of Δόξα and Being are regulated by a similar oppositional structure with emphasis on the positive member of the set. In the world of Δόξα this positive member points to the underlying third term on a noetic or ontological level. Affirmation on a noetic level not only defines or makes clear the distinction between affirmation and negation on the level of Δόξα but also necessitates the polar opposite of the world of νόος, that is, Not-Being: (A' implies A/-A implies a/-a implies a/A'/-a). The underlying mechanics — if they may indeed be given so precise a term — are somewhat unlike the Heraclitian logical movement we discussed above, but the *resulting structure is the same*. Fragment 16, in a somewhat Empedoclian way, reveals what may be a similar structure:

ὥς γὰρ ἕκαστος ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυπλάγκτων,
 τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ
 ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν
 καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλεόν ἐστι νόημα.

For as each holds the mixture of much-wandering limbs,
 So comes the mind for men, for the same thing
 Is what the nature of the limbs think for men,
 Both for all and for each. For the full [whole?] is thought.

Here νόος seems to be formed on the oppositional or dyadic mixture of physical members. At the same time over and above it “the full is thought”. The underlying unity of dyadic pairs is contributed by thought.

The symbolic phenomenon that lies at the base of the logic of Δόξα is the fundamental archetypal opposition of light and dark. We already have examined this phenomenon closely. The key to this analysis, of course, lies in the proem. The goddess, both the noetic term underlying the realm of Δόξα and also the expounder of the positive Way in the realm of Truth, commands the gates which somehow separate the ways of Night and Day. It is this light/goddess/dark structure that the great mandala fragment (12) symbolizes. Then too Parmenides draws our attention to the mixture of light and dark in 9 where a third term is not mentioned. The symbolic phenomena of Day and Night — a “natural” opposition — are, however, noted. The idea that from this mixture one should move towards Light is made clear both by 15 (*αἰεὶ παπταίνουσα πρὸς αἰγὰς ἡελίου* — “always gazing towards the rays of the sun”) and, of course, the proem which depicts the goddesses moving with the chariot towards the light (*προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός, / εἰς φάος* — “leaving the House of Night into light” — 1.9-10). This light is, however, a noetic term: light/noetic light/dark (a/A'/-a). The third term (A') underlies the proper understanding of the mixture of opposites in the realm of Δόξα and retains the name, although transformed in meaning, of the positive term which is lodged there. One may diagram the logic thus:



About the pure noetic realm there exists a simple logical dichotomy between Being and Not-Being. In other words a condition Parmenides declares is false in the world of $\Delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ is true in the world of Being. Not-Being is the simple, logical "other". All meaning lies in the positive term. I agree with Cassirer when he regards Not-Being as a logical characterization of a pure relational – i.e., graphic – concept.⁶⁷ In any case, there is no longer some underlying third term operating on this level since the level itself is the all-important, noetic third term towards which Parmenides wishes us to move.

What then, is the structural and symbolic relationship between Heraclitus and Parmenides? The basic sense of opposition is identical, and it is important that Parmenides developed, in its clearest form, this logical archetype of opposition as we saw it in the mandala fragment (12) and in the sharp distinction between Being and Not-Being in the pure noetic realm. Both men describe purely logical phenomena in terms of a particular type of bounded

tension. Both men relate an underlying third term to the dyadic structure. Heraclitus symbolizes it in his concept of $\pi\upsilon\rho$ and Parmenides symbolizes it by Light – the underlying phenomenon that links the realms of $\Delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ and Truth. The affective powers of the two symbols are obviously quite closely related. Both use the phenomenon of Light to designate a more important or more meaningful third, logical term. Both men have drawn stable structures along somewhat similar lines. The use of symbols on a secondary level tends to vary between the two, although specific structural qualities remain identical. It is difficult to gainsay the common symbolic importance of certain astronomical phenomena such as the sun and the moon, and although a slightly stronger emphasis in Heraclitus might be detected, no new or different use of symbols should be regarded as a point of philosophical conflict between the two. “In the wider intellectual life of Greece the philosopher who devises new symbols is not less important than the man who arrives at new doctrines. They are (mostly) one and the same person. Often it is only in the language of its symbols that the spirit underlying these doctrines acquires its peculiar tonal color”.⁶⁸ The difference between Heraclitus and Parmenides in the use of symbols is merely a difference in “tonal color”. The point is: in structural and symbolic terms they are much more alike than different. The ultimate proof of their broad cultural similarity, however, lies in the language, symbol, and structure of the third great archaic Pre-Socratic: Empedocles.

NOTES

1. Cf. Werner Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford 1948), p. 110 for an excellent understanding of Plato's “use” of Heraclitus.
2. [Parmenides] δύο τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς πάλω τίθησι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων· τούτων δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄν τὸ θερμὸν τάττει, θάτερον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν (986b33-987a2).
3. Hegel, *op. cit.* p. 316: “In der That ist diese Ansicht des Parmenides aber vielmehr das Gegentheil des Materialismus; denn dieser besteht darin die Seele aus Theilen unabhängigen Kräften – (das hölzerne Pferd der Sinns) – zusammenzusetzen”.
4. *Ibid.* pp. 343-344.
5. *Ibid.* p. 349: “ ‘Alles fließt (πάντα ῥεῖ), nichts besteht noch bleibt es je dasselbe’ und Plato sagt weiter von Heraklit: ‘Er vergleicht die Dinge mit dem Strome eines Flusse, – dass man zweimal in denselben Strom nicht einschreiten könne’ . . .”
6. Hermann Diels, *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (Berlin 1897), p. 68: “Denn mit den εἰδότες οὐδέν ist nicht die thörichte Menge (in Gegensatz zu dem εἰδῶτι φῶτι 1.3) zu verstehen (vgl. Theogn. 141), wie sie der πρώτη ὁδός 6.3 gemeint ist, vielmehr führt die Erwähnung der Doppelköpfe, der δίκρανοι, auf die Anhänger des Heraklit und den Ephesier selbst”.
7. A. Patin, “Parmenides im Kampfe gegen Heraklit”, *Jhr. Class. Phil.*, Suppb. 25 (Leipzig 1899), pp. 652-654.
8. T. Gomperz, *The Greek Thinkers* (London 1964 – first edition 1901), p. 171.
9. H. Slonimsky, “Heraklit und Parmenides”, *Philosophische Arbeiten* 17 (Giessen 1912-13), p. 32, “Parmenides kam auf den Gegensatz zwischen dem Einzusehenden und dem

Erscheinenden . . . Heraklits philosophische Betrachtungen halten sich hauptsächlich auf das äussere Spiel der Erscheinungen erstreckt, auf die Welt des Werdens gerichtet".

10. W. Kranz, "Vorsokratischen I", *Hermes* 69 (1934), pp. 114-119.

11. John Burnet, *Greek Philosophy* (London 1914), pp. 63-64.

12. F.M. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 117; "If Heraclitus was the prophet of a *logos* which could only be expressed in seeing contradictions, his great contemporary Parmenides was the prophet of a logic which would tolerate no resemblance of contradiction [?]. . . Whereas Heraclitus found his truth exemplified everywhere in the visible world of change with its unending warfare of opposite powers, Parmenides dismissed the witness of the senses as a delusion".

13. G. Vlastos, "On Heraclitus", *AJP* (1955), pp. 341-342 fn. 11. Vlastos also argues that Parmenides is almost maliciously indicating Heraclitus by imputing to someone a belief in Being and Not-Being when a belief in Not-Being alone would have been enough for his "critical dialectic". This would be the case only if Parmenides' dialectic were involved solely with Being and not a logical opposition of the two. I shall argue that this opposition was extremely important in Parmenidian thought.

14. Guthrie, *op. cit.* p. 408. Also note fn. 2 in which Guthrie produces an excellent summary of the various positions held on the Parmenidian passages in question (6.8-10, 8.57-58, and 4.3-4).

15. Leonardo Taran, *Parmenides* (Princeton 1965), pp. 49, 62, and 140. Concerning 6 he says "In all likelihood the doctrine attacked in this fragment is that of Heraclitus" (p. 69).

16. Kirk, *op. cit.* p. 2. Cf. p. 211.

17. J.E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (Cambridge 1948), pp. 25-26.

18. N.B. Booth, "Were Zeno's Arguments Directed Against the Pythagoreans?", *Phronesis* (1957), p. 93.

19. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* (Leipzig 1892), I.738-739 fn. 1.

20. Karl Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1959), p. 202: "Wie die *Δόξα* des Parmenides darum nicht weniger als eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Probleme des Widerspruchs zu gelten hat, weil sie Physik ist, so will auch Heraklits Physik nur eine andere Lösung desselben Problems darstellen; sie ist bedingt durch dies logische Problem, nicht umgekehrt das logische Problem durch die Physik; kurz gesagt: die Lehre von den Gegensätzen ist kein Beiwerk, dass dem Denker neben der Hauptarbeit gelungen wäre, dem er, um nichts unkommen zu lassen, in seinem Buche nebenbei noch einen Platz verschafft hätte, sondern die ist die innere Bindung, durch die erst die Teile seiner Gedankenwelt zur Einheit werden, der Grund, auf dem das Ganze steht; es ist derselbe Grund, auf dem Parmenides gebaut hat".

21. P. Tannery, *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène* (Paris 1930), p. 227.

22. K. Reizler, *Parmenides* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1934), p. 15.

23. W. Nestle, *Von Mythos zum Logos* (Stuttgart 1966), p. 111.

24. W.J. Verdenius, *Parmenides, Some Comments on his Poem* (Groningen 1942), pp. 77-78.

25. Olof Gigon, *op. cit.*, pp. 244-245: "Sie geben nicht auf diesselbe Frage entgegengesetzte Antworten, sondern stellen ganz verschiedene Fragen".

26. *Ibid.* pp. 267ff.

27. Jaeger, *op. cit.* p. 228 fn. 4.

28. J. Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt* (Assen 1964), pp. 1-41.

29. *Ibid.* p. 40: "Wir kommen deshalb am einfachsten mit der Hypothese aus, dass wir bei Pindar, Parmenides und Heraklit übereinstimmende Gedanken und Termini finden, deren Übereinstimmung als zeitgemässe und zeitgenössische Fortsetzung einer althergebrachten und allgemeinen Überlieferung zu erklären ist".

30. A. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven and London 1970), p. 2.
31. *Ibid.* pp. 11-34 and 40.
32. Taran, *op. cit.* p. 30.
33. E.A. Havelock, "Parmenides and Odysseus", *HSCP* 63 (1958), p. 133. Cf. fn. 49 of the present chapter.
34. C.G. Jung, *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, p. 325-326.
35. *Ibid.* p. 325.
36. Cassirer, *op. cit.* 2.92.
37. Karl Deichgräber, "Parmenides' Auffahrt zur Göttin des Rechts", *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz* 11 (1958), pp. 634ff.: "Die Übereinstimmungen und Ähnlichkeiten sind zahlreich und jeweils so gravierend, dass wir dieses Gedicht immer vor Augen haben sollten, um zu einer Fragestellung zu kommen, die das Problem noch schärfer hervortreten lässt" (p. 634). Also Hermann Fränkel, *Wege u. Formen*, pp. 157ff.
38. Deichgräber, *op. cit.* p. 653: "Parmenides spricht von sich als einem Ich, stellt aber dieses Ich nicht als etwas Geschlossenes dar, sondern als einen Bereich, in welchem der philosophische Eros bestimmend wirkt".
39. Cf. Schwyzer, *op. cit.* II.44. I am in accord with Taran's interpretation of this difficult passage (*op. cit.* p. 14): "πύλαι means one gate with two doors".
40. I am inclined to agree with Mario Untersteiner (*Parmenide* [Firenze 1958], p. 74 fn. 91) who, as Taran notes, interprets the keys as "le chiavi che si alternano indifferentemente" and sees no force in Taran's own argument that Untersteiner is being misled by "the plural which is merely poetical" (*op. cit.* p. 15). What is symbolized by these keys is the alternating duality of the logic in the body of the poem.
41. Fränkel, *Wege u. Formen* chap. 3. Cf. also W. Kranz, "Über Aufbau und Bedeutung des Parmenideischen Gedichts", *Akademie Berlin Sitzungsberichte* 2 (1916), pp. 1165ff.
42. Jameson's attempt to "correct" εὐκυλεος to εὐπέιθεος (G. Jameson, "'Well-rounded Truth' and Circular Thought in Parmenides", *Phronesis* 3:1 (1958), pp. 15-30) is utterly unconvincing. He makes the mistake of thinking that the circularity involved is a circularity in the logical argument (p. 19). His greatest mistake, however, is his insistence upon an identification of "thought" and what he calls "reality" in Parmenides (p. 23).
43. I agree with Taran, *op. cit.* pp. 13-14, that "it cannot be the case that the door stands between two ways", for indeed "if that were so the ways would be two before the door and two after it, which is not the case as is shown by the content of lines 9-21". The gate with its two doors separates in some way the way of Night from the way of Day, but nothing need be said about what is on the other side to explain how it does it.
44. ... καὶ Δίκας ῥέπει τὰ –
 λαπτον ...
 (Snell 17.25-26)
45. I cannot accept Taran's idea that the goddess of line 22 "is different from the Dike of line 14", *op. cit.* pp. 15-16, but must agree with Deichgräber, *op. cit.* p. 665, that the identity of Δίκη with Truth is a natural and, in this case, obvious phenomenon ("Er versteht auch leichter, als es früher möglich war, dass im altertümlichen Denken Dike mit der Wahrheit und gehobener Erkenntnis identisch sein kann, Recht und Natur eins sind, damit auch Wahrheit und Recht und wahre Lehre und Recht"). Taran states that "lines 14-22 show, however, that Parmenides did not identify them". I see no reason in these lines that proves this assertion. Surely he cannot argue that there are two goddesses because she is described at one time as "of stern vengeance" (πολύποιος 1.14) and at another as "receiving Parmenides gladly" (καὶ με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο – 1.22). Parmenides is an initiate unlike most men. He has traveled the road far away from the one trodden by them (ἡ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἔκτος πάτου ἐστὶν – 1.27).

46. Mourelatos, *ibid.* p. 18 fn. 22.

47. Eric A. Havelock, *op. cit.* p. 133: "The journey, the horses, the daughters of the sun, the gateway, the courtyard, and the rest of it are admittedly highly concrete symbols, but it is possible that they are designed to recall and reinforce certain contexts of experience which interpenetrate the philosophy of the whole poem".

48. *Ibid.* p. 142 fn. 38: "ὁδός διζήσιος: Frag. 2, line 2; Frag. 6, line 3; Frag. 7, line 2; διζήσεαι: Frag. 8, line 6; cf. Heracl. 22B 101, and *L.S.* sub vv. The verb is Homeric and lyric. The noun seems confined to Parmenides, though Diels introduced it (in the pl.) into the corrupt text of a magical formula which Kern (*Orph. Frag.* p. 333) rejected as non-Orphic".

49. *Ibid.* p. 139.

50. *Ibid.* p. 137. In footnote 26 page 141, Havelock lists the various instances of the use of "road words". I give them for reference: "ὁδός: Frag. 1, lines 2, 5, and 27; Frag. 2, line 2; Frag. 6, line 3; Frag. 7, lines 2 and 3; Frag. 8, lines 1 and 18; κέλευθος: Frag. 1, line 11; Frag. 2, line 4; Frag. 6, line 9. ἀταρπός: Frag. 2, line 6. Note also ἀμαξιτόν; Frag. 1, line 21".

51. Note also *E.* 287-292 where Hesiod describes the difficult ὁδός of Excellence in contradistinction to the way of Badness.

52. Much has been written concerning this journey and how it is described. Snell's, *op. cit.* p. 148, interpretation is to the point since it makes a connection with poetry. He sees in it "a solemn and dramatic recital based, as is proved by a number of analogies with a poem by Pindar, on the model of choral poetry". He cites *Ol.* 6.22ff. Cf. also *Py.* 3.103-104:

εἰ δὲ νόῳ τις ἔχει θνα—
τῶν ἀλαθείας ὁδόν, χροὴ πρὸς μακάρων
τυγχάνοντ' εὖ πασχέμεν.

But if anyone of mortals possesses in the mind
The way of Truth, it is necessary,
having come upon [his condition]
From the blessed ones, that he be well off.

53. Taran, *op. cit.* pp. 232ff.

54. *Ibid.* pp. 265-266 fn. 99 refers to such learned minds as Caelius Aurelianus, Wilamowitz, E. Lesky ("Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken", *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*, Jahrgang 1950, Nr. 19, pp. 1272ff.), Censorinus, and Untersteiner.

55. I agree with Taran, *op. cit.* pp. 166-167, who cites Fränkel, Loew, and Bergk, that πλήνται must be preferred over the unmetrical πλήντο Diels reads.

56. Snell, *op. cit.* p. 142, notes that Xenophanes followed speculations "... according to which the earth, the ocean, and probably even the cosmos were seen as perfect rounds". The highly phenomenological quality of these "speculations" should be obvious.

57. Taran, *op. cit.* pp. 33-40 is quite correct in realizing that the interpretation of this fragment and especially the subject of this verb (ἔστω) are crucial to the interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy as a whole. He points out that Reinhardt (*op. cit.* pp. 35ff.) and Deichgräber (*op. cit.* p. 44) followed an interpretation of Zeller's (*ZN* p. 687) and Diels (*Parmenides* p. 33) that takes the subject to be a non-expressed "das Seiende". Verdenius concludes that the subject is "reality" ("not in the sense of 'the real nature of things as opposed to appearance', but of all that exists, the total of things", *op. cit.* p. 32

fn. 3). Taran notes that more recently (*Mnemosyne* 4th ser. 15 (1962), p. 237) Verdenius has maintained the subject to be Truth. Taran is also correct in seeing (pp. 33-34) that Verdenius' interpretation is no different from that originated by Diels and Zeller. Another insight on Taran's part is to point out the fallacy in Raven's insistence that the difficulty consists in Parmenides' confusion [?] of the "existential and the predicative use of the verb 'to be' " (p. 33). Taran argues forcefully against any such "confusion" as well he should. I agree with him also when he argues that "Parmenides states that there are two ways of inquiry that can be conceived: one asserts 'exist', the other asserts 'exists-not' " (pp. 36-37). But I do not agree with him when he states that "Parmenides starts from the priority of the ontological problem" (p. 37). I contend that Parmenides starts from the priority of a logical problem that relates to the structures of the world of experience – a dyadic opposition with an underlying third term. In so far then as "das Seiende" is this third term, I am in complete accord with Diels, Zeller, Reinhardt, and especially Verdenius who has pointed to Truth as this term with good reason – cf. line 4 of the fragment under consideration ('*Ἀληθείη γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ*). Truth in this case is definitely an underlying term.

58. Note also the careful correlation of these statements in the Greek:

οὔτε σκιδνάμενον πάντῃ πάντως κατὰ κόσμον
οὔτε συνιστάμενον ...

59. In this interpretation I am in agreement with Patin, *op. cit.* pp. 565ff.

60. Taran should not doubt the placement of this fragment (*op. cit.* pp. 51-53). He nears my own interpretation only once in the beginning of his commentary when he states that the starting point might be in space (p. 51). This is indeed the case, except the space to which Parmenides refers is what we should call logical space. There is no objectively physical or material space involved.

61. If Parmenides did not have Heraclitus in mind and, for the sake of argument, not the latter's followers who might have misunderstood him, who else might fall into a direct line of criticism? Could it possibly be some group that argued or spoke in contradiction to the idea that Being must be always thought and spoke (*χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἔόν ἔμμεναι* – 6.1)? Could Parmenides, in other words, be attacking the emerging sophists or sophistic trends that tended to make use of oppositions for their argumentative value rather than their logical one? Could he, in other words, have been anticipating some of the later sophistic developments of a Gorgias or, say, the author of the *Dissoi Logoi*? He is certainly well-aware of correct argument and of persuasion (e.g., *πολύδηρῶν ἔλεγχον* – "much-contested proof" – 7.5). There is no space to examine this thesis in detail, but the manipulative formulation of oppositions could easily represent what Parmenides disliked most: the non-inclusive listing of examples on both sides of a question. It is clear, in any case, that the idea of opposition no longer maintains in sophistic thought its clear archaic structure and symbol. There is no longer a strong correlation of opposites immediately related to a third term. This second-rate type of sophistic thought could easily have been what Parmenides was attacking when he denounced the *βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν*.

62. W.R. Chalmers, "Parmenides and the Beliefs of Mortals", *Phronesis* V.1 (1960), pp. 5-22, argues that the basic distinction between Parmenides' two worlds of Truth and Belief is the distinction between Eternity and Time. He points to this significant fifth verse of fragment eight as proof. This he regards as "one of the first clear statements of the concept of Eternity in Greek philosophy" (p. 16). It is also one of the first clear statements of the timeless quality of an archetype. On the other hand, Chalmers points out that when the goddess speaks of things mortal she mentions straight away *γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι* (8.40). Being itself is earlier described as not allowed by *Δίκη* to

either become or be destroyed ("οὔτε γενέσθαι/ οὔτε ὄλλυσθαι" – 8.13-14). Chalmers is correct, I think, when he draws our attention to this distinction between Time and Eternity – a distinction without which we should certainly be confused if we consider Parmenides' logic itself and the *ὁδοί* of various kinds.

63. F.M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (London 1939), p. 44.

64. Fragment 19 refers to a false naming process by symbols too. Mortals have posited distinctive names for stages of a growing process which is really one:

οὐτῶ τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφν τάδε καὶ νυν ἔασι
καὶ μετέπειπ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι τραφέντα·
τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἀνδρωποὶ κατέθεντ' ἐπίσημον ἐκάστω.

Thus according to opinion did these things grow and are now
And hereafter from this growing shall come to an end.
And for these men have established a name, a sign [symbol?] for each.

65. A.H. Coxon, "The Philosophy of Parmenides", *CQ* 28 (1934), pp. 142-143.

66. *Ibid.* p. 143.

67. Cassirer, *op. cit.* 2.63.

68. Jaeger, *op. cit.* pp. 97-98.

EMPEDOCLES

The logic of the archaics reached its acme in the rich hexameters of Empedocles. Here there is no Parmenidian Being obscuring tensioned balances and the identity of opposites, nor is one placed in the position of having to reconstruct certain phases or representations of symbolization and structure as one is forced to do with the more unconscious utterances of Heraclitus. No, the extant corpus of Empedocles reveals a conscious, systematic use of symbols that in themselves draw the clearest possible structure the archaic mind could proffer.

The one critical difficulty, as I see it, that must be removed in order to examine most fruitfully the full corpus of Empedoclean thought is the groundless argument that assigns the *Καθαρμοί* and the *Περὶ Φύσεως* to two different modes of invention or two different forms of mind. Guthrie goes far in dispelling such an argument,¹ but he does not go far enough. For, it is not sufficient to say that “the idea of the conflict between science and religion . . . finds its place more easily in the nineteenth or twentieth century A.D. than in the lyric age of Greece”.² Moreover, Guthrie’s stated stance that the man “was poet and mystic as much as philosopher, his system was probably not completely consistent by the canons of rationalism [sic]”³ does outright injury to an understanding of Empedocles by carting out, as Guthrie did ultimately in the case of Heraclitus, Aristotelian and Cartesian categories that befuddle the wit and block any comprehensive philological and “philosophical” comprehension of what Empedocles is all about. The major question still remains: Wherein lies the symbol and structure that represent the basic tenets of archaic logic? It is important therefore, to re-examine in short order the controversy over the qualities of thought represented in the *Καθαρμοί* and the *Περὶ Φύσεως*.

Hegel in the early part of the nineteenth century cleverly, and to some extent fruitfully, avoided this sticky question altogether. He followed closely the doxography and Aristotle, stating openly that Empedocles is not very interesting at all.⁴ Hegel turned his attention to Empedocles’ conception of synthesis which, he declared, held good to the present day.⁵ Yet, this syn-

thetic conception is really absent of thought.⁶ One cannot take a substantive stance on it at all.

It would, perhaps, have been better if subsequent commentators had examined closely the reasons for Hegel's avoidance of some of the primary issues in Empedocles' worldview, for as the century came to a close, criticism was suddenly subject to certain empiricist and late romantic ideas that led to a major problem within the Empedoclean corpus: the absolute division between the *Περὶ Φύσεως* and the *Καθαρμοί*. Burnet in 1892 was a major guilty party. He argued that Empedocles reflected a definite split between his religious beliefs and cosmological views.⁷ This statement of division has adversely affected the English critical abilities to the present day.

Yet, in this instance the Germans and French were no less guilty of a kind of blind misrepresentation. Bidez in 1894 drew a romantic exegesis of the *Καθαρμοί*, seeing it as the work of a young man flushed with success, while the *Περὶ Φύσεως* represented for him the writings of a man sobered by exile.⁸ T. Gomperz in 1896 insisted that there was no connection between the two parts at all,⁹ and two years later Diels went so far as to reverse Bidez' ordering of the works and argued that those positions held in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* could not have been held at the time Empedocles composed the *Καθαρμοί*. The latter work, he insisted, was the product of the loneliness of exile. It was a later retraction.¹⁰ This blind insistence on division was reflected in 1903 when *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* at last saw the light of day. Kranz throughout the first half of the twentieth century (1912, 1935, and 1949) maintained the high priority of the *Καθαρμοί* to the general disparagement of the *Περὶ Φύσεως*. The critical blindspot continued to grow.¹¹ In the twenties Otto Kern attempted to use the then new and prevalent tool of psychological explanation: In Southern Italy Empedocles had undergone a great psychological conversion which in turn led to the distinctive character of the *Καθαρμοί* — “und erfuhr dann sein Damaskos in Unteritalien in den Kriesen der Orpheotelesten”.¹² Wilamowitz in 1929 was still arguing that the teaching of the *Καθαρμοί* was in full contradiction to that of the *Περὶ Φύσεως*.¹³

Recent years have produced an even more radical group of “divisionists” both because the Diels' text has come into general use and because division in many circles has seemed almost to assume the status of an unconscious premise. Jaeger in 1947 argued that “as soon as the first lines of the *Καθαρμοί* strike our ear, we find ourselves in a realm where a completely different, mystico-theological style and type of thought prevail”.¹⁴ Dodds in his *Greeks and the Irrational*, evidently observing the lack of a different kind of synthesis than Hegel found, notes that there is no attempt at all in Empedocles to synthesize his “scientific” and “religious” views.¹⁵ The late nineteenth century dichotomy between science and religion, that kind of love affair the English have had with “pure science” ever since Bacon and Newton, is still all

too operative. Vlastos in 1952 insisted that the two works "remain not only heterogeneous but contradictory at crucial points; they admit of no rational, or, for that matter, even imaginative harmony".¹⁶ Van Groningen in 1958 essentially toes the same line. He follows the order of Diels-Kranz, not only in terms of the major division into two parts but also in terms of the placement of fragments within those parts.¹⁷ Fragment two of the *Περὶ Φύσεως*, for instance, enunciates "un principe très sain de tout travail scientifique".¹⁸ For him the subject of the *Καθαρμοί* allows a precise distinction (une distinction précise) between things human and divine.¹⁹ Instead of noting a realm in which the human and divine are found in mixture and interaction, van Groningen insists on the primary disjunction made specific in the Diels' arrangement of fragments. Even a man like Solmsen who notes that Diels' arrangement of the Empedoclean corpus is no better than Karsten's in 1838 still tends to draw a sharp dichotomy between the two works. In discussing *Φιλία* and *Νεῖκος* in Empedocles' cosmology, he would prefer to keep the *Καθαρμοί* out of the discussions entirely.²⁰ The two most recent English books on Empedocles, Lloyd's *Polarity and Analogy* (1966) and O'Brien's *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* (1969) are two clear examples of the revival of the Aristotelian interpretation of the pre-Socratic, the "philosophical" and "scientific" stance of the man who defined "philosophy" and "science" at the expense of any understanding of the archaic mentality. Lloyd works on the idea of analogy and supposed "technological images" Empedocles employs.²¹ His scientific preoccupations come out most clearly in his discussion of the clepsydra fragment (100). "The suggestion that it is the variation in the pressure of the blood which controls the air entering and leaving the body is an idea which Empedocles tried to recommend and justify not, it is true, by investigating the problem directly [sic, then follows a footnote declaring that all would have been happier if Empedocles had performed dissections] but by appealing to the analogy of the clepsydra where we can observe how variations with the pressure of the air on the perforated strainer determine the movement of water into, and out of, the vessel".²² What does all this have to do with Empedocles? The question comes out even more strongly in the case of O'Brien who refuses, at one point, to consider the relationship of the *Περὶ Φύσεως* and the *Καθαρμοί* at all, even though he sees a strong likeness between fragment 30 and fragment 115. He doubts "... whether we are entitled to relate this detail of the religious poem to the physical system".²³ O'Brien is a reactionary. He relies heavily on Aristotle as an historian of philosophy, claiming that he finds him generally more reliable than does Cherniss. For him Aristotle's "skein of interpretation" does not lead necessarily to distortion of fact.²⁴ His view is totally unacceptable. It does irreparable harm to the relationship between the archaic symbol and structure in Empedoclean thought.

Not all scholars have been convinced, however, that an irreconcilable

dichotomy between the *Περὶ Φύσεως* and the *Καθαρμοί* actually exists. Some like Nestle (1948) and Cleve (1965) tend to straddle the fence. The former argues a dualism of *Weltanschauung* in Empedocles that held its roots in the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition. He does see that the *Περὶ Φύσεως* contains certain “mystical” elements and notes that the treatise is not theoretical – “ja im Grunde ist sein Erkenntnisprinzip nicht rational, sondern religiös . . .”²⁵ He suggests, along with Tzetzes, that there were two books of the *Περὶ Φύσεως* with the *Καθαρμοί* as an added third.²⁶ Cleve, while he finds no originality whatsoever in the *Καθαρμοί* sees the two works as complementing each other.²⁷ Empedocles believed that body and consciousness were merely two sides of the same phenomenon.²⁸ Zafirapulo somewhat earlier (1953) had put the argument a little more positively: both works represent a double exposition of one theme. He speculated that Empedocles was attempting to reconcile and unify two hostile branches of Pythagoreanism.²⁹

Diès in 1909 produced probably the first tentative attack on the irrational separation of the *Περὶ Φύσεως* and the *Καθαρμοί* in that he maintained a certain mystical characteristic of Empedoclean thought.³⁰ But, it was Bignone in 1916 who indicated clearly that what Burnet, Diels, and Kranz thought might be the content or tenor of the Empedoclean verses was not their content at all. Bignone came to the pre-Socratic with a highly cultivated mind. It is not for windowdressing that he compared Empedocles to Goethe in the *Wahlverwandschaften*, to Emerson, or to Swedenborg.³¹ He saw in the man a type of mind that draws together the world in a comprehensive, far-ranging fashion. There can, hence, be no clear distinction between science and mysticism. For Empedocles there was a definite link between knowledge and salvation.³² Both sides of the Empedoclean nature are tightly united – “questi due aspetti in Empedocle sono strettamente uniti . . .”³³ Empedocles’ personality permeated his thought. Bignone drew his great admiration for the man’s genius clearly in the last pages of the third chapter of his book when he compares him to Pindar: “Pindaro ha il lirismo della mistica; Empedocle il tragico, il mistero, l’invettiva, la polemica, l’eloquenza della persuasione”.³⁴ This is not the Empedocles of Burnet and Diels, and although Bignone’s obvious reaction to the prevalent empirical and scientific ideas behind the then recent critical stance was in some ways unfortunate – especially, I think, in his continual reliance on the mystical quality of Empedoclean thought – still, in many ways there is no better work even today to reveal the extraordinary plane on which the man’s thought operated. It was a plane that could not have tolerated an absolute division between a *Περὶ Φύσεως* and a *Καθαρμοί*. Verdenius continued in the same line as Bignone in 1948 when he insisted that there was no difference between the mental habits of rational insight and religious faith,³⁵ and in Kahn’s more recent article, “Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles’ Doctrine of the Soul” (1960), philosophy at last came to grips with the import of Empedocles’ work. Kahn notes that the pre-

Socratic saw a one-to-one relationship between the mind and the physical body.³⁶ One cannot really argue a dualism in Empedoclian thought.³⁷ Φιλία and Ἀρμονία conjoin the two poems as a complex reality that ultimately creates a link between the religious destiny of man and the cosmic principle of Φιλία.³⁸ I shall return to the structural importance of Ἀρμονία later. For the present, let it be noted that Kahn has opened up a new and fruitful means of Empedoclian criticism, stemming not from the disjunction but from the linkage of the *Περὶ Φύσεως* and the *Καθαρμοί*. Of course, by 1960 there was no other choice, for eleven years before Herbert S. Long had, in arguing the consistency of the Empedoclian doctrine, brought to light a piece of evidence that was at once searing and also totally destructive to any scholar still holding on to the “divisionist” principles dictated by Scaliger, Burnet, and Diels: only 24 out of the 153 fragments can be assigned to either work with any degree of certainty.³⁹ The game was up. A new critical stance was absolutely necessary.

The situation, however, did not only yield the insights of Kahn but also the first attempts at what I should call the structuralist approach. I speak now of the works of N.I. Boussoulas and Johann Christoph Lüth.

Boussoulas set out to prove that a concept of mixture (μίξις or κρᾶσις) underlay the primary concepts of several of the pre-Socratics. His work has never received adequate attention, for I suspect on first glance it appears somewhat radical and strange. The point is, of course, that he had described clearly the same idea of mixture I have noted stemming from the Homeric Hymns and has argued that this “mixture” lies at the basis of a large amount of pre-Socratic thought. What he has done, in fact, is to establish the realm or condition for the expression of the phenomenological structuralism of the archaics. He notes a strong parallel between Parmenides and Empedocles in this respect.⁴⁰ In Empedocles he notes similar parallels to Anaxagoras and also to Heraclitus.⁴¹ It is Φιλία that is the cause of this μίξις⁴² — again reaffirming certain points I have made in connection with the Homeric Hymns and Hesiod’s *Theogony*. For Boussoulas, Empedocles’ new idea is that of a μίξις in equilibrium, but he insists upon not a mixture of Φιλία and a mixture of Νεῖκος but on one that is intermediary between them.⁴³ He has, in fact, suggested the existence of a third underlying term.

Lüth, limiting himself unnecessarily I think to the *Περὶ Φύσεως*, considers the “Struktur des Wirklichen”. He notes that Empedocles’ Reality is formed on a basic light-dark dichotomy.⁴⁴ He sees clearly the antithetical nature of this structure.⁴⁵ For Empedocles the structural moment of Reality is grounded medially in the ontological structure of the living organism and the logical structure of opposition.⁴⁶ Lüth notes that this world is not objective but subjective for Empedocles.⁴⁷ In other words, he too recognizes that phenomenological aspect of pre-Socratic thought and suggests a structural alternative to the misdirection of most scholarship on the problem.

My point must be, of course, that Boussoulas' and Lüth's attempts are only beginnings. Except for the former's introduction of the concept of *μῖξις*, neither deals with structure in its basic symbolic terms, for it is through symbols – that is, through the primary philological terms of language – that a necessary critical light may at last be thrown on Empedocles. A study of the usage of these significant word-symbols dissolves, moreover, the old problem of the *Περὶ Φύσεως* and the *Καθαρμοί*, for the two works in symbolic terms are essentially alike. Let us examine, for the moment, the all-important coincidences of word-symbols and words not only between the two works but also between the *Καθαρμοί* – as defined by Diels – and the writings of Heraclitus and Parmenides. For the sake of argument, I too shall use the fragments as they are designated by Diels, not to argue, however, that the two works are distinct or separate, but to show that the use of important and significant language in both – even using the Diels dichotomy – is the same.

Three major Empedoclean symbols appear in the *Καθαρμοί*⁴⁸ – symbols I shall discuss more closely subsequently: *Νεῖκος*, *Ἀνάγκη*, and *Ἀληθείη*. *Νεῖκος* appears twice in fragment 115 (115.4 and 115.14), where the context concerns the important structural terms, *γυῖα* ("limbs") and the cycle of elements through which *Νεῖκος* propels the sinner. Of course in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* the occurrences of the symbol are many and always in context with important structural and symbolic words: the symbols of the cosmic elements or forms (17.19, 22.9, 109), the dyadic alternation and opposition to *Φιλία* (17.8=26.6, 30.1, 35.3 – here found conjoined with *δύνη*, 36), and the state of mixture (35.9). There is no difference in usage between the two works. *Ἀνάγκη* is intimately bound with the symbol of *Νεῖκος*. At 115 it is the structural force overriding *γυῖα* and the movement *Νεῖκος* instigates throughout the elements. 116 probably reveals the same usage, although its fragmentary nature makes it difficult to arrive at any sure definition. Now, while *Ἀνάγκη* does not appear in the *Περὶ Φύσεως*, it does, of course, occur at several important junctures in Parmenides where it describes the structural characteristics of Being (8.16 and 8.30) and the *πεῖρατα* of the perceivable universe (10.6). There is a direct line, therefore, between Parmenides' poem and the *Καθαρμοί*. A similar line may be established between Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the *Καθαρμοί* in terms of *Ἀληθείη*: 114 declares clearly that *Ἀληθείη* deals with *μῦθοι* and the "reliable impulse on the mind" (*ἐπὶ φρένα πίστις ὁρμή* – 114.3). Heraclitus speaks of *σοφίη* that is defined as speaking true things (*ἀληθέα λέγειν* – 112). Parmenides, of course, makes use of the word as a primary symbol equated with Being (1.29), as an attribute of *reliability* (1.30 – *πίστις ἀληθής*, 8.28, and 8.50-51 – *ποτὸν λόγον ... ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης*), as an attribute of the *ὁδός* (8.17), or an attribute of the lower symbolic order of the world of *Δόξα* (8.39). There can be little doubt that the *Καθαρμοί* contains the same language of primary symbolization that appears both in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* and the works of Parmenides and Heraclitus.

The same may be said for another level of vocabulary that either describes the medium and steadfastness of a structure (*μῦθος*, *λόγος*, and *πίστις*) or the peculiarly Empedoclean parts and construction of the structure itself (*γνῖα*, *ἁρμονίη*, and *δίη*). *Μῦθος* in 114.1 relates immediately to *Ἀληθείη* and, as I noted above, to “the reliable impulse of the mind” (114.3). It is a word found commonly in the *Περὶ Φύσεως*. In the important fragment 17, Empedocles commands us to listen to his *μῦθοι* (17.14). We are told that these will increase the *φρένας* (17.14). He urges us to attend to the *πείρατα μύθων* – the bounds of his *μῦθοι* (17.15). They will be dyadic (*δίπλ' ἐρέω* – 17.16). As with Heraclitus’ *λόγοι*, Empedoclean *μῦθοι* reveal the whole and the whole’s dyadic structure. 23.11 verifies that the phenomenon of mixture in harmony (*ἁρμονίη μείζαντε* – 23.4) comes to us by a *μῦθος* from the god (*θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον*), a statement clearly related to the truth value of language in 114. 24 connects the word with the symbol of the path (*ἄτραπὸν* – cf. also Parmenides 2.6)⁴⁹ and the experience of completeness – one should complete one path of *μῦθοι* (*μῦθων ... τελέειν ἄτραπὸν μίαν* – 24.2). In 62 Empedocles’ *μῦθος* (62.3) describes the underlying third term of *πῦρ* and its relationship to the dyadic terms of men and women (62.1) and water and heat (62.5). I have already described the importance of the *μῦθος* in Parmenides – the *μῦθος* of the goddess (2.1) and the *μῦθος ὁδοῖο* (8.1). Of course Heraclitus’ *ψυχῆς πείρατα* is also in context with the *ὁδός* (45) and structurally delineates, in my opinion, a realm very similar to the Empedoclean one of the *πείρατα μύθων* (17.15).

It is possible to trace a similar condition in the *λόγος* of 131.4 where Empedocles in true epic fashion asks his Muse to stand beside him as he begins to describe what must be a kind of theogony or structure of the gods (*ἅμρι θεῶν μακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον*). The word appears in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* as the *λόγος* urged on by the trustworthy things of the Muse (*πιστώματα Μούσης*) – surely again the Muse of 131 – and sifting into the innermost heart of man (4). In this work Empedocles’ structural statement is also, as is his *μῦθος*, a thing to be trusted (*λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν* – 17.26). It is also directly related to the structure of his language – his path of song (*πόρον ὕμνων* – 35.1). His *λόγοι* flow together in a pre-determined form (35.2). Both works obviously use the word in the same way, and we should do well to remember that not only is the word the primary and secondary symbolic and structural phenomenon in Heraclitus (1 [twice], 2, 31, 45, 50, 72, 87, 108, 115) but also appears thrice in Parmenides in connection with divine maidens (1.15), with the verb “to judge” (*κρίνω*) and with “argument” (*ἐλεγχον*) (7.5) and with *πιστός*, *νόημα*, and *ἀληθείη* (8.50). At all points *λόγος* and *μῦθος* possess structural connotations. They are steadfast and trustworthy (*πίστιος*) – e.g., *Καθαρμοί* 114.3. Note the sure faith (*πίστις*) in the elements of *Περὶ Φύσεως* 71, the faith in various types of perception (3.10), and the faith in the structure of the limbs (*γυῖων* – 3.13). The link with Par-

menides' *πίστις ἀληθής* (1.30) and *πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα* (8.50) is obvious.

Terms alluding to the Empedoclean construction of the cosmos also prove to be common. Empedocles presents us in 115.3 with the *γυῖα* of the *δαίμων* which, stained with blood, are thrown into the cycle of the elements. In 134.1 the *γυῖα* refer to the dyadic world of Appearance in contradistinction to the underlying aloneness of the holy *φρῆν* (*ἀλλὰ φρῆν ἱερή ... ἔπλετο μῶνον*). 128.10 refers to the pollution entered into by men who devour the "limbs" of animals. There is a possible connection between these "limbs" and the limbs of the *δαίμων*. There is a sure connection with the "limbs" in the realm of Appearance. There is a clear line between these three usages and usages in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* where *γυῖα* generally refer to the dyadic structures or processes of the cosmos (20.3, 27.1, 58 [not certain *ipsissima verba*], 62.8), human or animal appendages (61.4) where the word appears in the context of a dyadic hermaphroditic mixture of men and women – *μεμειγμένα τῇ μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν/ τῇ δὲ γυναικορυνῇ* (61.3-4), or the means of perception in the world of Appearance (2.1 and the *πίστις γυῖων* of 3.13). Yet, it can also refer to the limbs of a god (*γυῖα θεοῦ* – 31) as it does in the *Καθαρμοί* itself. *Ἀρμονίη* in the *Καθαρμοί* (122.2) appears in the "Hesiodic" catalogue of varied divinities and is described as *θεμερώπις*. The word appears 3 times in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* (23.4, 27.3, and 96.4), the first dealing with the all-important concept of mixture, the second concerning the symbol's "close-set secrecy" which in turn applies to the primary Empedoclean symbol of the *Σφαῖρος*, and the third pointing again to the divine origin of *Ἀρμονίη* and its relationship to the parts (*μέρεα*) of Earth – the "Hesiodic" definition clearly becomes linked with the more structural usage. Of course while such a usage does not appear in Parmenides, it does so in Heraclitus (8, 51, and 54) where I have shown *ἄρμονιή* to be a key structural term. Then finally the *δύνη*, the dynamic movement of the cosmos, appears once in the *Καθαρμοί* as a term describing the movement of the *αἰθήρ* – a term in itself pregnant with symbolic functions – and once in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* as the cosmic movement controlling the relationship of the dyadic forces, *Νεῖκος* and *Φιλότης* (35.4). Cosmic terms are the same in both works.

So also are the powerful "light" words, noetic vocabulary, and the strange new Empedoclean usage of *εἶδος*. The *αἰθήρ* in the *Καθαρμοί* is one of a set of elements within a structure (115.11), the transmutation immediately following the "rays of the blazing sun" (*αἰγὰς / ἡελίου φαέθοντος* – 115.10-11). It is once again related to an underlying structure in 135 where Empedocles links it to the boundless ray (*ἄπλετον αἰγὴ* – 135.2). In the *Περὶ Φύσεως*, *αἰθήρ* is generally an element or symbol of the second order and, therefore, an element of the cosmos' structure as a whole (37 [twice]; 38.4 where it appears in context with *κύκλος*, 39.1; 54 where it is linked with Empedocles' structural *ρίζαι*; 71.2 where it is located in a context with *εἶδη*, "the forms"; 98.2 and 109.2). At times it becomes equated with "the light" itself (9.1) or

with the “air” breathed by mortals in their own symbolic capacity (100.24), but it is clear that even this “air” possesses strong “otherworldly” qualities (111.8). Certainly Empedocles’ general use of *αἰθήρ* is the same as Parmenides’ (10.1 and 11.2 where phenomenological symbols are perceived in the world of *Δόξα*). There can be no doubt at all in the case of *αἰθερίος* which in Empedocles’ *Καθαρμοί* is linked with *δίνη* as a stage of elemental transmutation (115.9) that represents structurally the exact same configuration as Heraclitus’ transmutation of the cosmos (76) where *αἴηρ* assumes the function of the Empedoclean *αἰθήρ*. In Parmenides the adjective is consistently linked with cosmic, elemental light (8.56, 10.1) or the blinding gates to Truth or Being (1.13). The Parmenidian gate is, as I have argued previously, closely linked to the boundary of bright Zeus (*οὐρος αἰθριῶν Δίος* – Heraclitus 120). In all cases one senses the presence of the phenomenological world. The same holds true for *αβγή*. Twice it occurs in the *Καθαρμοί* in conjunction with the blazing symbolic power of light or *αἰθήρ* (115.10 and 135.2). In the *Περὶ Φύσεως* it is again representative of the power of the sun or light (21.4 and 42.1) or concerned with striking the *κύκλος* of the moon (43). So it appears with the sun in Parmenides (15) and, interestingly enough, with the symbolic realm of the *ψυχή* in Heraclitus (118). The archaic usage of light consistently maintains its general definition in Homer, the lyric poets, and the pre-Socratics.

There is no variation in “spiritual” or noetic vocabulary either. 138 uses *ψυχή* as “life-force”. The basic dynamic meaning of force lies behind the Heraclitian usage (12, 36, 45, 67a [*anima*], 77, 85, 98, 115, 117). Both pre-Socratics reveal their epic background. *Νόος* and *φρήν* are commonly interchangeable. Empedocles calls for a “thoughtful mind” in the *Καθαρμοί* (136.2). In the *Περὶ Φύσεως* he speaks of things “comprehensible by the mind” (*νόω περιληπτά* – 2.8). The *νόος* becomes for him an underlying third term through which man may become conscious of the construction of the cosmos (17.21). Heraclitus also uses the word to indicate “right” or “comprehensive” thought (104 and 114), as does Parmenides (4.1) who, although he is capable of conceiving the *νόος* as fallible or unsettled (6.6), may understand it as a third force underlying the mixture of limbs (*κρᾶσις μελέων*) in the phenomenological world of *Δόξα* (16. 1-2), “for the full is thought” (*τὸ γὰρ πλεόν ἐστι νόημα* – 16.4). The exact similarity to the Empedoclean usage is obvious. *Φρήν* is a much more common term in the *Καθαρμοί* and the *Περὶ Φύσεως*. Heraclitus identifies it with *νόος* (104). Empedocles sees it as a trusted seat of trusted (*πίστιος*) Truth (114.3); it is the recipient of the “broad road of persuasion” (*πειθοῦς ἀμαξιτός* – 133.3) and the underlying whole, third term itself (134.4). In the *Περὶ Φύσεως* the term is a “silent protector” (5). It is the province of a wise or technically competent man (15.1) and the seat of Truth or the comprehension of the “mixing” (23.9, cf. 23.4).

In both works Empedocles introduces a term that was to have a strong

symbolic usage in Plato: the *εἶδος*. In the *Καθαρμοί* it represents a structural characteristic underlying the transformation from life to death (125.1). It is surely tied to a usage in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* where the “forms of mortal things” (*εἶδη θνητῶν*) emerge from mixture (71.3). This relationship to mixture is maintained in the “painter’s mixture” fragment (23.5) and again at 22.7, at 73.3 where Empedocles stresses the term’s relationship to Cypris, and at 98.5. There can be little doubt that Empedocles made use of *εἶδος* for specific structural purposes, and one cannot avoid remembering the essential geometrical nature of the word that Burnet stresses in the case of the Platonic “forms”.⁵⁰

One major category of comparison remains. It is in Empedocles that the basic archaic, dyadic vocabulary at last assumes a full, conscious expression. The pre-Socratic seemed to possess a much more conscious linguistic grasp of archaic Greek’s structure than did Heraclitus or Parmenides and was, hence, even more capable than they of using the archaic mind form in a clear fashion to describe his own worldview. I speak now of the vocabulary of immortal/mortal, *ἄλλος*, *ἀλλότριος*, and *-αλλάσσω*. *ἄμβροτος* is a term we found in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*. In the *Καθαρμοί* Empedocles speaks of himself as the immortal god, no longer mortal (*ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός / πωλεῦμαι ...* 112.4-5). The opposition of terms could well be inherent in the statement. So too is Empedocles’ Muse “immortal” (131.1). It is interesting to note that in the *Περὶ Φύσεως* he appends this very old structural description to the bright phenomena of the universe in a passage dealing with the basic opposition between light and dark (21.4-5). He also speaks of the “blameless rush of immortal *Φιλότης*” (35.13). Empedocles obviously employs the adjective in situations of high structural importance. The same holds true in the case of *θνητός*. Not only is it opposed to *ἄμβροτος* or used to describe a state of experience inferior to Empedocles’ (112.4 and 113.2), it is also related to the mortal forms (*εἶδεα*) through which oath-breaking spirits are doomed to wander (115.7). The forms include the “wretched race of mortals” (*δειλὸν θνητῶν γένος* – 124.1). In the *Περὶ Φύσεως* Empedocles sets the word in an almost Pindaric context: “Not shall the blossoms of well-reputed honor force you [Muse] to accept from mortals . . .” (*μηδέ σέ γ’ εὐδόξοιο βίησεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς / πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελεῖσθαι ...* 3.5-6). In the important fragment 17, Empedocles tells of mortal limbs and the mortal man (*θνητὸς ἀνὴρ*) who learn nothing of *Φιλότης* as she moves among them (17.22 and 17.26). For him mortal phenomena are those things of the World of Appearance – things derived from mixture (71.3 – perhaps also 115.7). Empedocles seems to be dealing in both works with the underlying structural condition of the Homeric Hymns – a condition that far preceded the more elegant application of Heraclitus: *ἀθάνατοι / θνητοί, θνητοί / ἀθάνατοι...* (62).

As far as the “*ἄλλος* vocabulary” is concerned, Empedocles reveals a marked sensitivity for its usage. In the movement of the *δαίμονες* of the false

oaths, one element receives the fugitive from the other (ἄλλος ἐξ ἄλλου – 115.2). The structural identity is thus well portrayed. An ἄλλος usage appears several times in fragment 17: the elements at times (ἄλλοτε μέν) come together under the influence of Φιλότης; at other times (ἄλλοτε δ') they are drawn apart by Νεῖκος (17.7 and 17.8). An identical collocation in an almost identical context appears at 26.5 and 26.6 and again at 20.2 and 20.4 (20.2 is identical to 17.7; 20.4 is a variation of 17.8 and 26.6). Obviously Empedocles prefers ἄλλοτε as the formulaic sign of the dyadic relationship of Φιλότης and Νεῖκος. The usage in the *Καθαρμοί* and the *Περὶ Φύσεως* is identical in its structural import. So too does Empedocles employ the words to signify the equal structural status of the elements: each rules over its proper, but identical, area (τιμῆς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει ... 17.28). The elements running through one another (δι' ἀλλήλων θέοντα – 17.34)⁵¹ become “different things at different times” and yet “are always continuously the same” (γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἡνεκές αἰὲν ὁμοῖα – 17.35). No better statement of “otherness” but identity exists in the three pre-Socratics of this study. It is wise to center one’s attention on “the other”, since it clearly assumes such importance in the structure of the cosmos. Remember Parmenides’ “for nothing either is or will be other outside of Being” (οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἧ> ἔστω ἢ ἔσται / ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἑόντος – 8.36-37). One should watch constantly for the verbs and adjectives of “the other”, e.g., ἀλλάσσειν in *Καθαρμοί* 137.1 concerning the “changed” shape of a son a father slaughters and Parmenides 8.41 concerning the change of color in the realm of Δόξα, or the μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους of 115.8 which refers to the εἶδεα θνητῶν (“shapes of mortals”) and the διαλλάξαντα κελεύθος of 35.15 which deals directly with “mixture” – compare Parmenides’ παλῦτροπος κέλευθος (6.9) and the gates of the paths of Night and Day (1.11) – or the ἀλλότριον φῶς of Empedocles 45 that is the possession of this “thing made round by turning” (κυκλοτερές) and the ἀλλότριον φῶς of Parmenides 14 that is the possession of that dark-light thing (νυκτιπαές). The phrases and lines are in obvious verbal and formulaic imitation of one another: κυκλοτερές περὶ γαῖαν ἐλίσσεται ἀλλότριον φῶς – Empedocles; νυκτιπαές περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς – Parmenides.

The significant vocabulary of the *Καθαρμοί* and the *Περὶ Φύσεως* is similar, if not identical, in usage. It reflects a matrix of archaic meaning one can perceive in Heraclitus and Parmenides. There is no indication whatsoever from this internal and external consideration that Empedocles ever intended the two works to be taken as separate and opposing statements or, for that matter, to be taken as something totally out of the context of archaic Greek.

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There is no major difficulty in identifying symbolic phenomena in Empedocles, but they are so intimately implicated with the underlying structure of the thought that it is somewhat difficult to isolate them as phenomena unto themselves as we did in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Again, Empedocles has

succeeded in formulating the most lucid and internally consistent statement of archaic symbol and structure. There are, however, some more purely symbolic phenomena in his work that should be noted before one embarks upon a structural examination of his worldview. I speak of peculiar terms and specific shapes Empedocles uses to describe his *κόσμος* and of the symbols of light that I have established previously as stemming from the epic and lyric traditions.

Anyone reading Empedocles is struck by the pre-Socratic's use of *γυῖα* – “limbs”. It would be a great mistake indeed to regard these as merely “parts” of the physical body. They are closely connected to desire and love and very probably come from the same context as Alcman's “No longer, oh sweet-voiced, holy-voiced maidens, are my *limbs* able to bear me” (οὐ μ' ἔτι, παρσενικαὶ μελιγάρυες ἰαρόφρωνοι, / γυῖα φέρην δύναται – Page 10.1-2). The limbs are dyadic representations, as I have already stated, of phenomena in the perceivable *κόσμος*, that is, the world of Δόξα (20.3, 27.1, 58, 61.4, 62.8, 128.10, 134.1). They may even be characteristic of a god (31 and 115.3). They are not, however, characteristic of the underlying whole *κόσμος* lodged in the *φρήν* (134.1). The *φύσις* of the limbs is divided (διέσπασται μελέων φύσις – 63). These *γυῖα* are symbolic appendages that signify, in perceivable microcosms, the double or oppositional nature of the underlying macrocosm as a whole – not, of course, that the macrocosm is *ultimately* dyadic, since the final thrust is towards a single underlying term.

A more common set of symbols of which Empedocles makes considerable use is that of the circle and the sphere. They are both in the last analysis structural in nature. In speaking of the peregrinations of the astral bodies, e.g., the “broad circle of the moon” (σεληναίης κύκλον εὐρύν – 43), its “circular light” (κυκλοτερές φῶς – 45), or its “holy circle” (ἁγέα κύκλον – 47) that is opposed to the sun, he can move easily into the archaic symbol of the whirling nave of a chariot wheel (ἄρματος ὡς πέρι χνοίη ἐλίσσεται – 46). The immediate parallel certainly must be the flashing naves of Parmenides' own chariot (χνοίαι – 1.6). The *κύκλος* is a revolving phenomenon (περιπλόμενος κύκλος – 26.1). It lies behind a dyadic and identical perishing and waxing (καὶ φθίνει εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ αὔξεται – 26.2). It underlies the continuous interchange of the One and the Many. The two “never cease their continuous exchange, and in this are forever unmoved in a circle” (ἡ δὲ τὰδ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει, / ταύτη δ' αἰέν ἔασω ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον – 26.11-12, cf. also 17.13). We find the possibility of Νεῖκος moving to a circle's limits and standing away from the whole or all (τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ' ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου – 35.10). The *κύκλος* underlies the symbols that form the basic contents of the cosmic mixture. It also unites earth, sea, and air (γαῖα, πόντος, ἀήρ – 38.3) in the form of “Titan Aether binding all about in a circle” (Τιτάν ἡδ' αἰθὴρ σφίγγων περὶ κύκλον ἅπαντα – 38.4). As in Parmenides, the horizon once again acts as a rounded terminal

point of the world of Appearance. Beyond it or at it, phenomena, the *γυῖα* of the sun, the earth, and sea, lose their character and are subsumed under the harmonious third term of the circle – “Thus is the circular Sphere, rejoicing in its circumambient solitude, set in the fitted secrecy of ‘*Ἀρμονίη*’” (οὕτως ‘*Ἀρμονίης πυκνωῶ κρύφῳ ἐστήρικται / Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίῃ περιηγεί γαίῳ*ν – 27.3-4).⁵²

Obviously the relationship between the *κύκλος* and the *Σφαῖρος* is very close indeed. Both are underlying terms, clearly uniting and obliterating the dyadic or multiple condition of the *γυῖα*: “For two branches do not shoot from the back – nor feet, nor swift knees, nor generative organs. No, it was a sphere and from all ways equal to itself” (οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νώτου δύο κλάδοι αἰσούνται, / οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γούνα, οὐ μήδεα γεννήεντα, / ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἔην καὶ <πάντοθεν> ἴσος ἑαυτῷ – 29). The description of the rounded, symbolic sphere is clearly parallel to the Parmenidian phenomenon of the limit which in bulk is like unto a *εὐκύκλος σφαῖρα*. This limit (*πεῖρας*) is from all ways completed (*τετελεσμένον πάντοθεν*) and from the middle equally balanced in all directions (*μεσοσθέν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντη* – 8.42-44). The difference, of course, is that Empedocles conceives his *Σφαῖρος* to be altogether without bounds (*πάμπαν ἀπείρων* – 28.1), probably possessed more of the particular noetic tenor of Heraclitus’ boundless *ψυχὴ* (45). The Empedoclian phenomenon, while conceived differently in respect to the geometrical bounds, is still like Parmenides’ *Σφαῖρα* in that it is circular (*κυκλοτερὴς* – 27.4 and 28.2) and equal in all ways to itself (<*πάντοθεν*> *ἴσος ἑαυτῷ* – 29.3).⁵³ They are both underlying third terms either unmoved in themselves (*ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμών* – Parmenides 8.26) or represent the unmoved structural dynamics (*ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον* – Empedocles 17.12-13).⁵⁴ Empedocles, however, also locates the form of the *Σφαῖρος* or *κύκλος* in the world of Appearance in one very important instance as a direct link to the underlying *κόσμος*: I speak of the rounded pupil of the eye (*κύκλωψ κούρη* – 84.8). The word finds a parallel in Parmenides’ “round-faced moon” (*κύκλωψ σελήνη* – 10.4) and a rich epic background in Homer’s Polyphemus. Empedocles is well aware that there exists a one-to-one symbolic relationship between man and the *κόσμος*. This “reality” lies in the Primeval Fire that in the fine tissues hides itself in the pupil of the eye (... *ὠγύγιον πῦρ / λεπτήσω <τ’> δθόνησι λοχάζετο κύκλοπα κούρη*ν – 84.7-8). In this circle the intermediary elements of Fire and Water find mixture and interplay (84.10-11). To use a symbolic phenomenon even more representative of the physical world of Appearance, Empedocles tells us the situation is the same as it is in the case of a lantern. There too is lodged the flame of burning Fire (*πυρὸς σέλας αἰθομένοιο* – 84.2). I shall speak of light in Empedocles subsequently. The important detail to recognize here is that the criterion of analogy does not explain the obvious symbolic relationship between the roundness of the underlying *κόσμος*, the roundness of the eye’s

pupil, and the diffuse roundness of light as it emanates from the lantern. The common symbolic denominator is Fire. The three specific symbolic phenomena are located on three levels of the world-cosmos as a whole: the more purely physical, man, and the underlying κόσμος. One cannot avoid remembering the tripartite proportion of Heraclitus' ape:man:god (83).

The κύκλος, moreover, has a direct relationship to Empedocles' concept or experience of time. Like a circle it is a "completing phenomenon" (τελειόμενος χρόνος – 30.2), partaking of the circular quality of the τέλος which I have discussed previously. As we are told of the circular form underlying the movements of the One and the Many (17.13), so too are we informed that Time is itself an interchange of Κότος (Νεῖκος) and Φιλότης, "for from these are all things that were, are, and will be" (ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἔστι καὶ ἔσται – 21.9). It is a phenomenon that can obliterate right thought from man in its rounded course of years (περιπλόμενος χρόνος – 110.8). It is clear that Empedocles saw the essential movement of time to be linked to the circular or spherical nature of the underlying κόσμος – a direct forerunner of Plato's time as a "moving image of eternity" (εἰκὼ κινητὸν αἰῶνος – *Tim.* 37d).

The second category of major archaic symbolism involves the phenomenon of light. Like the poets and the other pre-Socratics, Empedocles conceived his universe in terms of this seminal experience. As I indicated above, he makes use of the bright phenomenological condition of the αἰθήρ both as an element or secondary symbol and as light itself: "Men, when [the elements] have been mixed in a man and come into the αἰθήρ, then say [that this] is to come into being" (οἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μυγέντ' εἰς αἰθέρ' ἵ<κωνται> / ... τότε μὲν το <λέγουσι> γενέσθαι – 9.1.3). The alternate dark side of experience is implied as the fragment continues: "And when [the elements] separate, in turn [they call] this sad fate" – i.e., death (εὔτε δ' ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ' αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον – 9.4). Empedocles senses the opposition between darkness and the various forms of light, not only in those of which I spoke above – the αὐγή, the αἰθήρ, the thing αἰθέριον – but also the ἥλιος and πῦρ. He tells us to observe (δέρκευ – 21.1) "the sun bright to see and in all places warm and as many immortal things as are are flooded with its heat and bright light. [Observe too] the murky and chilling rain in all things" (ἥελιον μὲν λευκὸν ὄραν καὶ θερμὸν ἀπάντη / ἄμβροτα δ' ὅσσ' εἶδει τε καὶ ἀπγέτι δεύεται αὐγῇ / ἄμβρον δ' ἐν πᾶσι δνορρόντ' τε ριγαλέον τε – 21.3.5). Note also the sun's opposition to the moon in 40 and the dark lonely blindness of night itself (νυκτὸς ἐρημαίης ἀλαώπιδος – 49). At another point he juxtaposes darkness and light in the forms of "Hesiodic" deities: "Here were the Earth-Woman and the far-seeing Sun-Woman" (ἐνθ' ἦσαν Χθονίη τε καὶ Ἥλιόπη ταναώπις – 122.1). Of course, the use of light and dark is ultimately a structural phenomenon; yet, the symbols of light, as well as dark, may easily be isolated in the pre-Socratic and represent his archaic background of expression.


This is especially true in the case of Fire ($\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$) which plays a primary and secondary symbolic role in Heraclitus and at least a secondary one in Parmenides. For Empedocles, $\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$ having chosen or judged, is instrumental in the genesis of men and women (62.1-2) – that is, in the generation of opposites. This $\kappa\rho\omega\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ $\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$ is, of course, the same Fire that will judge in Heraclitus 66 ($\tau\acute{o}$ $\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$ $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\lambda\theta\acute{o}\nu$ $\kappa\rho\iota\nu\epsilon\iota$) and represents an underlying harmonic or structurally dynamic characteristic of symbols in archaic thought. This Empedoclean $\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$ is also the underlying third term in 62, sending up first the undifferentiated shapes of earth ($\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\omicron\rho\nu\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha$ $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\pi\omicron\iota$ $\chi\theta\omicron\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$... $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\pi\epsilon\mu\pi\epsilon$ – 62.4-6). $\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$ strengthens the forms themselves: “Cypris busying herself with the forms gave them to quick Fire to strengthen . . .” ($\text{Κύπρις} \dots \epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\alpha$ $\pi\omicron\iota\pi\nu\acute{\nu}\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ $\theta\omicron\omega$ $\pi\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\acute{\omega}\kappa\epsilon$ $\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ – 73.1-2). Then finally, as I have discussed before, Empedocles reserves this symbol for the intricate and important relationship between the $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$, the human eye, and the lantern (84). Primeval Fire ($\omega\gamma\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\iota\omicron\nu$ $\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$) is a symbolic phenomenon in this pre-Socratic on all levels. By its presence in his $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ he is able to comprehend an underlying cosmic construction and dynamics, to produce a theory of sight, and to describe the meaning of a phenomenon as material and prosaic as the lantern. But with $\pi\bar{\upsilon}\rho$ we are thrown into a discussion of the elements themselves and ultimately the structure of Empedoclean thought. Fragment 17 is by far the most interesting portion of the *ipsissima verba* to reflect this structure and its incorporation of the elements and symbols which I have described. I offer the following examination of that fragment as an introduction to the structural formulation of the Empedoclean $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$.

Simplicius (*Phys.* 157.25) declared that this fragment occurred immediately ($\epsilon\upsilon\theta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\eta$) in the first book of the *Περὶ Φύσεως*, and it is easy enough to see why he would take these words as an introduction to, or statement of, the Empedoclean worldview. Van Groningen divides the first 26 lines into two equal statements (1-13 and 14-26) that deal with the continual movement of the Many to the One and the One to the Many. Lines 27 through 35, he declared, are used to indicate the six elements.⁵⁵ Yet, the movement evidenced in the first thirteen lines is much more complicated than van Groningen sees, for in addition to the dyadic movement from the One to the Many and the reverse, Empedocles has given a clear indication that the number three or the third underlying term is indeed another major consideration. There can be little doubt that Empedocles begins his explication in a dyadic manner. “Δίπλ' $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ ”, he says. “I shall speak double”. And so he does. Lines one and two tell us of the One that has increased from Many ($\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\eta\upsilon\acute{\xi}\eta\theta\eta$... $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ $\pi\lambda\epsilon\acute{o}\nu\omega\nu$) and the disjoining that creates the Many from One ($\delta\iota\acute{\epsilon}\rho\nu$ $\pi\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\xi$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$). The third, “synthetic” line makes the simple set of dyadic statements pointing to a third structure underlying the dynamics: “Double the genesis of mortals and double the death” (δοιῇ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\theta\nu\eta\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, δοιῇ δ' $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\iota\psi\iota\varsigma$). The next set of three lines works on the same

principle: “On the one hand (μέν) a meeting (σύνοδος) of all things both gives birth and destroys the one [genesis]; on the other back again (δε πάλιν)⁵⁶ [a death] having been reared while things are dislodged (διαφνομένων) flies apart”. Line six again states the condition of the third underlying term: “And these things changing continually (ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερές) never cease”. The clue, of course, lies in “ἀλλάσσοντα”, a word, as I have already indicated, of strong archaic, dyadic meaning. Lines seven, eight, and ten could be said to follow a similar pattern, although I suspect strongly that the manuscript failure at line nine is playing havoc with the original triadic structure of these lines.⁵⁷ At least lines seven and eight are properly dyadic and opposed: “Sometimes on the one hand (ἄλλοτε μέν) all things coming together through Φιλότης into One (έν); at others (ἄλλοτε δ’) again each thing being borne apart (δίχ’) by the hatred of Νεῖκος”. Empedocles here introduces the opposition between Φιλότης and Νεῖκος. The third line of the triad, I should suggest, is either missing or some reworking or replacement of Diels 10: ἡ δέ πάλιν διαφύντος ἐνὸς πλέον’ ἐκτελέθουσι (“And back again as the one is disjoined the Many spring forth”). A possible key lies in the dyadic word “πάλιν”, although as the line stands now it acts as a perfect doublet to the inserted line nine. No such doubt, however, lies in the last three lines of the opening statement: Eleven states that “in this on the one hand (τῇ μέν) things come into being and not for them [is there a] stable life (ἐμπεδος αἰών)”; twelve continues, “but in this on the other (ἡ δέ) things continually changing (διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερές) never cease”; and thirteen concludes, “in this they are always unmoved (αἰέν ἀκίνητοι) according to the configuration of a circle (κατὰ κύκλον)”. And here, of course, is the ultimate point of the triadic structure in these opening lines: the underlying symbolic third term of the κόσμος, i.e., the κύκλος. The second line of the last triad, ἡ δέ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει (17.12), is almost exactly parallel to the third line of the second triad, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει (17.6). Could the first line of the fourth triad, τῇ μέν γίνονται τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἐμπεδος αἰών (17.11) be either parallel to the possibly lost third line of the third triad, or could it represent somehow the idea of that lost line in terms of the continual movement of the elements, Φιλότης and Νεῖκος (see 17.7-8)?⁵⁸ The movement of these opening lines towards a kind of “ultimate” triplet that would introduce the κύκλος is almost too obvious to avoid.

After establishing the underlying triadic structure of the κόσμος, Empedocles reaffirms at line 14 that his point is in what he says: “Listen to my words” (μύθων κλυθι). “You might learn something (μάθη γὰρ τοι φρένας αὖξει), for as I said before, speaking of the bounds of [my] talk (πείρατα μύθων – 17.15), I shall speak double (δίπλ’ ἐρέω – 17.16)”. And speak double he does, for he repeats lines one and two, reintroducing the dyadic dynamic between the One and the Many, and then continues on to set before us the four elements (πῦρ, ὕδωρ, γαῖα, and the “boundless height of air” –

ἡέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος – 17.18). The light/dark dichotomy might indicate some dyadic opposition between πῦρ and ὕδωρ and γαῖα and ἀήρ. Certainly there can be no doubt about the dyadic opposition of the pair ruling and structuring these elements: Νεῖκος that stands apart from them (δείχα τῶν) and Φιλότης that is among them (ἐν τοῖσιν) (17.19-20). Thus in three lines Empedocles has introduced the six secondary symbols of his κόσμος: πῦρ, ὕδωρ, γαῖα, ἀήρ, Νεῖκος, and Φιλότης, besides offering a glimpse at their possible relationship and structure. Νεῖκος may stand apart; Φιλότης, then, is equal in length and breadth (ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε – 17.20) to the four lesser symbols themselves. This is all a noetic phenomenon, we are told (τῇν οὐ νόῳ δέρκευ – 17.21). “Don’t get confused” (μηδ’ ὄμμασιν ἦσο τεθηπώς – “don’t sit astonished with your eyes”). The secret lies, I think, in that Φιλότης exists inborn (ἐμφυτος) in mortal limbs (genitals (?), compare Herodotus *Hist.* 3.87 and 4.2) (17.22). Through Φιλότης “men think dear things” (τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι – 17.23) and “complete united works” (ἄρθμια ἔργα τελοῦσι – 17.23). Φιλότης is obviously a primary noetic and holistic cosmic key which is called Aphrodite in the common realm or realm of Δόξα (17.24) but is a phenomenon the mortal man (θνητὸς ἀνὴρ) does not see (17.25-26). Φιλότης, in its close identity to the four secondary elements and its opposition to Νεῖκος is assuming aspects of an underlying third term. It is much more than in mere opposition to Νεῖκος. The archaic logic is working once again at a depth of interior unity.⁵⁹



“But listen to the nondeceptive journey of my λόγος” (17.26), says Empedocles. On one level these six elements “are all equal and of the same age in respect to their creation” (ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσα τε πάντα καὶ ἡλικά γένναν ἔασι – 17.27). How can this be so? “Each one (ἄλλης ἄλλο) [dyadically and identically] rules over its prerogative (τιμή)” – again the structural prerogative we found assigned by Zeus to various gods and goddesses in the *Theogony*. These elements prevail in the moving circle of time (περιπλομένον χρόνον – 17.29). Once again Empedocles introduces the elements’ cosmic subordination to the κύκλος. Nothing in addition to these elements possesses the clear dyadic opposition of coming into Being or perishing (καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὐτ’ ἄρ τι ἐπιγίνεται οὐδ’ ἀπολήγει – 17.30). But, this Being and perishing

(Not-Being?) is only an illusion on one level of cosmic “reality”, for Empedocles seems to follow the Parmenidian structure of the universe in the ultimate construction of his κόσμος: Nothing can continually perish – i.e., be totally within the purview of Not-Being, for it then would not Be (17.31, compare Parmenides 8.3 and 8.19). The κόσμος for Empedocles and Being for Parmenides are ultimately indestructible. For the former such an idea is impossible of fulfilment and unheard of: *καὶ τ' ἐὼν εξαπολέσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον* – 12.2. The latter simply brands his Being *ἀνώλεθρον* (8.3). Nor can the Whole, κόσμος, or Being be enlarged in either pre-Socratic (Empedocles 17.32 and Parmenides 8.43-44). Just as Not-Being cannot be thought in Parmenides, so τὸ πᾶν can neither change shape nor be empty of the constituent elements (*ἐπεὶ τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἔρημον* – 17.33, see also 13 and 14). Empedocles makes clear in this all-important fragment that his κόσμος is structured on a cycle and mixture of identical yet opposite elements that “are alone; running through one another, some become different things at different times and are ever continuously alike”:

*ἀλλ' αὐτ(ᾶ) ἔστω ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δέ θέοντα
γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἡνεκές αἰέν ὁμοῖα
(17.34-35)*

The symbols of the elements, then, are primary constituents of one level of cosmic “reality”. Empedocles goes to some pains to describe their function and especially their “joints” or “harmonic interaction”. For instance, we learn in 115 that on one cosmic level they form a cycle through which Νεῖκος propels a god whose limbs (γυῖα) are stained with bloodshed. All of this is a matter of Necessity (Ἀνάγκη) – perhaps the same structural Necessity that keeps Parmenides’ Being in bounds (8.30-31). Located in a mythically timeless realm – thrice myriad seasons (*τρίς μυρίας ὥρας* – 115.6) does the god wander – the four elements (*αἰθήρ* or the *αἰθέριον μένος*, *πόντος* (ὕδωρ), *γαῖα*, and *ἥελιος* (πῦρ) force the errant spirit into all kinds of mortal shapes (*παντοῖα εἶδεα θνητῶν* – 115.7) and hence are tied directly to the phenomenological world of men. On the cosmic level they form a great cycle of transformation: *αἰθήρ* forces the spirit seaward, *πόντος* spewed them into earth; *γαῖα* into the rays of the sun, and *ἥελιος* to the eddies of *αἰθήρ*. The cycle completes its logic as it did in Heraclitus through a set of oppositional yet identical parts – one receives the spirit from another (*ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται* – 115.12). The language is of the same quality as it was at 17.34-45. On the more physical level, that is, in the world of Appearance or physical perception – i.e., *in things we see* – the four elements in addition to Νεῖκος and Φιλότης are not only seen in “all kinds of mortal forms” (115.7) but also considered as specific, perceptually tangible, classes themselves: “For we see earth by Earth, water by Water, divine aether by Aether, and destructive fire

by Fire, affection by Affection, and hate by Destructive Hate”:

γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὔδατι δ' ὔδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον ἅτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἶδηλον,
στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νεκεῖ λυγρῶ
 (109.1-3)

The immediate identity between the cosmic and the more nearly physical may be found only in a phenomenological understanding of the world. It is not surprising that Empedocles, once given the insight, can relate these elements to all kinds of earthly phenomena, e.g., the composition of animals (75), turtles or sea snails (76), trees (77 and 78), eggs (79), fruits (80), wine (81), hairs, leaves, and feathers (82), the eyes themselves (86), etc. etc. The connecting principle between cosmic and earthly phenomena could well be the *ρίζωματα* (“roots”) of which Empedocles makes obvious symbolic use. These come to us on one level in the terms of four gods (6) whose number coincides with the number of the four more “perceivable” elements. As *ρίζαι* (“roots”) they are connecting phenomena of transformation between the elements themselves, e.g., “Aether sank down on Earth with great roots” (*αἰθήρ <δ' αὖ> μακρῇσι κατὰ χθόνα δύνετο ρίζις* – 54). It is unfortunate that more examples of Empedocles’ symbolic usage of the “root” have not come down to us. It is certainly a word-symbol with old archaic ties – see Homer *Od.* 9.390 (*σφαραγεῦντο δέ οἱ πυρὶ ρίζαι* – “and the roots [of Polyphemus’ eye] crackled in the fire”) or Hesiod *E.* 18-19 (*θῆκε δέ μιν Κρονίδης ὑψίθυγος, αἰθέρι ναίων, γαίης [τ'] ἐν ρίζῃσι* – “And Kronos of the high seat, dwelling in aether, established her [kindly Eris] in the roots of earth”). In any case, the four elements, in conjunction with the dyadic function of *Νεῖκος* and *Φιλότης* which I shall examine more closely subsequently, find relationships and connections through symbolic means. One description of this is in terms of *ρίζαι* or *ρίζωματα*. Another lies in Empedocles’ concept of *Ἀρμονίη* and the “joint that combines two things” (*δύω δέει ἄρθρον* – 32).

Kahn argues that it is *Φιλότης* and *Ἀρμονίη* that in fact conjoin both poems and expose the complex reality with which Empedocles deals.⁶⁰ This insight not only allows us to understand the primary position of *Φιλότης* over *Νεῖκος* as a third term, but also points to the general structural necessity of a “conjoining” in the Empedoclean cosmos. We have already seen the structural principle at work in Heraclitus (8, 10, 51, 54). Empedocles makes it more specific. *Ἀρμονίη* for him regulates dyads and their multiples: “Pleasant Earth received in its broad-chested hollows *the twain parts* [dual case] of the *eight* parts of shining Nestis and *four* of Hephaestus. These became the white bones *fit together* by the gluings of *Ἀρμονίη* heaven-sent”:

ἡ δὲ χθών ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοάνοις
 τῷ δύν τῶν ὀκτῶ μερέων λάχε Νήσιδος αἴγλης,
 τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστου· τὰ δ' ὅστέα λευκὰ γέγοντο
 Ἀρμονίης κόλλησιν ἀρηρότα θεοσπειήθην
 (96.1-4)

The phenomenological “fittings” bring together all things “harmoniously”; they derive directly from the elements themselves and are noetic in nature: “For from these [elements] all joined things have fit and by these do [men] think . . .” (ἐκ τούτων <γάρ> πάντα πεπήγασιν ἁρμοσθέντα/καὶ τούτοις φρονέουσι ... 107.1-2). The proportions of the elements, as they come together, dictate mortal forms (εἰδέα) (98). All the elements themselves, the Beaming Sun, Earth, Heaven, and Sea, are united with their own parts – parts that, having been sundered from them, have grown up among mortals (ἄρθμια μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἐαντῶν πάντα μέρεσσιν, / ἡλέκτωρ τε χθών τε καὶ οὐρανὸς ἡδὲ θάλασσα, / ὅσσα φῶν ἐν θνητοῖσιν ἀποπλαχθέντα πέφυκεν – 22.1-3). We are, of course, now moving into the structure of a cosmic cycle, and it is not surprising to discover that Ἀρμονίη is a goddess opposed to Δήρις (Discord) in a list of Empedoclean deities (112.2). Ἀρμονίη lies in mixture – on one level, the mixture of the artist’s colors (ἁρμονίη μίξαντε – 23.4). The κόσμος, itself underlying the elements, is articulated by Ἀρμονίη: “In the close-set secrecy of Ἀρμονίη is set the circular Σφαῖρος, rejoicing in its circumambient solitude” (οὕτως Ἀρμονίης πυκνῷ κρύθῳ ἐσθῆρικται / Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίη περιηγεί γαίῳν – 27.3-4). There can be little doubt that Ἀρμονίη is a structural concept operating on all levels of the Empedoclean worldview. In its rule over dyadic and oppositional phenomena and especially in its “hidden” nature, we are reminded strongly of Heraclitian usages of the term – e.g., the ἀφανὴς ἁρμονίη of 54. With both pre-Socratics it is clear that Ἀρμονίη is an important structural and logical phenomenon.

Yet, so too are the dyadic relationships and oppositions that fill Empedocles’ work. As he indicates (17.1, 17.16, 25) the double or dyadic structure lies in language itself. “I shall speak double” (Δίπλ’ ἐρέω), he says. “It’s good to relate twice what is necessary” (καὶ δις γὰρ, ὅ δεῖ, καλὸν ἔστω ἐνισπεῖν – 25). Dyads occur in phenomena found partially in the world of Appearance: both eyes produce one vision (μία γίγνεται ἀμφοτέρων – 88). The eyes, of course, constitute the intermediation between the more nearly physical and the phenomenological worlds. Empedocles is well aware that they do so, for here he states clearly that from the two derives the One. One step removed from the more physical world, the forms and shapes derived from the elements produce dyads of their own: “Many things grow double-faced and double-breasted . . . and things mixed here from men and there female by nature furnished with hairy limbs” (πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφοιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφοίστερνα φύεσθαι, / ... μεμειγμένα τῇ μὲν ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν / τῇ δὲ γυναικοφυῇ σκιεροῖς

ἡσκημένα γυίοις – 61.14). The dyads, the dyadic opposition of men and women, the mixture, and the predominantly double phenomenon of the “limbs” create a primarily dyadic cosmic level. There is a dyadic relationship between the cosmic parts: they perish and grow into one another (εἰς ἄλληλα) and run through one another (δι’ ἀλλήλων) (26.2-3, see also 21.13). “Double is the genesis of mortals; double the death” (δοιή δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιή δ’ ἀπόλειψις – 17.3). Processes in the world of Appearance are double and not intelligible to the untrained eye. There is, for instance, no nature of all mortal men and no completed end of destroying Death (φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστω ἀπάντων / θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτω τελευτή – 8.1-2, see also 15). The dyadic opposites of Life and Death are not what they might seem at all. What Empedocles posits is a continual movement from life to death and death to life through the medium of the form: “For from living things he changing the forms established dead things <and from the dead, living ones>” (ἐκ μὲν γὰρ ζώων ἐτίθει νεκρά εἶδε ἀμείβων / <ἐκ δὲ νεκρῶν ζώοντα> – 125). In fact the only phenomenon one has is a μίξις and an exchange of things having mixed – this is the true φύσις or nature in reference to men (ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων / ἔστι, φύσις δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισι – 8.3-4). The Empedoclean movement and identity of dyads is the same as the Heraclitian one.

Opposites play a key role at one level of the κόσμος. They are derived from separation or cosmic judgment – e.g., Fire from which the opposing shoots of men and women are sent up (62.1-2). They form shares in undifferentiated shapes of the elements – e.g., the opposites of water and heat in the shapes of Earth (62.5-6). The sexes are formed by running into one of two members of a basic opposition: the female comes from the encounter with Cold; the male, with the Hot (65, see also 67). This presence of oppositions is very old and very potent indeed as one can see from the “Hesiodic” catalogues into which Empedocles places phenomena of either negative import (e.g., the Murder, Wrath, Sickesses, Putrefactions, and Ἄρη of 121) or phenomena of negative and positive opposition (e.g., the Earth-Woman and Sun-Woman, Discord and Ἀρμονίη, Beauty and Ugliness, Speed-Woman and After-A-Long-Time Woman, and Infallibility and Uncertainty of 122 or the Growth and Decay, Rest and Waking, Movement and Immovability, Greatness and Despoilment, Silence and Voice of 123). There is an eternal presence of a basic dyadic oppositional structure.


To be sure, this eternal presence is best exemplified in the phenomenological portions of the κόσμος by the “reality” of Love and Hate (Φιλότης and Νεῖκος). In the body, for instance, at one time (ἄλλοτε μὲν) Φιλότης makes the limbs one (εἰς ἐν ἅπαντα γυῖα – 20.2-3) and produces the prime of flourishing life. At another time (ἄλλοτε δ’) all is broken apart under the influence of Eris (Νεῖκος) (20.1-5). On the more purely cosmic level, Φιλότης and Νεῖκος form the primary dyad: “For by what they held formerly also

will they be. And never, I believe, will unceasing eternity be emptied of them both” (ἢ γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἔσκε, καὶ ἔσσεται, οὐδέ ποτ’ οἶω, / τούτων ἀμφοτέρων κενεώσεται ἄσπετος αἰών – 16). Hence both in mythological and philological time are very old. The first instance of any opposition resembling theirs is in Hesiod’s *Theogony* 224 where Φιλότης is opposed to Ἀπάτη (Deceit). It must have been a very potent opposition, for as I observed in an earlier chapter, this opposition occurs in an otherwise purely negative catalogue stemming from Night.

Νεῖκος itself for Empedocles has some of the characteristics of Parmenides’ Not-Being. For instance, “a wise man would not divine in his φρήν that . . . when they have been dissolved apart, they then are not” (οὐκ ἂν ἀνήρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιο, / ... καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθην, οὐδὲν ἄρ’ εἰσω – 15.1-4). Pure destruction or Νεῖκος is, hence, unthinkable, just as is Parmenides’ Not-Being. One cannot divine or think Not-Being – “keep your thought away from that way of search” (ἄφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα – Parmenides 7.2). At the most Νεῖκος is at work in the world of Δόξα, in the phenomenological realm, or in the cosmic realm of the Many. At one level it tends to break in twain the One and the γυῖα into separate wandering entities (πλάζεται ἄνδιχ’ – 20.5). It is directly related to the transformations of mortal forms throughout the cycle of elements (115), even though as an element reflected by the more physical phenomena in the realm of Δόξα it is obviously equal to the other five elements of the κόσμος (109, see also 17.27). It does, however, “stand apart” from them (Νεῖκος δίχα τῶν – 17.19). We are told that Νεῖκος always remains, even at a time when Φιλότης is ἐν μέσῃ and phenomena are moving towards the One (35.3-9, see also 36). It retains itself in some limbs (ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τ’ ἐμέμιμνε μελέων – 35.11). As a force of division it is always hovering in the wings. As a force of division its thrust is towards opposition and the many seemingly unrelated phenomena in the world of Appearance or the less pure orders of the cosmic realm.

Exactly the opposite is true with its own opposite, Φιλότης. Its thrust is away from dyadic opposition or the Many and towards the One and Oneness on all levels, so that while it indeed lies in opposition to Νεῖκος in a dyadic sense, it assumes an holistic, cosmic character Νεῖκος does not at all. There can be made a good argument, for instance, that Φιλότης is Empedocles’ equivalent to Parmenides’ Being insofar as it takes its place in the midst of the elements and is equal to them in length and breadth (ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε – 17.20). Hence it is in the center of activity and comparable to Parmenides’ spherical Being that is “evenly-balanced in all directions from the middle” (μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ – 8.44). Both Φιλότης and Being are defined by their centrality and circularity. As Kahn states so well, the “element of Love is not merely one ingredient among the others”. It is the positive aspect of Consciousness and the principle of unity and symmetry.⁶¹ Empedocles has taken the Cypris or Aphrodite of the Homeric Hymns (his

“Life-giving Aphrodite” – 151 or his single, major goddess Cypris of 128) and brought the archaic force immediately into his own cosmos as Φιλότης. It bespeaks not only an order of meeting and concrescence but also one that is radically opposed to its dyadic opposite, Νεῖκος: “And when they came together, Νεῖκος stood out at the outermost [region of the Sphere]” (τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων ἐξ ἔσχατον ἵστατο Νεῖκος – 36). Φιλότης, then, is of a much greater cosmic significance than is Νεῖκος. Structurally one is forced to argue that a triadic archaic logic once again is coming to the fore:



The unifying cosmic center is, then, an underlying third term. Empedocles names this phenomenon several names: *πᾶν* (13, 14, 35.10, 39.3), the *Σφαῖρος* (27.4=28.2, 29.3, see also 28.1 and 31), the *κύκλος* (17.13=26.12, 26.11, 35.10, 38.4, 43, 47), and, in my opinion, also *Φιλότης* (17.7=20.2, 17.20, 19, 21.8, 26.5, 35.4, 35.13). These terms unite the various levels of the universe and within them the dynamics are best seen in the movement of phenomena through the elements (e.g., 115) – dynamics that derive from Necessity itself (115.1). Empedocles admits freely that the third term is hidden and not to be seen, heard, or comprehended in the mind (*οὕτως οὐτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὐτ' ἐπακουστά / οὐτε νόῳ περιληπτὰ* – 2.7-8), but one knows that he speaks here of the uneducated eye, ear, and mind, for there can be little doubt that he himself regards the third term as inherent in what he says and how he says it – both in his dyadic speech and the triadic arrangement of the first twelve lines of fragment 17. The third term forms the consummate triad and structure of all cosmic and worldly phenomena. Within it dyadic opposition and reversal are bound by its unmoved bonds:

*τῇ μὲν γιγνONTΑΙ τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών·
 ἣ δε διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
 ταύτῃ δ' αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον*
 (17.11-13)

Nor despite Empedocles' specific caveat of fragment two, should we doubt

that this third term, this phenomenon that is “lawful and broad-ruling over all things” and “stretches continuously through the *Ἀιθήρ* and boundless light” (*ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διὰ τ’ εὐρυμέδοντος / αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διὰ τ’ ἀπλέτου αὐλῆς* – 135.1-2) – should we doubt that this is a sure characteristic of the *νόος* or *φρήν*. Mind is not of the physical world. It does not partake of the *γυῖα* of the human body (134.1). The *φρήν* is holy, unutterable and single, “darting through the whole *κόσμος* with its swift thoughts” (*ἀλλὰ φρήν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μῦνον, / φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταίσσουσα θοῇσιν* – 134.4-5). Within the microcosm of the Mind, then, lie the dynamics and structure of the macrocosm itself. “All phenomena possess the ability to use their own *φρήν* by the will of Fate (*τῇδε μὲν οὖν ἰότητι Τύχης πεφρόνηκεν ἅπαντα* – 103). There can be little doubt that the noetic experience is lodged in the phenomenological ground of man. Empedocles tells us that thought (*νόημα*) is lodged in the blood around men’s hearts (*αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα* – 105.3) and as *μητις* or counsel “increases towards the present for men” (*πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μητις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν* – 106) – a sure indication of the central, timeless, and cosmic nature of the Mind. In the form of the Homeric *πραπίδες* (*φρένες*) we see that the Mind indeed is an unmoved structure uninfluenced by the dynamics (*δύναμις*) of any world or cosmic level. Once you have pressed them into the unmoving mind (*ἀδυνῆσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας* – 110.1), phenomena will remain throughout your life (*ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι’ αἰῶνος παρέσονται* – 110.3). The one universal principle to remember is that all things possess *φρόνησις* and thought (*πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν* – 110.10, compare Parmenides’ *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι* – 3). It is the *λόγος* that sifts into these innermost regions (4.3), and it is the *νόος* that regulates the senses themselves and puts restraints on the dyadic or multiple structures of the limbs:

But come now, consider by every way how each thing is clear,
 Trusting no sight more than hearing,
 Nor [holding] resounding hearing above those things made clear
 by the tongue,
 Nor anything of the others in as many ways as there is a way
 for the *νόος* to operate.
 Restrain the trust in the limbs, and use your *νόος* to make
 each thing clear.

ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἄθρ’ αἴσῃ παλάμη, πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,
 μήτε τω’ ὄψῳ ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκοήν
 ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,
 μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅποσιν πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,
 γυῖων πίστω ἔρυκε, νόει δ’ ἡ δῆλον ἕκαστον.
 (3.9-13)

The Mind's proper sphere is not of the world of Δόξα – “miserable is the man to whom shadowy δόξα about the gods is a care” (δειλὸς δ', ὧ σκοτέεσσα θεῶν περί δόξα μέμηλεν – 132.2). Man's care and Φρήν must be oriented towards the truth that lies in the structural and symbolic principles of the underlying κόσμος. One must dwell on the “wealth of divine thought” (θείων πραπίδων πλοῦτον – 132.1); the eyes or hands do not bring the underlying term within reach (113). In other words physical or phenomenological dyads do not hold the ultimate answer. The wise man (ἄνῆρ περιώσια εἰδώς – 129.1) who has acquired this wealth of thought (πραπίδων πλοῦτον – 129.2, see 132.1), whenever he might reach out with his whole mind (πάσῃσιν ὁρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν – 129.4), easily would see each thing of all things that are τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον – 129.5). From the structure of the Mind, then, is derived the definition and situation of each individual phenomenon. The Mind, a totality and unity in itself, creates totality and unity in both the phenomenological and more physical orders. It lies deep as a third term.

It is easy enough to see now why the Empedoclean One or Whole and the Parmenidian Being have so much in common. Besides the previously discussed evidence from fragment 17 which indicated that the two views were the same in terms of the imperishability, enlargement, and noetic definition of the third underlying term, other examples point to Empedocles' denial of Not-Being – only the narrow-minded would “expect Not-Being to come into being previously” (δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἔόν – 11.2). He also postulated an eternal presence of Being – “for it will always indeed be there where anyone might always fix it firmly” (αἰεὶ γὰρ τῇ γ' ἔσται ὅπῃ κέ τις αἰὲν ἐρείδῃ – 12.3). Compare Parmenides 8.5: “Not ever was it nor will it be since it is now a whole altogether” – οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστω ὁμοῦ πᾶν. Both pre-Socratics, as also was the case with Heraclitus and his *Logos*, rely at the deepest level of their thought upon an holistic, eternally present, underlying third term. The term is essentially noetic and should, I think, fall under the general category of Consciousness.

What in fact is the constitution of this third term in Empedocles? Boussoulas pinpointed it as an “intermediary mixture”.⁶² He also states clearly that it is Φιλότης that underlies the concept.⁶³ Empedocles tells us yet more. The mixture itself is dyadic in nature in that Aphrodite, having made phenomena alike makes them feel affection *for one another* (ἀλλήλους ἔστερκται ὁμοιοθέντ' Ἀφροδίτῃ – 22.5). It is through this dyadic “likeness” and “opposition” that all things relate and ultimately change: “And running through they become of different shapes – through as much as κρήσις exchanges” (... δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα/γίγνεται ἀλλοιωπά τόσον διὰ κρήσις ἀμείβει – 21.13-14). The δύνη or “eddy” connects in this mixture the dyad of Νεῖκος and Φιλότης and through the position of Φιλότης in this dynamic phenomenon all things come together to be alone one (ἐν τῇ δὴ τάδε πάντα συνέρχεται

ἐν μόνον εἶναι – 35.5). It is surely the same dynamic configuration that regulates breathing on the phenomenological level and the function of the clepsydra on a more physical or perceptible one. Everything is in *μίξις* and *διάλλαξις* (“mixing” and “exchange”) (8.3). On the phenomenological level this includes the *φύσις* of man (8.4). This cosmic process finds its forms in the phenomenon of man: “Thus let not deception overcome your mind that there be another ‘from-whence’ of mortals” (οὕτω μὴ σ’ ἀπάτη φρένα καυνύτω ἄλλοθεν εἶναι / θνητῶν – 23.9-10). The same cosmic process might be seen in the more physical world of the painter’s mixture of colors “from which are arranged the forms like unto all things” (ἐκ τῶν εἶδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι – 23.5). Such mixtures are perceptible throughout the more physical world – e.g., in water and wine (91), in brass and tin (92), and in elderberries and linen (93). Empedocles is capable of relating the macrocosmic *μίξις* to microcosms of several orders. He has in fact joined the cosmic, divine, human, and more nearly material phenomena of the universe under the logical rubrics of symbol and structure.

We are, therefore, back once again to the primary experiential, “poetic”, and “philosophical” realm of men and gods – that same “mixed” realm that lies behind the *Hymn to Aphrodite*. Empedocles has, of course, either consciously or unconsciously exemplified this primary condition of knowledge and Consciousness in his exposition of the world in terms of *μίξις*, dyadic opposition, the central place of *Φιλότης*, and the general acceptance of symbol and structure as a way of comprehending the naively perceptible realm on the one hand and the hidden cosmic one on the other. His most interesting “new” use of the archaic logic is the development of the phenomenological realm in the processes of man himself. “There enters the gentle-minded immortal thrust of blameless Love, and straightway things became mortal which previously had known immortality” (... ἐπήμει / ἡπιόφρων *Φιλότητος* ἀμεμφούς *ἄμβροτος* ὁρμή • / αἵψα δὲ *θνήτ’* ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον *ἀθάνατ’* εἶναι – 35.12-14). So too do mortals share the experiences of the immortals: “Sharing the hearth with the other immortals, being at the same table, indestructible [and] away from the lot of human woes (*ἀθανάτοις* *ἄλλοισιν* ὁμέστοι, αὐτοτράπεζοι / ἔοντες, *ἠδρείων* *ἁχέων* ἀπόκληροι, ἀτειρεῖς – 147, see also 146). The geometrical or structural simplicity of archaic logic, expounded through the symbolic content of a universal order, finds no better spokesman than Empedocles – the last archaic logician of a period never since reproduced in the history of culture.

NOTES

1. Guthrie, *op. cit.* II.124ff.
2. *Ibid.* p. 125.
3. *Ibid.* p. 126.

4. Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, p. 357. "Aus seiner Philosophie ist nicht viel zu machen".
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.* pp. 363-364. "Dies ist die Natur des synthesierenden Vorstellens überhaupt, dies das gewöhnliche Gedankenlose, jetzt die Einheit dann die Vielheit festzuhalten und beide Gedanken nicht zusammenbringen".
7. J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 250.
8. J. Bidez, *La biographie d'empédocle* (Ghent 1894), p. 162. "Il y a une différence absolue de ton et de sentiment entre les deux oeuvres . . . La contradiction qu'il y a entre le ton des deux oeuvres nous permet de deviner la distance que les événements lui avaient fait parcourir sur le chemin de l'expérience et des désillusions".
9. T. Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 252.
10. H. Diels, "Über die Gedichte des Empedokles", *Sitz. d. preuss. Ak.* 1898, p. 406.
11. W. Kranz, "Empedokles und die Atomistik", *Hermes* 47 (1912), pp. 18-42; "Die Katharmoi und die Physika des Empedokles", *Hermes* 70 (1935), pp. 111-119; *Empedokles: Antike Gestalt und romantische Neuschöpfung* (Zürich 1949).
12. O. Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen* (Berlin 1926, 1935, and 1938), II.146.
13. Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Die *Καθαρμοί* des Empedokles", *Sitz. d. preuss. Ak.* 1929, pp. 651ff.
14. W. Jaeger, *op. cit.* (Oxford 1947), p. 133.
15. E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951), p. 146.
16. G. Vlastos, "Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought", *PQ* 2.6 (1952), p. 120.
17. Van Groningen, *op. cit.*, pp. 201 and 218.
18. *Ibid.* p. 202.
19. *Ibid.* p. 220.
20. F. Solmsen, "Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology", *Phronesis* 10 (1965), p. 110.
21. Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 274.
22. *Ibid.* p. 333.
23. D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* (Cambridge 1969), p. 88. For a full discussion see pp. 85-92.
24. *Ibid.* pp. 17 and 18.
25. W. Nestle, *Griechische Studien: Untersuchungen zur Religion, Dichtung und Philosophie der Griechen* (Stuttgart 1948), p. 154.
26. *Ibid.* p. 157.
27. F.M. Cleve, *The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy* (The Hague 1965), pp. 338 and 341.
28. *Ibid.* p. 369.
29. J. Zafiropulo, *Empédocle d'agrigente* (Paris 1953), pp. 69ff.
30. A. Diès, *Le cycle mystique* (Paris 1909).
31. E. Bignone, *Empédocle* (Turino 1916), pp. 11 and 12.
32. *Ibid.* p. 13. "Veduta così quale è la sua teoria, è difficile dire dove finisca il compito dello scienziato, e dove incominci quello del mistico".
33. *Ibid.* p. 14.
34. *Ibid.* pp. 284-285.
35. W.J. Verdenius, "Notes on the pre-Socratics", *Mnemosyne* 4th ser. 1 (1948), p. 11.
36. C.H. Kahn, "Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrine of the Soul", *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil.* 42 (1960), p. 15.
37. *Ibid.* p. 19.
38. *Ibid.* pp. 24 and 27.
39. H.S. Long, "The Unity of Empedocles' Thought", *AJP* 70 (1949), p. 144. Long

points out that it was actually Scaliger who suggested the categories "physical" and "religious".

40. N.I. Boussoulas, "La structure du mélange dans la pensée de Parménide", *Rev. d. metaph. et d. morale* 1 (1964), p. 4.

41. N.I. Boussoulas, "Essai sur la structure du mélange dans la pensée présocratique: Empédocle", *Rev. d. metaph. et d. morale* 2 (1958), p. 135. He notes the similarity between Empedocles 23 and Heraclitus 9.

42. *Ibid.* p. 138.

43. *Ibid.* pp. 140 and 142.

44. J.C. Lüth, *Die Struktur des Wirklichen im empedokleischen System 'Über die Natur'* (Meisenheim am Glan 1970), p. 157.

45. *Ibid.* "Bei der Betrachtung unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Logik zeigt sich eine weitgehende antithetische Struktur des Wirklichen, die in wenigen Fällen durch Zwischenglieder vermittelt und nur in einem Fall dialektisch aufgehoben wird".

46. *Ibid.* p. 165. "Dagegen sind folgende Strukturmomente des Wirklichen auch mittelbar begründet: Die ontologische Struktur der Lebewesen und die logische Struktur der Gegensätze..."

47. *Ibid.*

48. The *Καθαρμοί* consists of Diels fragments 112-153a; the *Περὶ Φύσεως*, 1-111.

49. See also the *ἁμαξιτός* of 133.3 which symbolizes the "road of persuasion into the mind" (*πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτός εἰς φρένα*). The same noetic usage may be found in Parmenides 1.21.

50. J. Burnet, *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito* (Oxford 1924), p. 31. "It seems to me certain that *εἶδος* was the original word for a geometrical figure, though it was almost certainly superseded by *σχῆμα* in later days".

51. One could also examine *ἀλλήλων* in the purview of the "ἄλλος vocabulary". Compare Empedocles 136.2, 17.34, 21.13, 22.6, 26.3, and Parmenides 8.56.

52. Empedocles must have placed great stock in the "circular solitude" of the *Σφαῖρος*. 27.4 is identical to 28.2.

53. The use of *πάντοθεν*, attested to in Parmenides, has been supplied in Empedocles by Schneidewin — cf. Diels, *Vor. Sokr.* II.325, apparatus to line 5. The interesting parallel to note is in Schneidewin's reconstruction of the line on Hesiod's *Th.* 126: *Γαῖα δέ τοι πρώτον μὲν ἐγένεατο ἴσον ἑωυτῇ* ("And first was there Earth equal to herself"). Again the conceptual parallels between Hesiod and the pre-Socratics are clear and firm.

54. Although the matter has been fraught with controversy, I am going to decide in favor of O'Brien when he argues "that the sphere was alone at rest and that at all other times the elements were moving", *op. cit.* p. 4. The cosmic "picture" in Empedocles is much more complicated in the sense that it consists, as I shall argue, of more precise symbolic levels *between* the world of Appearance and the world of Being or the One. Nonetheless, there can be little question in my own mind that the *Σφαῖρος* is the ultimate symbolic phenomenon that lies in polar opposition to the perceived world of Appearance.

55. Van Groningen, *op. cit.* p. 207.

56. Remember Heraclitus' *παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη* (51) and Parmenides' *παλίντροπος κέλευθος* (6.9). *Πάλιν* is a dyadic word creating identical oppositions in these pre-Socratics.

57. The manuscript provides a lacuna at line nine which is filled by supplying line eight of fragment 26. On first glance this seems to be reasonable enough since 26.9-12 are identical to 17.10-13 *with the exception* that 26.11, *ἧ δὲ τὰδ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει*, is not exactly like 17.12 but rather closer to 17.6, hence indicating that some serious manuscript difficulty might well be afoot. Yet another identity of lines strikes the attention: 17.7-8 equals 26.5-6 *with the exception* that 26.5 ends with *εἰς ἕνα κόσμον* and 17.7 with *εἰς ἕν ἅπαντα*. The plot thickens. We are

faced with yet another possibility for error. Yet, if one were to supply a line at 17.9, why supply 26.8 when we have 26.7, εἰσόκεν ἔν συμφύοντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται (“until growing together [into] One they may become the All [Whole] underneath”)? Now here’s a proper triadic third to complete 17.7-8 and one that points to the all-important underlying term – πᾶν. There is indication of a serious manuscript or scribal confusion between fragments 17 and 26, but to keep things in comprehensible thirds, I should suggest that after 17.8 there should appear 26.7 followed by 17.11-13. Omit the present doublet, 17.9-10. The last two triads would read something like this with the possibility still lingering in the wings that 26.11 might be repeated at 17.12 and 26.5 might be 17.7:

- ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἔν ἅπαντα, (17.7)
 ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νεῖκεος ἔχθει. (17.8)
 εἰσόκεν ἔν συμφύοντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται. (26.7)
 τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών. (17.11)
 ἧ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει, (17.12)
 ταύτη δ' αἰέν ἔασω ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον. (17.13)

O'Brien in his own reconstruction of this passage, *op. cit.* pp. 323-324, also suggests the inclusion of 26.7 after 17.8.

58. See previous footnote 57.

59. This view is in complete disagreement with not only Hegel's (cf. fn. 6 of this chapter) but also van Groningen's, *op. cit.* p. 209, who claims that while “il y a combinaison remarquable de deux procédés: l'enchaînement par similitude de contenu et l'entrelacement d'éléments divers”, it all goes to form an exterior unity that is more solid than an interior one. The obvious placement of the elements in the structure of things speaks strongly against such a naive view.

60. Kahn, *op. cit.* p. 24.

61. *Ibid.* p. 22.

62. Boussoulas, “Empédocle”, *op. cit.* p. 142.

63. *Ibid.* p. 138.

LANGUAGE, TIME, AND FORM

Language represents, on the one hand, the one sure entrée to the world, but it is also true, on the other, that for many there is no *one* "reality" that it must mirror. Any simple, straight-forward comparison between Aristotle and the "pre-Socratic" period verifies this statement, for the use of language and the ultimate derivation of "meaning" is, if not constantly in opposition, at least not compatible in any comprehensive sense. The progressive or directional relationships by which the former defines his world stand out in sharp contrast to the essentially symbolic and structural "premises" the earlier period observed at all levels of experience. The difference in "method", of course, is the most striking. Aristotle created his own and forced it upon language, elevating particularly sympathetic patterns to the level of "reality" and suppressing, or more often discounting, vast areas of experience as untenable. The pre-Socratics, on the other hand, came to language and its natural symbolic functions in a much more direct and comprehensive manner. Their *ὁδός* was alive and well in the broad perspectives of the language itself. It joined all orders. They needed no *μέθοδος* to derive the world.

Language for the archaic mind is not a tool for limited, precise communication so much as a total matrix of interrelated elements pointing towards a unified and holistic view of the world. At one and the same time, this matrix may be regarded *from our point of view* as two-dimensional and also obscure — if the truth be known, I daresay, Heraclitus would hardly be the only archaic a modern would prefer to label "der Dunkle". Empedocles for some of us may possess both superficial unity and deep spiritual truths. The inconsistency in this position lies not so much in some inability to read Greek as much as in a decided blindness vis-à-vis what the nature of the language must be: a matrix of powerful and connected symbolic utterance that develops directly both on an unconscious, and eventually conscious level, into a statement of the structured, universal nature of the *κόσμος*.

The symbol at its basic level is merely a word, but, of course, it is a word with extraordinary meaning. On the one hand, its affective power appears to us simple, almost pure, and certainly one dimensional. To speak of *αἰθήρ* is

to speak of "air", but it is to speak of "air" with a difference, for the symbolic force of the word not only emanates in a kind of concentric circle from it, it also forms an immediate linkage with other word-symbols of like power. It makes no difference if we examine "poetry" or "philosophy"; the matrix or linkage of basic symbolic phenomena arises with little aid from the reader. There is no especial need of such categories as the "poet" or "philosopher" to clarify the philological situation. On the other hand, then, besides to a seemingly one-dimensional, simple affective power, the symbol points away from its obvious state in the perceptual world and towards a hidden, noetic and cosmic unity of experience. In other words, the symbol is itself in the world of Appearance and also in the world of Being. It is, and it "is" not; it "is" not and it is. Actually, of course, it most assuredly *is*. Language itself, then, assumes a primary oppositional or symbolic function that operates as an intermediary between the strikingly obvious and perceptibly unaccountable. Hence a major, developed, and conscious symbol might be the Heraclitian *Logos* that explains the world from the way men talk to the central, regulating unity of a macrocosmic condition that is very difficult to see for the many. It could easily emerge as the Parmenidian Being with its powerful presence in the world of Δόξα and the world of Truth. Or it may take the form of the Empedoclian κύκλος or πᾶν, sending forth its "reality" from both the more-nearly physical world or realm of Δόξα to the deepest cosmic orders one can create. Symbolic formulation, like any phenomenon of language, is a communicative ordering of the world, but, unlike the strongly theoretical and confining postulates of the Aristotelian order, the symbolic order strives by its very nature to comprehend the totality of experience. It is no empty or irrelevant statement to argue that the ἥλιος for Heraclitus is the same ἥλιος for Mimnermus. Yet, no one would advance the argument that ἄνθρωπος for Aristotle is the same ἄνθρωπος for the creators of the Homeric Hymns. The communicative processes involved are totally at odds. The symbolic power of the archaic language is no longer potent by 375 B.C.

Now, while symbolic language tends to find expression in all orders of "reality", so also does it tend towards concrescence. It is, perhaps, in the natural identity of highly emotive and affective language that what we might term objectively separate phenomena become subjectively identical. Language as experience represents the unity of identical affectation. Language as information represents isolated, totally defined memory units. Archaic language is primarily the former. The symbols form a grid or matrix by which total experience may be explained. Because, moreover, of the vertical power of this emotive expression — that is, because of the constant return to the meaningful kernel of experience — there exists not only a natural merging of symbols within the matrix but also a "returning" or "bending" of language that produces a circular binding or bound on the matrix itself. Parmenides' and Empedocles' descriptions of Being or the Σφαῖρος are, for instance,

nothing more than archaic philological expression made conscious. There exists a constant identity between the word and the κόσμος. Both the symbol and its matrix are clear archaic phenomena.

This eternal philological grid, however, creates its own sense of time that is radically opposed to the progressive and linear concepts of Aristotle. It is a time of return rather than progression. Archaic logic does not move from a to b but from a to a or a to A through a series of symbols or words that appear both different and the same. The characteristic aetiological myth of the Greeks is but a variety of a general philological reality. The language may return to a kind of archetypal meaning — say from being to Being or from any positive experience in the realm of Appearance to its dominant place in the cosmic world or world of Truth. This movement is at the most a spiral possessed of a definite triadic or triangular structure. Archaic time is the time of the present. It is intimately related to what is and, in a kind of comprehensive sweep, brings the past into the present. The perfected past in the present is, after all, a peculiarity of the perfect tense in early Greek. So while from our point of view the Greeks might seem to be constantly facing the past, they are also experientially bringing the past to the totality of the present. I should suggest that it is precisely this ambivalence, opposition, and identity between what we might call past and present states, between Being and Becoming-Totally-Being as it were, that created the sense of cosmic Oneness on the one hand and the teleutic development into Oneness on the other. In other words, the distinction between the world of Δόξα and the world of *Logos*, Being, or the One is primarily a philological phenomenon rooted in the great realm of experience that archaic language by its very nature embraces.

In dealing with archaic logic, we are facing the psychic or experiential reality of the man expressing himself in the symbols of language. This is the case whether this man be a Homer, a Solon, a Pindar, or an Empedocles. There is never any of the present intellectual ramifications of “objectivity”. The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* with all of its implications of severe mind/body conflicts and dichotomies did not exist for the archaic Greeks. Philologically Parmenides’ statement that τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι does not mean the same thing at all. The powerful difference lies in the “Aristotelian *ergo*”. For Descartes a implies b. For Parmenides a is b. To “use the νόος” is “to be”. *The experience is the same* — especially philologically where the symbolic utterance must comprehend the totality of the experience. This experiential totality is, of course, exactly what Aristotle himself overlooked even at those times when he seemingly wished to address himself to man’s emotional response to language. Κάθαρσις and πάθος are weak and essentially empty categories next to the μέτρον of Homer, the πῦρ of Heraclitus, and even the τέλος of Herodotus. A study of archaic Greek authors is primarily a study of the philological ramifications of a spiritual

development within the artist-man aimed at a conscious self-definition — an articulate creation of the macrocosm in order to reveal fully and consciously the microcosm. This process or application of the archaic philological matrix to the self and the entire world is a creative phenomenon of the highest order and, as such, must comprehend the totality of the artist's experience, whether the artist be Homer or, for that matter, Plato. Hence, Heraclitus, the archaic logician, did indeed "search for himself".

None of our dichotomies are totally applicable to the archaic configuration of consciousness, although some may be partially so. There is no comprehensive category of "subjective-objective". "Concrete-abstract" is even further from being a useful tool. "Material-spiritual" leads to all kinds of conflicts in interpretation at which the archaic Greek would no doubt have scratched his head or shrugged his shoulders. The reason is, I think, that the unity of the creative artist — that is, in this case, the unbreakable identity he experienced and expressed between language, time as Being, and himself — did not differentiate itself, or, as some might prefer, had not differentiated itself at that point, into such interior-exterior or particular-general categories. It is the formal nature of the logic and thought that forbids it.

There can be little doubt that the archaic phenomena of language and time did display specific formal characteristics. If we could be more certain of what the Pythagorians, for instance, actually *said*, I am sure that the forms of language and time would be at our disposal clearly and unequivocally. Unfortunately this is not the case, and we are forced to trace or derive the philological and temporal forms from the *ipsissima verba* of artists who, while quite obviously working on particular formal principles, seldom declared what the forms actually were. The interesting exceptions are, say, the Σφαῖρος of Empedocles, the mandala fragment of Parmenides, the Ὀλκεανός of Homer or Stesichorus. Thus, as it was in the case of language and time, so it is with "form" — the powerful linking phenomenon always remains the symbol that shifts, because of its power, into formal structures of thought. Archaic language, time, and form appear before us full-blown, unborn, and undeniably of one "stuff". The matrix or grid that defines them partakes not at all of an historical development. It is simply "there", or to state it in Parmenides' or Empedocles' terms it simply *is*.

In my own mind, I do not doubt that this matrix may explain the creative results of other epic, lyric, and "pre-Socratic" artists. Nor can the writings of Plato himself be explained without reference to the transmutation of archaic symbols and structure into his own comprehensive patterns of thought. This is especially true in any consideration of the "difficult" dialogues of the middle and late periods. Yet, like any other critical tool in the hands of the moderns, archaic symbol and structure always will run the risk of itself being interpreted by some limited category of modern experience. Take, for instance, an obvious misinterpretation that could easily arise from what I have

stated previously. Aphrodite in the hymn bearing her name is most decidedly a “sexual” phenomenon. I made it quite clear that it was the sexual relationship between Anchises and her that created the form of the language in the poem and ultimately the poem itself. Is it, therefore, now time to bring to the fore Freud with all of his marvellous bourgeoisie problems out of fin-de-siècle Vienna? It sounds impossible, but there has been more than one impossibility raised to the rank of a critical premise. Clearly the “sexual” category is much too narrow a term. We have it. I daresay the Greeks did too, but there is every indication that it partook much less of “sexual” and much more of “mixing” than does ours. There lies a broad spiritual and cultural gulf between the modern “mixing” of two human beings and the archaic “mixing” of a man and a goddess. The created realms are essentially different, and the point is, of course, that from the archaic Greek activity sprang the symbols and structure of a particular poetic and philosophic *κόσμος*.

Similar modern misinterpretations seem to me to be always possible; yet, I also think that because of a modern shift away from previous linear thought patterns, away from the neat objectivity of the written page, and more into the emotive subjectivity of personal experience through the various representations of this experience that play themselves out in a much more vivid, intense, and comprehensive way before the eyes and ears — that because of this, the “archaic” patterns are more easily recognizable and more easily explained. In other words, if the power of the moon no longer lies primarily in the fact that it revolves about the earth from west to east in the time a bit less than a month, that its diameter is 2,160 miles, that its mass is about one eightieth and its volume one forty-ninth of earth, that it is about 238,857 miles away, and that these are miles we must for some reason cross in a line “simply to get there” — if these “objective” statistics are replaced in importance by the circular shape of the full moon that in its bright roundness reveals the “subjective” power of our own experience, then once again language and experience become more and more one and more and more a One. The archaic language of symbol and structure once again assumes a clear and primary position in the “annals” of culture.

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INDEX OF ANCIENT PASSAGES

Aeschylus

Septem. (387-390), 8.

Alcman

(1.52-63), 19; (10.1-2), 131.

Archilochus

(122.1-4), 18.

Aristotle

Meta. (341b2), Chap. 3. n. 41; (984a), 90; (986b), 91; (986b33-987a2), Chap. 4 n. 2; (987a), 90.

Mu. (392b3) and (400a30), Chap. 3 n. 41.

Ph. (218b9-10), 15; (218b13-14), 16; (218b29-219a1), 16; (219a12-13), 16; (219b1-2), 16; (219b9-10), 16.

Bacchylides

(13.151-153), 19; (17.25-26), Chap. 4 n. 44; (17.54), 19; (17.81), 13; (17.86-87), 13; (17.89), 102; (17.90-91), 13; (17.102-107), 13; (17.119-123), 13.

Bias

(10.6.1), Chap. 3 n. 52.

Cicero

De Fin. (II.5), 60.

De Nat. Deor. (I.26), 60; (III.14), 60.

Empedocles

(2), 122; (2.1), 127; (2.7-8), 142; (2.8), 128; (3.5-6), 129; (3.9-13), 143; (3.10), 126; (3.13), 126, 127; (4), 126; (4.3), 143; (5), 128; (6), 138; (8.1-2), 140; (8.3-4), 140; (8.3), 145; (8.4), 145; (9.1), 127; (9.1-3), 133; (9.4), 133; (11.2), 144; (12.2), 137; (12.3), 144; (13), 137, 142; (14), 137, 142; (15), 140; (15.1), 128; (15.1-4), 141; (16), 14, 48, 141; (17), 21, 126, 129, 130, 133, 142, 144, Chap. 5 n. 57; (17.1), 139; (17.3), 140; (17.6), 135, Chap. 5 n. 57; (17.7), 130, 135, 142; (17.7-8), 135, Chap. 5 n. 57; (17.8), 125, 130, 135; (17.9), 135, Chap. 5 n. 57; (17.10), 135; (17.10-13), Chap. 5 n. 57; (17.11), 135; (17.11-13), 142; (17.12), 135; (17.12-13), 132; (17.13), 14, 63, 131, 133, 135, 142; (17.14), 126, 135; (17.15), 126, 135, Chap. 2 n. 44; (17.16), 6, 126, 135, 139; (17.17), 142; (17.18), 136; (17.19), 125, 141; (17.19-20), 136; (17.20), 136, 141, 142; (17.21), 128, 136; (17.22), 129, 136; (17.23), 136; (17.24), 136; (17.25-26), 136; (17.26), 6, 126, 129, 136; (17.27), 136, 141; (17.28), 130; (17.29), 136; (17.30), 136; (17.31), 137; (17.32), 137; (17.33), 137; (17.34), 130, Chap. 5 n. 51; (17.34-35), 137; (17.35), 130; (19), 142; (20.1-5), 140; (20.2), 130, 142; (20.2-3), 140; (20.3), 127, 131; (20.4), 130; (20.5), 141; (21.1), 133; (21.3-5), 133; (21.4), 128; (21.4-5), 129; (21.8), 142; (21.9), 14, 133; (21.13), 140, Chap. 5 n. 51; (21.13-14), 144; (22.1-3), 139; (22.5), 144; (22.6), Chap. 5 n. 51; (22.7), 129; (22.9), 125; (23), Chap. 5 n. 41; (23.4), 126, 127, 128, 139; (23.5), 129, 145; (23.9), 128; (23.9-10), 145; (23.11), 126; (24), 126; (24.2), 126; (25),

139; (26.1), 63, 131; (26.2), 131; (26.2-3), 140; (26.3), Chap. 5 n. 51; (26.5), 6, 130, 142; (26.5-6), Chap. 5 n. 57; (26.6), 125, 130; (26.7), 6, Chap. 5 n. 57; (26.8), Chap. 5 n. 57; (26.9-12), Chap. 5 n. 57; (26.11), 142; (26.11-12), 131; (26.12), 142; (27.1), 127, 131; (27.3), 127; (27.3-4), 132, 139; (27.4), 132, 142, Chap. 5 n. 52; (28.1), 132, 142; (28.2), 132, 142, Chap. 5 n. 52; (29), 132; (29.3), 132, 142; (30), 14, 122; (30.1), 125; (30.2), 133; (31), 127, 131, 142; (32), 138; (35.1), 126; (35.2), 126; (35.3), 125; (35.3-9), 141; (35.4), 127, 142; (35.5), 145; (35.9), 125; (35.10), 63, 131, 142; (35.11), 141; (35.12-14), 145; (35.13), 129, 142; (35.15), 130; (36), 125, 141, 142; (37), 127; (38), 49; (38.3), 131; (38.4), 127, 131, 142; (39.1), 127; (39.3), 142; (40), 133; (42.1), 128; (43), 128, 131, 142; (45), 130, 131; (46), 131; (47), 14, 131, 142; (49), 133; (54), 127, 138; (58), 127, 131; (61.1-4), 140; (61.3-4), 127; (61.4), 127, 131; (62), 126, 133; (62.1), 126; (62.1-2), 133, 140; (62.3), 126; (62.4-6), 133; (62.5), 126; (62.5-6), 140; (62.8), 127, 131; (63), 131; (65), 140; (67), 140; (71), 126; (71.2), 97, 127; (71.3), 129; (73.1-2), 133; (73.3), 129; (75), 138; (76), 138; (77), 138; (78), 138; (79), 138; (80), 138; (81), 138; (82), 138; (84), 133; (84.2), 132; (84.7-8), 97, 132; (84.8), 132; (84.10-11), 132; (86), 138; (88), 139; (91), 145; (92), 145; (93), 145; (96.1-4), 139; (96.4), 127; (98), 139; (98.2), 127; (98.5), 129; (100), 17, 122; (100.24), 128; (103), 143; (105.3), 143; (106), 143; (107.1-2), 139; (109), 125, 141; (109.1-3), 138; (109.2), 127; (110.1), 143; (110.3), 143; (110.8), 133; (110.10), 143; (111.8), 128; (112.2), 139; (112.4), 129; (112.4-5), 129; (113), 144; (113.2), 129; (114), 125, 126; (114.1), 126; (114.3), 125, 126, 128; (115), 122, 125, 137, 141, 142; (115.1), 142; (115.2), 130; (115.3), 127, 131; (115.4), 125; (115.6), 137; (115.7), 129, 137; (115.8), 130; (115.9), 128; (115.10), 128; (115.10-11), 127; (115.11), 127; (115.12), 137; (115.14), 125; (116), 125; (121), 140; (122), 140; (122.1), 133; (122.2), 127; (123), 140; (124.1), 129; (125), 140; (125.1), 129; (128), 142; (128.10), 127, 131; (129.1), 144; (129.2), 144; (129.4), 144; (129.5), 144; (131), 126; (131.1), 129; (131.4), 126; (132.1), 144; (132.2), 144; (133.3), 128, Chap. 5 n. 49; (134.1), 126, 127, 131, 143; (134.4), 128; (134.4-5), 143; (135), 127; (135.1-2), 143; (135.2), 127, 128; (136.2), 128, Chap. 5 n. 51; (137.1), 130; (138), 128; (146), 145; (147), 145; (151), 142.

Heraclas Medicus

(22 B 101), Chap. 4 n. 48.

Heraclitus

(1), 64, 66, 126; (2), 64, 66, 72, 104, 107, 126, Chap. 3 n. 47; (3), 64, 72, 97, 104, Chap. 3 n. 33; (4), 68; (5), 70; (6), 64, 97; (7), 71; (8), 78, 127, 138; (9), 63, 68, Chap. 5 n. 41; (10), 76, 78, 92, 138; (11), 68; (12), 75, 77, 128; (13), 68, Chap. 3 n. 55; (14), 69, Chap. 3 n. 32; (15), 70, Chap. 3 n. 32; (16), 64, 68, 73; (17), 70, Chap. 3 n. 62; (18), 71; (19), 71; (20), 81; (21), 80, Chap. 3 n. 65; (22), 63, Chap. 3 n. 53, Chap. 4 n. 48; (23), 76; (24), Chap. 3 n. 57; (25), Chap. 3 n. 61; (26), 64, 80, Chap. 3 n. 67; (27), 70, 76; (28), 69; (29), 69; (30), 65, 74, Chap. 3 n. 43; (31), 66, 77, 80, 93, 126; (32), 67; (33), 67; (34), 71; (35), 71, 101; (36), 5, 7, 73, 79, 128; (37), 68; (39), 68; (40), 69; (41), 67; (42), 64, 74; (43), 72; (44), 67; (45), 66, 73, 126, 128, 132, Chap. 2 n. 44, Chap. 3 n. 33; (46), 71; (47), 71; (48), 78, Chap. 3 n. 74; (49), 69; (49a), 75; (50), 67, 126; (51), 78, 92, 127, 138, Chap. 5 n. 56; (52), 62, 81; (53), 64, 76; (54), 78, 127, 138, 139; (55), 58, 71; (56), 71; (57), 62, 69; (58), 76; (59), 63, 75; (60), 20, 63, 75; (61), 77; (62), 12, 75, 77, 129; (63), 77; (64), 65; (65), 75; (66), 65, 133; (67), 65, 75, Chap. 3 n. 49; (67a), 128; (68), 70; (69), 70, Chap. 3 n. 60; (70), 63, Chap. 3 n. 49; (71), 63, 70; (72), 67, 126; (73), 71, 74; (74), 81; (75), 73, 74, Chap. 3 n. 67; (76), 66, 81, 128; (77), 77, 128; (78), 60, 70, Chap. 3 n. 57; (79), 6, 62, 79; (80), 64; (81), 69; (82), 62, 79; (83), 62, 79, 133; (84), 75, Chap. 3 n. 68; (85), 73, 128; (86), 70; (87), 68, 126; (88), 67, 75, 78; (89), 74, Chap. 3 n. 67; (90), 65, Chap. 3 n. 53; (91), 75, 78; (92), 71; (93), 63, Chap. 3 n. 49; (94), 78,

Chap. 3 n. 66; (95), 70, Chap. 3 n. 62; (96), 69; (97), 68; (98), 73, 128; (99), 76; (100), 78; (101), 57, 69, 72, Chap. 4 n. 48; (101a), 75, Chap. 3 n. 43; (102), 76; (103), 63, 107, Chap. 2 n. 44, Chap. 3 n. 61; (104), 68, 69, 128; (105), 64, 74; (106), 64, 69; (107), 71, 73; (108), 67, 68, 126, Chap. 3 n. 35; (110), 70; (111), 77; (112), 72, 125; (113), 66, 72; (114), 66, 68, 72, 128; (115), 73, 126, 128; (116), 72; (117), 70, 73, 81, 128, Chap. 3 n. 70; (118), 73, 128; (119), Chap. 3 n. 57; (120), 64, 74, 128; (121), 68; (123), 67, 69, 72; (124), 74; (125), 77; (125a), 68; (126), 77, 91.

Herodotus

Hist. (3.87), 136; (4.2), 136.

Hesiod

Erga (3), 10; (18-19), 138; (19), Chap. 2 n. 25; (20), Chap. 2 n. 25; (24), Chap. 2 n. 25; (132), Chap. 3 n. 80; (216-217), 102; (287-292), Chap. 4 n. 51; (438), Chap. 3 n. 80; (565-566), 49; (615-617), 49; (619-620), 49; (648), 79, Chap. 3 n. 81; (694), 79.

Theogony (1-10), 34, Chap. 2 n. 13; (11-21), 34, 35, Chap. 2 n. 13; (16-17), 34; (17-18), 34; (19), 34; (19-20), Chap. 2 n. 14; (20), 34; (22), Chap. 2 n. 16; (22-35), Chap. 2 n. 13; (22-43), 35; (22-49), 35; (24), 95; (27), 96; (27-28), Chap. 2 n. 16; (28), 96; (36-43), Chap. 2 n. 13; (43), (43-46), 35; (44-52), Chap. 2 n. 13; (47), Chap. 2 n. 17; (47-49), 35; (50-52), 35; (53-65), Chap. 2 n. 13; (53-104), 35; (64-79), 35; (65-71), Chap. 2 n. 13; (71-79), Chap. 2 n. 13; (80-103), 35, Chap. 2 n. 13; (104), 35, Chap. 2 n. 13; (105-113), 35; (105-115), Chap. 2 n. 13; (106), 35; (106-107), 35; (108-110), 35; (114-115), 35; (116), 36; (116-117), 36; (116-122), 39; (117), 37; (118-119), 45, Chap. 2 n. 23; (119), 37, Chap. 2 n. 27; (120-122), 38; (123-124), 39; (126), 39, Chap. 5 n. 53; (126-127), 37; (127), 36; (132), 48; (133), 48; (134-210), 42; (138), 41; (155), 41; (158-159), 41; (197), Chap. 2 n. 17; (200), 38; (201), 38; (204), Chap. 2 n. 17; (206), 38; (207-210), 41; (220), Chap. 2 n. 7; (223), Chap. 2 n. 17; (224), 39, 141; (224-225), 40; (225), Chap. 2 n. 25; (226-232), Chap. 2 n. 25; (226-264), 41; (233-236), Chap. 2 n. 32; (242), Chap. 2 n. 46; (265-269), 41; (295), Chap. 2 n. 35; (296), Chap. 2 n. 17; (298-299), 41; (302), Chap. 2 n. 17; (337-370), 41; (372-373), Chap. 2 n. 17; (383-385), 42; (395-396), 42; (404-452), 42; (407), Chap. 2 n. 17; (411-412), 42; (444), 42; (452), 42; (453-506), 42; (472), 43; (479), 43; (507-616), 42; (588), Chap. 2 n. 17; (617-628), 43; (635-636), 43; (637), 43; (644), 43; (678-681), 43; (687), 43; (689-699), 65; (695), 48; (700), 43; (716-719), 44; (720), 45; (720-721), 37; (720-819), Chap. 2 n. 39; (722-725), 46; (724-725), Chap. 2 n. 43; (726-727), 47; (734-735), 44, Chap. 2 n. 40; (736-738), 47; (740-743), 47; (741), Chap. 2 n. 43; (744), 47, 48, 98; (746), 47; (746-747), 47, 98; (748), Chap. 2 n. 45; (748-750), 47; (748-751), 98; (749-750), 99; (751-754), 98; (752), 99; (752-754), 98; (753), 99, 100; (755-756), Chap. 2 n. 45; (758-766), Chap. 2 n. 27; (758-773), 44; (763), Chap. 2 n. 27; (764-765), Chap. 2 n. 27; (767), 47; (767-770), 48; (769), 47; (775), 47, 48; (775-777), 44; (776), 48; Chap. 2 n. 49; (776-777), 48; (815-819), 44; (886-929), 44; (900), 44; (919), 44; (922), 45; (924-929), 44; (927), 44; (928), 44; (929), Chap. 2 n. 41; (967-968), Chap. 2 n. 17; (1021-1022), Chap. 2 n. 41.

Frag. (205.2), Chap. 3 n. 80.

Homer

Hymns

(*Aphrodite*) (1-2), 30; (2-3), 32; (3), Chap. 2 n. 7; (12), Chap. 2 n. 7; (32), Chap. 2 n. 7; (35), 32, Chap. 2 n. 7; (39), Chap. 2 n. 7; (41), Chap. 2 n. 7; (46), Chap. 2 n. 7; (47), Chap. 2 n. 7; (48), Chap. 2 n. 7; (50), Chap. 2 n. 7; (50-52), 33; (51), Chap. 2 n. 7; (52), Chap. 2 n. 7 & 11; (55), Chap. 2 n. 7; (62), Chap. 2 n. 7; (63), Chap. 2 n. 7; (95), Chap. 2 n. 7; (96), Chap. 2 n. 7; (108), Chap. 2 n. 7; (109), Chap. 2

n. 7; (109-110), 32; (110), Chap. 2 n. 7; (122), Chap. 2 n. 7; (129), Chap. 2 n. 7; (141), 32; (142), 32, Chap. 2 n. 7; (145), Chap. 2 n. 7; (147), Chap. 2 n. 7; (149), Chap. 2 n. 7; (149-150), 32; (153), Chap. 2 n. 7; (162), 28; (167), Chap. 2 n. 7; (171), 28; (172), Chap. 2 n. 7; (175), 28, Chap. 2 n. 7; (185), Chap. 2 n. 7; (186), Chap. 2 n. 7; (188), Chap. 2 n. 7; (190), Chap. 2 n. 7; (192), Chap. 2 n. 7; (195), Chap. 2 n. 7; (199), Chap. 2 n. 7; (200), 33, Chap. 2 n. 7; (200-201), 33; (202), 30, 31; (203), Chap. 2 n. 7; (204), Chap. 2 n. 7; (205), 31, Chap. 2 n. 7; (206), Chap. 2 n. 3; (208), Chap. 2 n. 3; (211), Chap. 2 n. 7; (214), 31, Chap. 2 n. 7; (219), 31, Chap. 2 n. 7; (221), 31, Chap. 2 n. 7; (232), Chap. 2 n. 7; (239), Chap. 2 n. 7; (239-240), Chap. 2 n. 10; (240), 31, Chap. 2 n. 7; (245), Chap. 2 n. 7; (246), Chap. 2 n. 7; (247), Chap. 2 n. 7; (249-250), Chap. 2 n. 3; (250), Chap. 2 n. 7 & 11; (251), Chap. 2 n. 3; (253), Chap. 2 n. 7; (255), Chap. 2 n. 7; (257-272), 31; (259), 33, Chap. 2 n. 7; (260), Chap. 2 n. 7; (261), Chap. 2 n. 7; (268), Chap. 2 n. 7; (275), Chap. 2 n. 7; (281), Chap. 2 n. 7; (290), Chap. 2 n. 7; (292), Chap. 2 n. 7.

(*Delian Apollo*) (25), 30; (29), 30.

(*Demeter*) (11), Chap. 2 n. 8; (116), Chap. 3 n. 80; (221), Chap. 3 n. 80; (237), 29; (239), 28; (240-241), 28; (260), Chap. 2 n. 5; (260-261), 29; (275-280), 28.

(*Dionysus*) (34), 27; (35-41), 27; (38-39), 27; (44-46), 27; (47), 27.

(*Dioscuri*) (16), 28.

(*Hermes*) (9), Chap. 2 n. 8; (68), 49; (111), 28; (115-137), 28; (160-161), 29; (184-185), 49; (338-339), 29; (410-413), 28; (412), 28; (415), 28; (441-442), 30; (507-509), 28; (507-510), 28; (550), Chap. 2 n. 6; (576), 30.

(*Pan*) (32-33), 30.

(*Pythian Apollo*) (440-445), 65.

(*Iliad*) (1.544), 10; (11.225), Chap. 3 n. 76 & 80; (13.688), 65; (14.201, 246, 303), Chap. 2 n. 48; (18.399), Chap. 2 n. 49; (18.488), Chap. 2 n. 50; (18.488-489), 49; (23.85), 12.

(*Odyssey*) (3.179), Chap. 3 n. 81; (4.385), Chap. 3 n. 76; (4.389), 78, Chap. 3 n. 81; (4.662), 65; (4.668), Chap. 3 n. 76; (4.688), Chap. 3 n. 76 & 80; (5.234-235), 14; (5.248), Chap. 3 n. 75; (6.41), Chap. 1 n. 54; (9.390), 138; (10.496), 12; (10.539), 78, Chap. 3 n. 81; (11.317), Chap. 3 n. 80; (18.217), Chap. 3 n. 80; (18.323), Chap. 3 n. 36; (19.532), Chap. 3 n. 80.

Lysias

(32.17), 14.

Micias Epigrammaticus

(74.48), Chap. 3 n. 41.

Mimnermus

(6), Chap. 1 n. 79; (10), 64; (12.3-4), 49; (12.6), Chap. 1 n. 79.

Orphica

L (178), Chap. 3 n. 41.

Parmenides

(1.1), 95, 103; (1.2), 103, Chap. 4 n. 50; (1.3), Chap. 4 n. 6; (1.5), Chap. 4 n. 50; (1.6), 131; (1.6-7), 97; (1.7-8), 96; (1.8), 97; (1.8-10), 99; (1.9), 97, 98; (1.9-10), 97, 112; (1.9-21), Chap. 4 n. 43; (1.11), 96, 97, 98, 130, Chap. 4 n. 50; (1.13), 128; (1.14), 98, Chap. 4 n. 45; (1.14-22), Chap. 4 n. 45; (1.15), 126; (1.15-16), Chap. 4 n. 45; (1.17-18), 101; (1.17-19), 103; (1.21), 103, Chap. 4 n. 50, Chap. 5 n. 49; (1.22), Chap. 4 n. 45; (1.25), 101; (1.27), 103, Chap. 4 n. 45 & 50; (1.28-30), 96; (1.28-32), 102; (1.29), 96, 97, 110, 125; (1.30), 125, 127; (2), 106; (2.1), 126; (2.2), Chap. 4 n. 48 & 50; (2.4), Chap. 4 n. 50 & 57; (2.6), 126, Chap. 4 n. 50; (3), 107, 143; (4), 92, 107; (4.1), 107, 128; (4.2), 107; (4.3), 107; (4.3-4), Chap. 4 n. 14; (4.4), 107; (5), 63, 95, 107; (6), 20, 92, 108, Chap. 4 n. 15; (6.1), Chap. 4 n. 61; (6.1-2), 108; (6.2),

108; (6.3), Chap. 4 n. 6, 48 & 50; (6.3-5), 108; (6.4), 91; (6.5), 108; (6.6), 128; (6.7), 108; (6.8), 92; (6.8-9), 92, 108; (6.8-10), Chap. 4 n. 14; (6.9), 130, Chap. 4 n. 50, Chap. 5 n. 56; (7), 108; (7.1), 108; (7.2), 141, Chap. 4 n. 48; (7.2-3), Chap. 4 n. 50; (7.3), 108; (7.3-6), 109; (7.5), 126, Chap. 4 n. 61; (8), 92, 107, 109; (8.1), 126, Chap. 4 n. 50; (8.1-3), 109; (8.3), 104, 137; (8.3-4), 109; (8.5), 144; (8.5-6), 109; (8.6), Chap. 4 n. 48; (8.8-9), 109; (8.13-14), Chap. 4 n. 62; (8.13-15), 109; (8.15-16), 109; (8.16), 125; (8.16-18), 110; (8.17), 125; (8.18), Chap. 4 n. 50; (8.19), 137; (8.22), 110; (8.25), 110; (8.26), 110, 132, Chap. 2 n. 44; (8.27), 110; (8.28), 125; (8.30), 125; (8.30-31), 110, 137; (8.31), Chap. 2 n. 44; (8.34), 107; (8.35-35), 107; (8.36-37), 130; (8.37-38), 110; (8.38-39), 111; (8.39), 125; (8.40), 111, Chap. 4 n. 62; (8.41), 130; (8.42), Chap. 2 n. 44; (8.42-43), 110; (8.42-44), 132; (8.42-49), 107; (8.43), 6, 110; (8.43-44), 137; (8.44), 110, 141; (8.49), 110, Chap. 2 n. 44; (8.50), 126, 127; (8.50-51), 110, 125; (8.52), 110; (8.53-54), 99, 111; (8.53-63), 107; (8.54), 111; (8.55-56), 111; (8.56), 111, 128, Chap. 5 n. 51; (8.57-58), 111, Chap. 4 n. 14; (8.58-59), 111; (9), 107, 111, 112; (10), 97, 103, 104, 105; (10.1), 128; (10.1-2), 103; (10.2-3), 103; (10.4), 132; (10.6), 125; (10.6-7), 103, 106; (10.7), Chap. 2 n. 44; (11), 104, 105; (11.2), 128; (12), 7, 14, 20, 47, 95, 97, 99, 104, 105, 112, 113; (12.4), 105; (13), 104, 105; (14), 97, 99, 130; (15), 97, 99, 104, 112, 128; (16), 111, 112; (16.1-2), 128; (16.4), 128; (17), 104, 105, 111; (18), 104, 105, 111; (19), 111, Chap. 4 n. 64.

Pindar

Olympian (1.1), 65; (1.1-2), Chap. 3 n. 53; (3.4), 18; (6.22), Chap. 4 n. 52; (13.13), Chap. 3 n. 57; (13.66-78), 18.

Pythian (3.103), 20; (3.103-104), Chap. 4 n. 52.

Nemean (6.1-4), 101.

Plato

Cratylus (402a), 90; (440c), 90, 94.

Theaetetus (152e), 90; (176b), 29; (179e-181a), 90; (180e), 94; (181a), 94.

Timaeus (37d), 133.

Republic (434e-435c), 4; (616c), 7.

Sophist (258b), 90.

Symposium (203a), Chap. 2 n. 2.

Sappho

(65a), 8; (191), 19; (191.7-12), 19.

Simplicius

Phys. (157.25), 133.

Solon

(27.17-18), 78.

Stesichorus

(6), Chap. 1 n. 79; (6.1-3), 49.

Theognis

(141), Chap. 4 n. 6.

